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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
1.1 Topic and research questions 
Despite the predictions of the more optimistic proponents of modernism and 
despite real declines in the numbers of adherents in Western societies, 
religion remains a political flashpoint across the world, even in the 
apparently most secular societies. Whether it is questions relating to 
abortion or the publication of satirical cartoons mocking religious figures, 
religion retains the power to ignite fierce passions which can in extreme 
cases lead to unrest, violence, and even murder. Religion remains on a 
global scale the source of much of political behaviour and it is often reached 
for in times of crisis as a way of understanding the conflicts and 
circumstances that people find themselves in and as a way of attempting to 
resolve them. Sadly, the interventions of religion often tend to inflame 
political conflicts particularly when they take place across religious 
boundaries, as is the case in Northern Ireland and across the Middle East. 
In the latter case, we have seen as a response to Western hegemony and 
Israeli occupation over the years that religion has come to the forefront as a 
means of expressing outrage and fermenting dissent. All too often, its 
methods have been obscene and bloody and far from the message of peace 
and understanding that religion at its best presents. In the West itself, 
increasingly political elites have found themselves in the grip of religious 
extremists and messianic tendencies that have been the cause for alarm and 
have served to further entrench conflicts rather than to heal them.  
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Accordingly, students of political participation and civil society cannot afford 
to ignore religion as a source of explanation. The presence of examples of 
religion at its most explosive and obnoxious in the headlines should not 
however be taken as representative of the actions of all religious people. 
Instead we need a dispassionate account of how religious people behave in 
everyday life in forms of political and social behaviour that are not so 
immediately attention-grabbing. We need an account of religion that details 
how religion behaves on the day to day level, so we can understand the roots 
of religious conflict when it flares up. We need to understand under what 
contextual circumstances religion can have a strong bearing on societal 
organisation. Furthermore, from a scientific perspective, the dominant 
theories within the sociology of religion have tended to focus overwhelmingly 
on predicting and explaining religious vitality in terms of numbers of 
adherents and attendees. New research is needed that can show how the 
types of macro-level changes that these theories identify as having causal 
influence on religiosity, impact upon the social behaviour of the religious in 
wider society and beyond pulpit and pew.   
This thesis attempts to meet these goals by aiming to ascertain what it is 
about the country hosting the religious individual that either enables public 
participation or makes it less likely for them. Three areas of public life are 
explored. They are: (1) conventional political participation – defined by 
modes pertaining to the occupation and influencing of government; (2) civil 
society – thought of as that independent space between state and individual 
that seeks to express the interests of the latter in response to the former; 
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and (3) unconventional political participation – which seeks to influence 
government and affairs through ways external to the conventional route of 
politics that are defined by their tendency to more directly challenge 
authority. 
1.2 Theoretical departure 
It is theorised that religiosity, when thought of in something akin to a 
theoretical de-contextualised social vacuum, is linked to these three modes 
of public behaviour – positively in the cases of conventional political 
participation and civil society, and negatively in the case of unconventional 
political participation. It is argued that religiosity offers motivations, means, 
and opportunities for mobilisation that make participation in the first two 
cases more likely. However, religion is often thought of as socially 
conservative and authoritarian, which is expected to steer religious 
individuals away from unconventional political participation due to its 
authority-challenging nature.  
This thesis then draws on two schools of thought within the sociology of 
religion in order to place firmly these individual-level theories within the 
country context. They are secularisation theory and religious economies 
theory, which is also referred to as either the rational choice or the supply-
side approach. Secularisation theory links decline in religious attendance to 
modernisation. It is argued that the advent of modernisation makes religious 
beliefs more untenable whilst religion fails to find itself socially useful and 
thus falls into disrepair and confined to the private sphere. However, this 
theory has been challenged by Casanova (1994) who has argued that 
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religion can re-manifest itself within civil society in a response to 
secularisation as it loses its legitimacy within politics proper. 
Religious economies theory by contrast, sought to explain religious vitality 
by conceiving of religion as subject to social forces analogous to those of the 
market-place. This school contends that religions rise and fall depending on 
the amount of effort that the clergy puts in, in order to satisfy the religious 
needs of the people. Their efforts are conditioned by two factors that delimit 
the religious market place – namely the level of religious freedom allowed to 
the individual through the separation of religion and state, and the level of 
competition between different providers of religion. Where the clergy’s 
income is more suspect to doubt due to the lack of religious state support 
and the availability of competitors who can provide an alternative service, so 
it is expected that they will work harder and be more successful in filling the 
houses of worship. Where they are assured their income and have no 
competitors, it is thought according to this school, that they will become 
lazy, their product will suffer and declines in religious adherents will follow. 
The individual-level theories linking religiosity to the three modes of public 
participation are contextualised using these theories. It is expected that 
religiosity will become less pronounced in its effect on conventional political 
participation due to effects associated with secularisation when 
modernisation is at its greatest. Conversely, it is predicted that religiosity 
will increase its effect on civil society participation as religion re-orientates 
itself to the modern secularised world. Thirdly, it is predicted that 
secularisation will occur where modernisation is greatest and thus religion 
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will lose that which makes it distinct more and more so that it increasingly 
loses its innate deference to authority. This would manifest itself in a 
lessening of its negative effect on unconventional political participation. 
The contextualisation of the individual-level theory of religiosity linking it to 
conventional political participation and civil society using religious 
economies theory, stems from the supposition that under conditions of 
greater separation of religion and state, the clergy will work harder and 
become more familiar with the tenets of their religion and this will transfer 
on down to the faithful. It is expected that concurrently will come greater 
religious assertiveness and enthusiasm that should cause religious people to 
participate more in both conventional political participation and civil society, 
where conditions of separation of religion and state are greatest. However, 
with this greater self-assurance of religion would come a greater familiarity 
with itself and this is expected to be manifested in an increasingly negative 
effect of religiosity on unconventional participation. As religion becomes 
more assured of itself, so its predispositions become more activated and this 
includes its innate authoritarianism that renders unconventional political 
participation suspect. 
1.3 The thesis 
The empirical results in themselves provide only passing evidence in support 
of these theories. This is not seen as disappointing but exciting as it offers 
the chance for new perspectives and theoretical insight beyond the obvious 
and dogmatic. On the secularisation side, it is found that modernisation 
nearly always has an effect on religiosity’s impact on conventional political 
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participation, civil society participation, and unconventional political 
participation. However, given that effects are often not in the expected 
manner, some theoretical revisions to secularisation theory have to be 
offered. It is argued that under conditions of greater modernisation, 
religiosity is not privatised in the sense that it leads individuals away from 
conventional political participation. Since this is not happening, it cannot be 
said to be ‘deprivatising’ by re-manifesting itself within civil society, even 
though its effect is more pronounced under modern conditions.  
Instead it is argued that religiosity is associated with increasing 
organisational behaviour in conventional political participation and civil 
society under conditions of greater modernisation because modernisation 
itself makes organisational life more difficult due to a lack of alternative 
motivating secular ideologies and the stresses that modern life places on the 
individual. Religiosity becomes more advantageous to making these forms of 
behaviour possible by providing the ideological motivation that can sustain 
participation despite the increased costs. Regarding unconventional 
participation, it is found that religiosity becomes less hostile to 
unconventional political participation under conditions of greater 
modernisation but only with regard to those modes of behaviour that are 
potentially the least challenging and threatening to authority. Where the 
challenge is greatest and the most direct, this secularising effect of 
modernisation is not enough to overcome religion’s aversion to 
unconventional politics. It is argued that secularisation theory needs to be 
revised so as to incorporate the irony that when religion is potentially at its 
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most powerful in terms of its mobilising capacity, it is also at its weakest 
since it lacks the numbers to have real influence.  
Regarding religious economies theory, no energising effects of greater 
separation of religion and state are found with one or two exceptions. The 
fact that they are exceptional is taken as informative in itself and it is 
argued that as there is no consistency, we cannot reasonably expect the 
kind of mechanisms derived from the religious economies school to be 
functioning. Instead, it is supposed that greater participation in some but 
not all types of civil society organisation can be explained with reference to 
the types of organisation themselves and how they relate to the separation of 
religion and state. It is argued that religious people participate more in 
religious, cultural, and educational type organisations when separation of 
religion and state is at its highest, as they are frozen out of the state by legal 
restrictions. Thus, they have a greater incentive to participate in civil 
society. When the functions that these organisations carry out are 
undertaken by the state and in way compatible with religious teachings, 
then there is less need for religious people to provide these themselves in 
civil society. Additionally, a positive effect of separation of religion and state 
on religiosity was found pertaining to boycotting. It is argued that in secular 
society religiosity has much more to boycott, hence this result. Effects were 
not observed in the other indicators of unconventional political participation 
because petitions and protests are senseless in a highly secularised state as 
the constitution forbids enactment of religious laws. Even though the 
religious would want to engage in such activity, they do not and under such 
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circumstances religious people will resort to boycotting as they do have 
control over their own consumption and can maybe exert influence through 
its pointed application. Effects were not evidenced concerning conventional 
political participation. This is put down to the fact that at either end of the 
spectrum of separation of religion and state, there are upward pressures on 
religiosity’s relationship to conventional politics that serve to cancel each 
other out. In conditions of full establishment, religious people participate 
because they are for something; under conditions of full separation, they 
participate because they have something to be against. It is thus suggested, 
that the most promising direction for further study would be to explore 
effects of separation of religion and state shorn of religious economies 
theory. 
1.4 Overview of chapters 
In Chapter 2, these hypotheses are given their fullest explanation along with 
the concepts they utilise. A review of the relevant literature is also 
presented. In Chapter 3, we concern ourselves with data, measurements, 
and their validity. An introduction is offered to the World Values Survey 
which forms the bases for our empirical exploration. Additional data sources 
at the macro-level are also introduced. Measurement instruments are 
introduced, discussed, and assessed for validity, using empirical methods of 
validation. With Chapter 4, our empirical analyses begin with the study of 
conventional political participation and religiosity. Chapter 5 concerns itself 
with the exploration of religiosity and civil society whilst Chapter 6 explores 
unconventional political participation. All of these three empirical chapters 
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make extensive usage of multilevel modelling. Finally, Chapter 7 concludes 
the investigation and argument by bringing all the findings together in an 
attempt to synthesise them into a coherent body whilst making revisions to 
the two theoretical approaches proposed in Chapter 2. 
This doctoral thesis was written as a member of the GK SOCLIFE research 
training group at the Cologne Graduate School of Management, Economics, 
and Social Science (University of Cologne), to whom I am grateful for their 
support and financial backing. Its focus is on comparative research and how 
individual outcomes are influenced by macro-level trends, and this thesis 
thus stands in line with a much broader research agenda. Needless to say, 
all mistakes found within are mine alone. 
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Chapter 2 - Constructing and contextualising a theory of 
religiosity and participation in public life 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter religiosity is linked to public participation and then this 
individual level theory is contextualised by identifying what exactly it might 
be about the country hosting the individual that makes different the effect of 
their religiosity on their behaviour from that of another individual in another 
country. The theoretical argument begins by outlaying religiosity as 
something that is a property of individuals that one could reasonably expect 
to aid participation in conventional political action and civil society. This is 
done through an extension of the theory of political participation, associated 
with Verba and his colleagues. Regarding unconventional political 
participation, it is predicted that due to religion’s often conservative and 
authoritarian nature, religiosity ought to steer individuals away from 
unconventional political participation due to its authority-challenging 
nature. These individuals theories assume context does not matter. 
Once these individual links are established between religiosity and public 
participation, they are then situated in the country context, using 
secularisation theory and religious economies theory. Secularisation is 
understood as the reduction of the social significance of religion brought 
about by the onset of modernisation resulting in religious decline and 
religious privatisation. Thus, modernisation is predicted to reduce the 
strength of the effect of religiosity on participation in mainstream politics. 
However, drawing on an influential work by Casanova (1994), it is also 
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argued that the result of religion drawing away from conventional politics is 
that it re-manifests itself in civil society so that modernisation is predicted 
to increase the link between religiosity and civil society participation. With 
unconventional political participation, it is argued that the effect of 
modernisation will be to bring about secularisation that makes religions less 
conservative so that the link between religiosity and the avoidance of 
participation in unconventional elite-challenging forms of participation is 
reduced almost up to the point of non-existence.  
The alternative to using secularisation theory to contextualise our theory is 
to use a different strain of theory from the sociology of religion, namely 
religious economies theory. This theory predicts that religious competition 
and religious freedom, as seen as stemming from the separation of religion 
and state, delimit the religious opportunity structure and condition the 
religiosity of the country through a direct effect on the clergy who become 
more active in encouraging religious attendance under these conditions. It is 
argued that under religious free-market conditions, religiosity will become 
more vital and more assertive of itself and this will translate itself into 
greater positive effects on conventional political participation and civil 
society participation. With regard to unconventional political participation, it 
is expected that with greater quality of services provided by clergy due to 
market-forces unleashed by separation of religion and state will come a 
greater familiarity with the tenets of religion so that the authoritarian streak 
within it becomes more pronounced. Thus, it is expected that with greater 
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separation of religion and state will arise a more negative effect of religiosity 
on unconventional political participation. 
The theoretical argument begins by looking at individual links between 
religiosity and participation along with a summary of the relevant literature. 
Then the theories of secularisation and religious economies are introduced, 
along with a review of the empirical evidence and some criticisms. Finally, 
hypotheses are proposed that form the basis of the subsequent empirical 
chapters. But before any of this is possible, it is first essential to define our 
key terms and delineate the spaces between them. 
2.2 Conceptualising religiosity 
The concept of ‘religiosity’ is in common usage in the social sciences even 
outside of the niche that is the sociology of religion, where it will consistently 
appear if only as a control variable. Nevertheless, it often escapes explicit 
definition. Scholars will freely band the term about and are very interested 
in what it is that is expressive of religiosity without explicitly stating what it 
actually is. A definition is wanting and much has to be inferred back from 
the dimensions and indicators that are utilised by social scientists when it 
comes to measurement. Definitions of ‘religion’ by contrast are ten-a-penny 
in sociology. This thesis follows Bruce (2002b) in defining religion: 
“I follow common usage in defining religion substantively as beliefs, actions and institutions 
predicated on the existence of entities with powers of agency (that is, gods) or impersonal 
powers or processes possessed of moral purpose (the Hindu notion of karma, for example), 
which can set the conditions of, or intervene in, human affairs.” Bruce 2002b:p2) 
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What is now missing is an understanding of what ‘religiosity’ is. A definition 
is hard to find within the literature – its definition is often taken for granted. 
Indeed, one paper (Mokhlis, 2009) that sets out to define the concept ends 
up by giving definition after definition of religion without addressing the 
question of whether or not there is a distinction between religion and 
religiosity.  
The approach used in this thesis, builds on the distinction made by Georg 
Simmel, for whom a fundamental conceptual distinction in sociology was 
that between form and content. ‘Form’ referred to a set of social 
arrangements existing between human beings that were expressive of 
certain ‘content’ which was the desires and impulses of these individuals 
which caused forms to come about (Simmel, 1950; Furseth & Repstad, 
2006). It was the task of sociology, according to Simmel, to outlay the 
various forms through which content was manifested, independently from 
that very content. Thus, for Simmel, the term ‘religion’ was a form and 
‘religiosity’ was the content that expressed itself within (Furseth & Repstad, 
2006). Religiosity was thus thought of as “a state or a spiritual rhythm 
lacking any object” (Simmel 1997, p165 / cited in Furseth & Repstad, 2006). 
Religiosity is thus to be understood as a drive towards religious ideals that 
manifests itself in the social relationships that religion provides. 
Building on this approach, religiosity is considered to be something that is 
possessed by individuals which can vary in the same way as a continuous 
variable does. Religions themselves are seen as being rather like categorical 
variables – which one either belongs to or not, which are either in existence 
 
 
~ 24 ~ 
 
or not. Religiosity is thus understood to be the varying degree of commitment 
held by individuals to the belief systems and institutions of the religions – that 
is independent of the actual religion in question.  
What about spirituality? Is it conceptually distinct from religiosity? 
Zinnbauer et al. (1999) attempt to clarify the two terms before resolving 
what they see as something of a false opposition within the literature1. For 
Zinnbauer et al., the social science cannon has generally turned up the 
following generalised definitions: 
“… religiousness was predominantly associated with formal/organisational religion, and 
spirituality was more often associated with closeness with God and feelings of 
interconnectedness with the world and living things.” (1999, p896) 
The argument of Zinnbauer et al. is that traditionally, social science has 
tended to consider religiousness as encompassing spirituality with the two 
concepts having not been seen as diametrically opposed. More recent 
approaches however, have sought to locate these two concepts as polar 
opposites, with religiousness denoting that done within monolithic and 
lugubrious religious institutions, whilst spirituality comes to be seen as 
something youthful and dynamic that is practiced independently and 
reflective of a personal development or quest. Religiousness is the 
institution, spirituality is the individual’s own unique voyage of personal 
discovery. This though is an error as it overlooks both the institutional 
environment that surrounds spirituality and also the personal voyage that 
occurs within the old religious traditions. Empirically, people will also tend 
                                       
1 Zinnbauer et al. speak of ‘religiousness’ and not religiosity. For our purposes, they are 
treated here as inter-changeable. 
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to identify themselves as both religious and spiritual and so it is both a 
theoretical and factual error to hold the two separate. Instead, we need an 
approach that can successfully merge the two: 
“As such, spirituality is the heart and soul of religion, and religion’s most central function. 
Spirituality has to do with the paths people take in their efforts to find, conserve, and 
transform the sacred in their lives. Whereas religion encompasses the search for many 
sacred or non-sacred objects of significance, spirituality focuses specifically and directly on 
the search for the sacred. As with religion, spirituality can take individual and institutional, 
traditional and non-traditional, and helpful and harmful forms.” (Zinnbauer et al., 
1999:p909). 
This extract is showing how these two concepts can be synthesised. 
Spirituality is to be seen as part of religiosity – the development of the 
individual that spirituality implies is also central to religiosity. What unites 
them for Zinnbauer et al. is that they both contain aspects pertaining to the 
orientation of the individual towards the sacred. In the sense that they are 
different, it is that spirituality does not attempt to order the world along 
religious lines (Zinnbauer et al. 1999). Thus, this thesis treats spirituality as 
part of religiosity. 
2.3 Conceptualising public behaviour – conventional, unconventional 
political participation & civil society 
The explicandum of this study is termed loosely ‘public participation’ which 
is seen as an umbrella concept covering all sorts of social behaviour that is 
carried out in places where the discourse is not conceived of as something 
akin to a private conversation and/or there is a felt influence on wider-
society itself. Anyone can join in and effects can be felt by everyone. Three 
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modes of public participation are identified of interest for this study, 
namely: conventional political participation, unconventional participation, 
and participation within civil society. These are not conceived of as 
exhaustive of what could be classified as public participation. Other forms 
might be a public lecture or a religious sermon. It is simply the case that 
this dissertation focuses on only three aspects of a much wider social 
phenomenon, because they have the greatest consequences for our social 
order and life-chances. 
2.3.1 Conventional vs. unconventional political participation 
Political participation has been defined by Verba & Nie (1972) as: 
“…those activities that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of 
governmental personnel and/or the actions they take” (Verba & Nie, 1972:p2) 
For Verba & Nie, political participation is behaviour aimed at affecting 
influence over and upon government both in terms of personnel, law-
making, and policy. It is not just confined to voting or running for office but 
extends to include such behaviours as membership of political parties and 
the contacting of officials. For Verba & Nie, political participation has to be 
something meaningful that is not merely performative or symbolic. It has to 
be expressive of a meaningful conversation between governed and governor. 
They exclude psychological orientations relating to perceived political 
efficacy, for instance, but stress that these may have explanatory roles to 
play. Their definition of political participation relates only to government. It 
is not intended to include participation in other spheres that may have a 
democratic element, such as schools. They stress that their interest is in 
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acts of participation that are within the rules of the system, meaning 
behaviours that are “generally recognised as legal and legitimate” (Verba & 
Nie, 1972:p3). This is not to say that extra-legal modes of participation are 
not of academic interest or necessarily wrong. Rather, it is to restrict the 
scope of their investigation. The problem is that they are ignoring different 
forms of political participation that are equally of substantive interest since 
their definition is too restrictive. 
An important distinction that is often made within the study of political 
participation is that between conventional and unconventional participation. 
Such a distinction can be found in the work of Barnes & Kaase (1979) who 
treated conventional political participation as behaviour revolving around 
the process of elections and reflective of traditional institutional processes, 
whilst the unconventional forms of participation were considered to occur 
externally and are construed of as radical, innovative, and 
deinstitutionalised.  These dimensions whilst conceptually distinct tended 
however to carry some considerable correlations between them, such that 
we can consider both to be different means towards a common end, with 
individuals using both or either routes of participation depending upon 
circumstances or the likelihood of carrying successful influence. 
There have been many other attempts made at classifying forms of political 
participation made within political science. However most have at their heart 
the distinction between the conventional and the unconventional (Grasso, 
2010), give or take some ‘gymnastics of meaning’. One alternative to the 
conventional/unconventional distinction is offered by Inglehart (1977) who 
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saw that the distinction lay between elite-directed activities and elite-
directing activities. Later, the latter category was renamed ‘elite-challenging’ 
(Inglehart & Catterberg, 2002). The former is reflected in such activities as 
voting, membership of a political party, party canvassing, or trade union 
activity. The latter includes new social movement activities, demonstrations, 
boycotts, petitions, occupations, and unlawful strikes. Given the indicators 
offered by Inglehart are more or less the same as those used by Barnes & 
Kaase and their associates, we can use the terms conventional and 
unconventional without too much concern. 
2.3.2 Civil society 
Civil society is often political in nature but nevertheless remains distinct 
from the conventional mode of political participation, although as we shall 
see, it shares some overlap with the unconventional mode. The idea of civil 
society has long animated the imaginations of social and political theorists 
with empirical social scientists coming to the game relatively late. Attention 
to civil society was further heightened in the wake of the dissolution of the 
old communist order in Eastern Europe. In more recent times, civil society 
has been witnessed at its most powerful, persuasive and challenging to 
authority, in the Arab Spring, whilst in the United Kingdom, the concept is 
traduced here and there as a stop-gap to plug the holes left by radical and 
drastic cuts in government spending - this being the so-called ‘big society’ of 
David Cameron. 
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The term ‘civil society’ is widely in usage but its definition is often taken for 
granted and as self-explanatory, even though as we shall see, it is quite an 
intricate concept. Anheier (2004) provides us with a definition: 
“...most analysts would probably agree with the statement that civil society is the sum of 
institutions, organisations and individuals located between the family, the state and the 
market in which people associate voluntarily to advance common interests.” (Anheier, 
2004:p20) 
According to Calhoun (2011), civil society has taken on various shades of 
meaning across the course of academic history. Fundamentally though, it is 
referring to: 
“… society distinct from the state, organized ideally as a realm of liberty, with freedom of 
religion, association, business activity, conversation and the press. The promise of civil 
society was that social life could be self-organising, even in complex, large-scale societies, 
and that it could thereby be more free than if left to government officials or to technical 
experts.” (Calhoun, 2011:p2) 
For Diamond (1994), civil society is a section of society distinct from the 
state. This idea is key to the understanding of this concept and is found 
elsewhere (e.g. Anheier, 2004; Ekiert & Kublik, 2000; Taylor, 1990). Civil 
society is a sphere for individuals organised into associations that are bound 
by legal or social rules that govern conduct within it. Diamond writes: 
“It is distinct from ‘society’ in general in that it involves citizens acting collectively in a 
public sphere to express their interests, passions, and ideas, exchange information, achieve 
mutual goals, make demands on the state, and hold state officials accountable. Civil society 
is an intermediary entity, standing between the private sphere and the state.” (Diamond, 
1994:pp5-6) 
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For Diamond, civil society is about citizens co-operating to achieve their 
desires as an intermediary between individual and state. The relationship is 
one whereby individuals act together in order to ensure the state is 
compliant with their wishes. Thus, so much of civil society participation is 
conducted within voluntary associations. Civil society both makes demands 
upon and attempts to be regulative of the state. This means that civil society 
does not include voluntary associations that are designed to fulfil needs and 
desires described as “inward looking” (Diamond, 1994:p5), namely 
recreation, entertainment or spirituality. Nor does it include individual or 
family associations. Diamond’s conceptualisation of civil society is distinctly 
political without being political in the sense that it is enmeshed within the 
executive, legislative, or judicative branches of government. Civil society is in 
dialogue, competition, and even sometimes conflict with the state, but 
without ever seeking to occupy it. Accordingly, political parties as voluntary 
associations would be excluded here.  
Diamond stresses civil society organisations must be civil in the sense that 
they eschew violence. Civil society is not limited to democracies. It can exist 
outside in a “tentative or battered form” (Diamond, 1994:p6). However, once 
this space is opened up, it becomes possible for those opposed to the values 
of civil society to participate within and to operate in manner destructive of 
it (Ekiert & Kublik, 2000; Calhoun, 2011). It may exist outside of democracy 
and indeed did so under the state-socialism of the former Soviet bloc 
according to Ekiert & Kublik, (2000). Civil society organisations there tended 
to be severely hampered in their capacity to operate. Ekiert & Kublik 
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identified three distinct types of civil society organisation that operated 
under state socialist regimes: (1) pseudo-autonomous – such as most trade 
unions; (2) semi-autonomous - some churches and religious organisations; 
and (3) illegally autonomous – dissident groups. The term has also been 
applied in research undertaken in colonial-era Africa. Bratton (1989) has 
written that civil society was an important source of solidarity and 
resistance to imperial rule, both through traditional sources of organisation 
but also encompassing more modern forms of association, such as labour 
unions and professional associations. Such associations pressed the case 
for greater rights and ultimately independence. Much like in Soviet-era 
Eastern Europe, they could be either suppressed or co-opted by the state. 
Action varied in shape and size across African countries with “the Christian 
churches in Kenya and Burundi; Islamic brotherhoods in Senegal and 
Sudan; lawyers’ and journalists’ associations in Ghana and Nigeria; farmers’ 
organisations in Zimbabwe and Kenya; and the mineworker’s unions in 
Zambia and South Africa…” (Bratton, 1989:p412) evidencing that civil 
society action appears as often as not to be conducted along religious lines.  
Thus, we can conceive of civil society as a universal phenomenon that is 
occurring even outside of democratic circles although its movement and 
development may very well be restricted there. Along these lines, Sivan 
(1990) has argued that Islamic civil society organisations have provided an 
example of alternatives to corrupt post-colonial states but simultaneously 
are possessive of values anathema to those of civil society. 
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2.3.3 Conceptual distinctions and conceptual overlap 
Three areas of public participation have been conceptually demarcated – 
conventional political participation, unconventional political participation, 
and civil society. However, these three modes of behaviour should not be 
regarded as empirically non-concurrent in individual behaviour and 
preferences, since political actors often choose the appropriate method 
depending on situation and circumstance. Thus, we could expect that at 
times political parties will delve into unconventional political behaviour 
particularly during times of crisis and upheaval, or when their participation 
in the conventional stream is restricted, or they do not have enough support 
within parliament or amongst the electorate (as is common with far-left 
parties in Britain). 
Similarly, unconventional specialists may enter the political mainstream and 
combine conventional and unconventional means in order to maximise their 
effect. Civil society is always heavily engaged with the conventional mode of 
political participation, although by definition it abstains directly from 
participation in parliament and elections as these contest the occupation of 
the state. Civil society organisations are also often at the heart of political 
demonstrations and things like petitions and boycotts. 
It should be clear then that these three concepts can achieve empirical 
overlap. The inter-relationships between them are laid out in the Venn 
diagram displayed in Figure 1. Conventional political participation may at 
times overlap with unconventional political participation which can overlap 
with civil society, but civil society always must remain distinct from the 
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conventional route of politics even though they are locked into at times a 
mutually-antagonistic relationship. 
Figure 1: Three modes of public participation – distinctness and overlap 
 
2.4 Related work to the study of religion and political participation 
Much work has been devoted to making the link between religion and 
politics explicit. Norris & Inglehart (2004) have argued that there has been 
decline in voting for religious political parties over time although religiosity 
remains an excellent predictor of right-wing voting choice – greater in fact 
than indicators of socio-economic status with 70% of the most religious 
voting for the right. Religiosity showed an inconsistent relationship to 
measures of political participation and interest. Religious attendance was 
associated negatively and significantly with political discussion and interest 
and less participation in more direct and confrontational modes of 
participation (unconventional participation). However, belonging to a 
religious voluntary association was linked to greater “confidence in major 
political institutions, voting participation, support for democracy, social 
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tolerance and trust, political interest and propensity to sign petitions, or 
participation in consumer boycotts” (Norris & Inglehart, 2004:p192).  Thus, 
it seems the wider social political impact of religiosity is made apparent 
through religious voluntary association membership which by nature, tends 
to get more stuck-in in the running and problems of society than religious 
attendance alone. The findings of Norris & Inglehart can be subject to doubt 
since they do not account for the nested structure of their data in their 
modelling. 
Religiosity has been identified as a source of social capital and thus an 
enabling resource for political participation. Campbell (2004) has argued 
that Evangelical Christians only come into politics when their core beliefs 
are perceived as threatened and that the tight social bonds between them 
can bring about rapid mobilisation. Putnam (2000) has argued that church 
goers are more likely to vote and participate politically whilst Peterson 
(1992) has linked church attendance to the fostering of civic skills that 
enable democratic practice, and greater political conservatism. McClerking 
& Daniel (2005) have argued that church attendance boosts political 
participation by increasing the political resources of individuals in a manner 
comparable to party membership and fosters social relationships which 
create bonds of obligation that deter political free-riding. Crucial to their 
analysis is the ‘flavour’ of the church in question – churches wherein politics 
is seen as a more pressing concern produce more participants than 
otherwise. Patterson (2005) has argued that Protestantism is associated with 
greater democratic practice due to its tradition of ‘bottom-up’ organisation 
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whereby church members have a greater say over church organisation, 
which transfers into democratic political practice. However this would be 
only a sufficient relationship as data from Brazil showed no Protestant 
advantage over Catholics in both conventional and unconventional forms of 
participation whilst data from Chile confirmed an advantage but only within 
the unconventional mode (Patterson 2005). Secret et al. (1990) also found a 
link between religiosity and increased participation in America, amongst 
both blacks and whites. Robnett & Bany (2011) found that amongst black 
Americans, church involvement and a highly politicised church community, 
result in a gender gap in participation in favour of men. Miller & Wattenberg 
(1984) have found that increased religiosity is linked to greater conservative 
voting preferences, increases voter turnout and political campaigning, but 
does not affect other forms of participation. Middendorp (1989) argues that 
political factions can be classified on two axes – left-right and libertarian-
authoritarian – with the votes along both lines being predicted by greater 
religiosity. Religiosity has also been linked to greater voter turnout by 
Macaluso & Wanat (1979), Gerber et al. (2008), and by Norris (2002). 
Religion remains a significant electoral cleavage although in the United 
States it is a constantly evolving one. For instance, Brooks & Manza (2004) 
found Evangelical Protestants and Catholics, relative to other 
denominations; had shifted towards the Republican Party. Jews tend 
towards the Democrat Party. Mainline Protestants are centrists, black 
Protestants right of centre, whilst Catholics are left of centre. These findings 
are closely supported by Hoffman & Miller (1997) who showed Protestants of 
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both liberal and conservative colours were the most conservative whilst Jews 
were the most liberal. Indeed, the American religious cleavage has been 
argued to be shifting from one based on denominations to one based on the 
level of religious orthodoxy and commitment and that the effect of religiosity 
on presidential choice has become more influential (Layman, 1997). In 
Europe, religious people are more likely to opt for Christian democratic 
parties and Catholics more likely to opt for the centre-right in elections (Van 
der Brug et al., 2009). Outside of the developed world, little research is 
immediately forthcoming. One study did find increasing levels of Christian 
political involvement in Ghana (Yirenkyi, 2000). 
Religion is also seen as a powerful influence on political attitudes and the 
values they stem from. Religiosity has been tied to conservative political 
positions (Froese & Bader, 2008). Across 8 western nations, religious 
affiliates were found by Hayes (1995) to be more disapproving of abortion 
and female employment, whilst having more trust in institutions and 
favouring more religious involvement in politics. Religiosity was found to 
predict economic and cultural conservatism, along with racism and 
nationalism in Flanders (Duriez et al., 2002). In America, foreign policy 
attitudes were found to vary across denominations, with Catholics being 
relatively dovish whilst Evangelical beliefs were associated with more 
hawkish stances in some cases (Jelen, 1994). Wilcox found that church 
attendance interacted with denomination so that fundamentalists who 
attended frequently were more hawkish across a range of political subjects. 
In Arab and Islamic societies, the importance of religion can be overstated, 
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with Tessler (2003) arguing that political and economic factors are of greater 
importance. Tessler & Nachtwey (1998) found that support for political Islam 
was associated with hawkish stances regarding conflict resolution and aside 
from this, personal religiosity was unrelated. Religious fundamentalism has 
been linked to authoritarianism and prejudice towards minority groups 
whilst religiosity that sees itself as a quest of personal development does not 
(Hunsberger et al., 1999; Hunsberger et al., 2005; Altemeyer et al., 2009). 
Schwartz & Huismans (1995) found religiosity was correlated with values of 
tradition, conformity, and security, and inversely related to values 
pertaining to hedonism, stimulation, and self-direction. Roccas & Schwartz 
(1997) found religiosity to be correlated with values of tradition, conformity, 
and benevolence with these relations being conditioned by the level of 
separation of religion and state, although analysis was restricted to a limited 
number of countries. The theoretical framework of Schwartz concerning the 
study of values has been highly influential. In a meta-analysis of studies 
incorporating this outlook, Saroglou et al. (2004) found that overall, 
religious people tended to favour societal conservation at the expense of 
change. 
Of course religiosity is not the only factor in explaining political 
participation. In fact, as source of explanation, it is somewhat marginal 
within the literature. Political participation has been strongly tied to socio-
economic status (SES) (Mishler, 1979; Verba et al., 1978; Verba & Nye, 
1972; Parry et al., 1992). The SES model works as an excellent predictor of 
participation in the study of conventional political participation. Participants 
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tend to be from higher class backgrounds and be better educated; however 
the SES model does not supply an explanatory mechanism (Brady et al. 
1995). A resources based explanation was thus put forward by Brady et al. 
(1995) whereby it was argued that individuals need resources in order to 
participate, in the form of time, money, and social connectivity. This serves 
to connect SES to political participation as higher statuses come with 
greater resources. Social capital, being a resource in itself, is frequently a 
source of explanation whereby individuals with greater connectivity and 
social trust are more likely to participate (Goerres, 2009; La Due Lake & 
Huckfeldt, 1998). Social capital is seen as fostering participation by 
connecting people to opportunities to participate and by shaping the values 
of individuals leading to personal identification with a political cause (Passy 
& Giugni, 2001). Social capital has also been associated with increasing the 
information relating to opportunities to participate that are channelled 
through both formal and informal participation (McClurg, 2003). Trust has 
also been linked to unconventional participation – Kasse (2007) found lower 
trust in conventional politics and higher interpersonal trust was related to 
greater participation in this mode. 
Another side of the discourse concerns explanations for changes in patterns 
of political participation. One school looks at an emerging democratic crisis 
whereby advanced societies are suffering a decline in civic behaviour 
necessary for sustaining democracy (Putnam, 2000). It has been noted that 
party membership is in decline (Wattenberg, 1996) and that publics are 
more distrusting of government (Nye et al. 1997). However, the counter 
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argument is that losses can be offset elsewhere by new forms of 
participation. Barnes et al. (1979) argued that conventional participation 
would decline in advanced modern societies whilst unconventional 
participation would increase. Similarly, Inglehart (1977) has argued that 
what he calls elite-directed forms of participation are set to decline in 
advanced democracies whilst elite-challenging or elite-directing forms are set 
to rise with changes in individual values being seen as having especial 
explanatory power. Modern societies are said to produce individuals less 
concerned with material wellbeing and thus people come to exhibit post-
materialist values which lend themselves towards elite-challenging protest 
politics. Inglehart & Catterberg (2002) did indeed find increased levels of 
unconventional political participation in the most developed societies, whilst 
in the new democracies such behaviour had diminished with this put down 
to dissatisfaction with the way democracy had developed there. Norris (2002) 
found that falls in turnout have been registered in only 10 of the post-
industrialised societies and stability in the rest of the West excepting a few 
instances of increasing turnout. Elsewhere, in developing societies in Latin 
America and Asia, rises have been evidenced. Party membership has been 
found by Norris to be a thing of less-developed societies with media 
penetration been seen as having crucial explanatory import, whilst protest 
politics is on the rise.   
In summary, studies that focus on religion and political participation look at 
religiosity either as something determining choices and attitudes or as 
something that enables participation. What is missing is an appropriate 
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consideration of social context by allowing for variation across countries that 
can be explained by macro-level variables. Existing studies mostly fail to 
locate themselves within the dominant theoretical currents of the sociology 
of religion. Additionally, religiosity and its link to unconventional political 
participation are under-researched. This thesis serves to address these 
shortcomings. 
2.5 Related work to the study of religion and civil society participation 
Much attention has been aimed at the relationship between religiosity and 
civil society participation and each approach has its own unique flavour. 
Ruiter & De Graaf (2006) found participation increased with church 
membership and attendance. They also found religious volunteering had a 
spill over effect whereby participants in religious civil society were also more 
likely to participate in secular civil society. Ruiter & De Graaf found an 
interesting interaction, whereby voluntarism rises with levels of national 
devoutness, but also that national devoutness interacts with church 
attendance at the individual level and reduces its effect. Norris & Inglehart 
(2004) found that religiosity is empirically linked to participation in religious 
based voluntary associations which are also more evidenced under modern 
conditions of human and political development. In wider civil society, greater 
political development was significantly associated but human development 
had only a positive but insignificant bearing. Religiosity was found to be 
positively associated with higher levels of membership with Protestants 
having the greatest number. Religious attendance was found to be linked 
more to organisations that offered more welfare-orientated services such as 
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services for the elderly and infirm and youth organisations, than political or 
leisure based groups – the only organisation that did not show a positive 
relationship with religiosity was trade union membership.  These results are 
interpreted by Norris & Inglehart as confirming social capital theory’s 
stipulation that “social networks and personal communications derived from 
regular churchgoing play an important role, not just in prompting activism 
within religious-related organisations, but also in strengthening community 
associations” (Norris & Ingelhart, 2004: pp189-90). The concept of social 
capital is also used by Greely (1997) in order to link religious attendance to 
volunteering in both secular and non-secular concerns. 
Webb & Abzug (2008) also found church attendance to be positively related 
to civil society participation. Caputo (2008) found civil society participation 
was related to both intrinsic religiosity and church attendance. Interestingly, 
socialisation was found to have an effect with greater parental religiosity and 
parental voluntary activity being related. Fundamentalism also had an 
impact. Perks and Haan (2011) also explored the effect of religious 
socialisation and concluded that in Canada, youth involvement in religious 
organisation is positively related to community participation in adulthood, 
although levels of religious youth involvement were in decline. Early life 
involvement is seen as being sufficient to develop a civically minded 
character.  
Taniguchi (2010) found that in Japan, religiosity is significantly and 
positively related to volunteering. However, as Bryant et al. (2003) would 
argue, perhaps the link between religious attendance and participation is 
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because they are more likely to be asked as they are seen as more desirable, 
reliable and trustworthy. Bryant et al.’s thesis is that it is not so much 
about the person who volunteers but rather the likelihood of them being 
asked to volunteer. They argue that those who appear to conform more to 
conventional standards of morality and decency are more likely to be asked 
than those who do not. This is because they represent something that is 
perceived as good and therefore are considered trustworthy with less risk 
attached to them.  
The activities of religious organisations have come to scholarly attention too. 
Chaves & Wineburg (2009) found that increased funding made available to 
American faith-based organisations by the Bush II administration did not 
increase their involvement in civil society related work. Rather, the taking of 
government money was done by those religious organisations that had been 
active prior to governmental intervention. For Chaves & Tsitsos (2001), at 
least in the United States, religious organisations are part of a welfare 
system that includes also the state and secular organisations. Additionally, 
Littlefield (2009) found that African-American religious organisations were 
more likely to provide economic, social and legal services on a voluntary 
basis than white religious organisations.   
Some scholars have asked if the various components of religiosity might be 
interacting with each other. Cnaan et al. (1993) found no relationship 
between volunteering and intrinsic religiosity. Rather, it was more to do with 
high levels of personal religiosity when placed within religious social 
networks. These findings are interesting but the statistical methodology 
 
 
~ 43 ~ 
 
employed is far from sophisticated. These scholars are drawing inferences in 
some instances, from bivariate t-tests alone.  Similarly, Becker & Dhingra 
(2001) found no differences between liberal and conservative religious types 
in the likelihood of volunteering nor were they more likely to volunteer in 
religious organisations as opposed to secular ones. They concluded that it is 
not a matter of religious commitment but rather the extent to which one is 
integrated into a religiously based church network. One volunteers if one is 
asked to and many respondents in qualitative interviews told how they were 
recruited through personal church based contacts. Volunteering is a social 
network effect.  However, their research is not entirely convincing as 
strength of religious commitment is measured through a single dummy 
variable which does not capture the richness of religiosity. Also, their 
sample is of New Yorkers only.  
Lam (2002) has also asserted the importance of different aspects of 
religiosity, including the effects of fundamentalism, when investigating civil 
society participation. Lam found all faiths, except Judaism, increased the 
chances of participation and that fundamentalists were more likely to 
participate than liberals. Lam (2006) later concluded that there was a 
“double negative Catholic effect” whereby individuals living in Catholic 
countries were less likely to volunteer but that also Catholics were less likely 
to volunteer independently of which country they were living in. Also, the 
number of Protestants living in the country had a positive significant effect, 
indicating that any Protestant advantage is not so much down to a dead 
cultural footprint but equally something conditional on a living Protestant 
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culture. These findings of Lam were in no way conditional on the level of 
secularisation of the country, as measured by aggregate levels of believing 
and belonging. Halman & Luijkx (2006) asked if religiosity regardless of 
denomination mattered at the macro level. They argued that religion would 
leave a cultural footprint of altruism that leads to voluntary associations. 
They concluded there was only an effect on institutional trust and not 
voluntarism. Meulemann (2008) argues the ‘bottom-up’ structural 
organisation of Protestantism is conducive to autonomous free associations. 
Indeed, Curtis et al. (1992) saw that all of their top six countries, in terms of 
size of civil society, were predominantly Protestant, although large numbers 
of Catholics living within these countries poses problems for such a thesis. 
However, later analyses by Curtis et al. found some evidence for greater civil 
society activity in countries with Protestant and mixed-Christian countries 
than Catholic countries (Curtis et al., 2001).   
Religious economies theory (see below for explanation) was applied to 
voluntary association participation by Borgonovi (2008). Although no 
supporting evidence was found relating such market-type mechanisms to 
church attendance, a positive relationship between pluralism and 
participation in religious organisations was present.  This is not, according 
to Borgonovi, at the expense of secular civil society which remains buoyant 
despite this increase in religious activity associated with religious 
organisations. Also, being part of a religious minority had no effect on 
volunteering. At the macro-level, a greater number of religious adherents are 
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associated with a greater likelihood of volunteering in religious 
organisations, but not in secular ones, she argues.  
Religiosity is of course not the only source of explanation. Wilson & Musick 
(1997) argue that volunteering in formal organisations (civil society) was 
related to human capital, number of children within the household, and 
informal social interaction, as well as religiosity. Perhaps the most 
consistent result is that of the relationship between education and civil 
society (Wollebæk & Strømsnes 2008, Webb & Abzug 2008, Ruiter & De 
Graaf 2006, Meulemann 2008). Occupational status also matters. Webb & 
Anzug (2008) found professional, managerial, and military occupations 
being more likely to participate than other professions.  Generally speaking, 
it is the winners who tend to participate (Bryant et al. 2003). Meulemann 
(2008) reports higher earners having greater propensity to get involved. 
However, Taniguichi (2010) reports that it is the marginalised who volunteer 
although this may only apply in Japan where less value is placed upon 
associational involvement. Age has also been shown to be relevant and tends 
to follow a curvilinear pattern (Taniguichi, 2010; Ruiter & De Graaf, 2006). 
Effects of age and education are not entirely consistent however with 
Halman & Luijkx (2006) reporting no relationship. Webb & Anzug found 
more children increased participation. Marital status was linked by 
Taniguichi (2010) and Bryant et al. (2003), whilst employment has been 
linked by Taniguichi (2010). Webb & Anzug (2008) found men participated 
more whilst Bryant et al. (2003) and Halman & Luijkx (2006) found it was 
women doing more.  
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Civil society varies in size from country to country. For instance, it was 
widely believed that the United States was the associational country par 
excellence. However, Curtis et al. (1992) showed that America’s associational 
behaviour is indeed greatest although this is largely due to the volume of 
American religious associations. When these are excluded from the analysis, 
there was no statistically significant difference between America and 
thirteen of the other countries included in the analysis. Other countries in 
the analysis of Curtis et al. with large civil societies were Australia, Northern 
Ireland, Canada, Sweden and the Netherlands. Countries with less 
developed civil societies were France and Japan. Economic development is 
one variable that has been empirically linked to civil society participation. 
Empirically, there is a relationship between civil society and economic 
development, as unearthed by Meulemann (2008) and Curtis et al. (2001). 
However, Ruiter & De Graaf (2008) found no such relationship between 
economic development and civil society. Also, Curtis et al. (1992) remind us 
that just because there is a general statistical trend, it does not mean that 
something is true in every country. For instance, voluntary associations 
tend to be more numerous in countries with greater levels of 
industrialisation and urbanisation, but not in Japan, France, and West 
Germany, all of which are highly industrialised and urbanised.  
Another related area, is the organisation of the state. Curtis et al. (2001) 
argue that liberal democratic and social-democratic regimes will have more 
developed civil societies than traditional corporatist regimes. Some empirical 
evidence was found to support this position but models were deemed 
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suspect by Curtis et al. due to problems relating to multicollinearity. 
Meulemann (2008) tested the same hypothesis and found type of political 
regime showed some effects, with social democracies seemingly having more 
active civil societies, although liberal regimes showed some traces of effects 
too. Schofer & Fourcade-Gourinchas (2001) concluded that statism reduces 
involvement in associations, especially new social movements. 
Corporateness was found to encourage involvement, especially in old social 
movements. Legacies of communism have also been investigated. Wollebæk 
& Strømsnes (2008) report lower levels of social capital in countries such as 
Russia and Romania as measured by trust and voluntary associations. On 
the contrary though, Curtis et al. (2001) found some evidence for an actual 
discrepancy in favour of the Eastern bloc, although this disappears when 
removing unions from the dependent variable. Halman (2003) concluded 
that civil society participation is positively related to both the level of 
democratic entrenchment and the age of the democratic system. The link 
was further evidenced by the findings of Parboteeah et al. (2004), Curtis et 
al. (2001), and Meulemann (2008). However, this finding is questioned by 
Ruiter & De Graaf (2006) who found that volunteering within civil society 
was actually negatively linked with democratic level. They did find that 
democracy was related to greater likelihood of holding a membership of a 
voluntary association as opposed to doing actual unpaid work for them, 
pointing to potentially a civic lethargy in more democratic countries, 
whereby people are happy to join but contribute their actual time and 
labour less and less. 
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Like political participation, the effects of religiosity tend to be positive on 
civil society participation, with some exceptions. Additionally, effects at the 
country-level are better developed both theoretically and empirically. 
However, cross-level interactions are usually left unexplored. 
2.6 An individual-level theory of religiosity and participation 
This section begins with discussing religiosity’s link at the individual level to 
conventional political participation and civil society participation. 
Subsequently, the discussion moves on to unconventional political 
participation, which due to its authority-challenging nature which stands in 
contrast to the conservative and authoritarian nature of religion, demands a 
separate theoretical outlook. The following section is something of a thought 
experiment whereby the reader is asked to imagine religiosity in a de-
contextualised social vacuum. This is sufficient to establish that religiosity 
should have an effect on different forms of public behaviour, were context 
not to matter. The resulting theories will be contextualised later on since 
nothing is free of social context. 
Why do individuals participate in politics? This was the question posed by 
Verba and his associates in a number of seminal works in the canon of 
political science (e.g. Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1978). In a more 
recent paper (Brady et al., 1995), the answer was put succinctly – people 
participate because they want to, because they can, and because the 
opportunity was presented to them. In short, participation results when 
individuals have some combination of: (1) the motivation to do so, (2) the 
means needed, and (3) the possibility of being mobilised. It can be argued 
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that religiosity can provide individuals with each of these three enablers. 
The links between religiosity and conventional political participation and 
civil society are first outlaid. Then a different explanation is put forward for 
unconventional political participation. 
MOTIVATIONS: Religiosity may provide motivations to participate since 
religious doctrines are moral doctrines that are often at odds with the 
prevailing tendencies of contemporary political and social life. Also, religions 
offer a supernatural incentive structure whereby compliance with religion’s 
moral imperatives is met with heavenly rewards whilst non-compliance is 
rewarded by infernal punishment (Silberman et al., 2005). Thus, a religious 
believer will be in possession of the realisation that something is wrong, that 
there is a divinely authored solution and that they will be rewarded or 
sanctioned depending upon their actions.  
According to Sherkat & Ellison (1999) the literature contends that religion 
may be beneficial to political participation due to motivations stemming from 
their ideologies. Religions may: 
“...(a) provide a groundwork for the framing of movement issues, (b) enhance the resonance 
of movement positions, (c) generate social legitimacy to enhance mobilisation and stave off 
repression, and (d) lend narratives to social movements that help provide a rationale for 
action and a foundation for collective identities and group solidarity” (Sherkat & Ellison, 
1999:p370). 
 As much might equally be applied to segments of civil society, namely those 
concerned with welfare, social justice, and more immediate economic issues. 
Similarly, Ziebertz (2011) argues that: 
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“Religions potentially represent an answer to the societal quest for common goals and 
shared values. Religions can arouse spiritual commitment and charity, motivating 
individuals to play an active part in civil society.” (Ziebertz, 2011:pp11-12) 
The possibility of religion arousing altruistic passions is also raised by 
Silberman et al. (2005). Furthermore, religion may promote participation as 
a form of civic duty (Macaluso & Wanat, 1979). Religion is thus an 
ideological source of motivation for action in both conventional politics and 
civil society. 
MEANS: Religiosity may provide the means to participate by providing the 
transferable social and organisational skills that can be accrued through 
participation in religious services (Peterson, 1992; Secret et al., 1990; Norris 
& Inglehart, 2004). Indeed, it has been demonstrated that civic skill acts are 
frequently performed during participation in religious services (Brady et al., 
1995). Religious people will have an advantage over non-religious people in 
that they have already developed the skills needed to participate and thus 
will be better equipped to thrive within conventional politics and civil society 
and less likely to drop out.  
Churches and the like, also constitute a resource in themselves as they 
provide meeting spaces, leadership within the community, fundraising 
capacities, and perhaps most importantly the perception of legitimacy within 
the community (Williams, 2002).  
MOBILISATION: Religious attendance will bring people into greater contact 
with the wider community allowing greater possibility of recruitment 
(Wilcox, 1987). It has been argued that religious institutions provide popular 
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recruiting grounds for political movements (Norris, 2002). In an influential 
work in the development of social capital theory, Granovetter (1974) argued 
that getting a job was more likely to happen for those with a greater number 
of so-called ‘weak ties’ to individuals in their social network, as individuals 
with more of these were more likely to be exposed to greater awareness of 
job opportunities. We might apply the same idea to link religiosity and 
political participation - religious people will accrue more weak ties when 
they are actively attending religious services, meaning they have greater 
likelihood of being recruited and greater knowledge of opportunities for 
recruitment.  
Social capital derived from church attendance has been used by Greely 
(1997) as an explanation for connecting individuals to further opportunities 
for volunteering. Norris & Inglehart (2004) used a pretty similar 
argumentation for justifying a link between religiosity and civil society. 
Social capital theory, they state, links religiosity through religious 
attendance to participation in faith-based organisations and community 
groups. They argue this is brought about through the provision of meeting 
places that provide fertile soil for informal social networks to be formed and 
also through the provision of welfare services. Similar theoretical grounds 
were used by Ruiter & De Graaf (2006) to link religiosity to civil society 
participation. 
The theoretical link between religion and these modes of participation is 
further fleshed out by Williams (2002), for whom religion compliments social 
movements as they require organisation, a movement culture based on a 
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guiding ideology plus the social sophistication necessary to navigate 
successfully through political life. Religion supplies not only the ideology but 
also the organisational basis. Religious services within churches are 
ritualised affairs and ritual is thought, Williams argues, to increase feelings 
of solidarity and emotional connections which can instil a collective identity 
as people will come to emphasise with each other thus making political 
participation more likely as the problems that can motivate the individual 
are multiplied as the individual comes to identify more with others. 
Religiosity has also been linked theoretically to voting turnout. Macaluso & 
Wanat (1979) contend that voting is seen as a civic duty and that religiosity 
promotes this for two reasons:  
“(1) religion promotes “order, ritual, duty, legitimacy and respectability” which are thought 
to encourage the idea of fulfilling the obligations of citizenship, and (2) the sense of civic 
duty is reinforced through religious service attendance whereby the individual is more in 
contact with others who place great emphasis thereon.” (Macaluso & Wanat, 1979:pp160-1) 
Religious people are thus not only spurred on by their faith but also by their 
fellow faithful who will sanction them socially if they do not meet their civic 
obligations. 
Also, if we take religious people as responsive to the direction of religious 
elites, then another way of looking at religion and politics can emerge. Gill 
(2001) has written that religious authorities may attempt to harness the 
coercive power of the state since they have none themselves. He argues 
religious leaders may take advantage of their standing in the community to 
challenge governments in order to preserve what authority and credibility 
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they have. Thus, religious leaders have a vested interest in public 
participation and therefore we could legitimately expect them to be likely to 
mobilise their flocks for participation, so that the religious would have an 
advantage over the non-religious and thus be more likely to participate, so 
Gill’s argument runs. Religious attendance can also influence participation 
directly through politically based sermons (Secret et al., 1990). 
The discussion so far has focused on conventional political participation and 
civil society participation and it has been established that we can speak of 
religiosity as having a ‘public ‘drive’. Whilst it is true that the same 
arguments applied to conventional politics and civil society could also be 
applied to unconventional political participation, it is argued that these 
theoretical arguments in this case do not hold. This is because religiosity 
tends to be politically conservative in nature (Middendorp, 1989; Duriez et 
al., 2002) and to be supportive of authoritarianism (Hunsberger et al., 1999; 
Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2009; Hunsberger 
2009). Religiosity is also linked to conservatism, tradition and conformity 
(Schwartz & Huismans, 1995; Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Cukur et al., 
2004). Given that religiosity is linked to authoritarianism and religiosity’s 
respect for tradition and conformity, it is hard to justify a theory that would 
predict that religiosity encourages individuals to participate in political 
action that is characterised by its challenge to those in positions of authority 
and its relative novelty (when compared with the conventional path that is). 
Thus, with regard to unconventional political participation, it would be 
better to expect the converse – that given its conservative and conforming 
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nature and the empirical link between religiosity and authoritarian outlooks, 
religiosity would be negatively linked. Whilst one can argue that although 
religiosity provides motivations, means, and opportunities for mobilisation, 
nevertheless, it is expected that the conservative nature of religiosity would 
override such a facilitating public drive in relation to unconventional 
political participation and guide them down the conventional path of 
participation where the challenge to authority is not so direct. Conventional 
participation by contrast would be appealing to religious people because it 
allows them to have their political say whilst causing minimal disruption to 
the authorities that their religion conditions them into respecting. 
Remember that Norris & Inglehart (2004) found strong negative 
relationships between religiosity and authority challenging modes of 
participation. So in addition to its ‘public drive’, religiosity also has an 
‘authoritarian drive’ which serves to dampen participation that threatens 
authority. 
This section has argued that conventional political participation and civil 
society participation will be more likely for the religious, but that 
unconventional political participation will be less likely. These theories are 
considered as ‘acontextual’ – that is to say that under artificial conditions 
whereby the societal context does not matter, these relationships would 
hold. Now the discussion turns to how one contextualises these theories. 
Two macro-level theories of religion are subsequently presented, along with 
the related empirical evidence and some criticisms. They are secularisation 
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theory and religious economies theory. Thereafter, they are synthesised with 
the theoretical ideas outlined immediately above. 
2.7 Defining and conceptualising secularisation 
Secularisation theory is the dominant paradigm in the sociology of religion, 
although not everyone agrees as to its definition, character, or even its 
empirical veracity. The theory is an old theory and has its roots in the work 
of Durkheim and Weber. Sometimes the definition of secularisation is 
presented simply as a decline in numbers of adherents or participants in 
religious ceremonies (e.g. Norris & Inglehart, 2004). However, according to 
Wilson (1982) the correct sociological definition of the term is more subtle: 
“... by the term secularisation, I mean that process by which religious institutions, actions, 
and consciousness, lose their social significance”  (p149) 
We are not to understand secularisation as a process the end of which is the 
condition of perfect atheism amongst the people who make up the society. 
Instead, we are to imagine a society where atheism may exist but it does not 
have to in order to be consistent with the idea of a secularised society. 
Paramount is that the society would be one where religion would have no 
role in the ordering of society, its governance, or in influencing the ways that 
individuals conduct themselves in their interactions with others. In short, 
religiosity may still exist in a society that has undergone perfect 
secularisation but if it did, it would be expected to be a private affair, 
according to Wilson. This definition has gained currency in social science. 
Bruce’s (2002b) formal definition of secularisation is roughly the same as 
Wilson’s only more systematic: 
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“In brief, I see secularisation as a social condition manifest in (a) the declining importance 
of religion for the operation of non-religious roles and institutions such as those of the state 
and the economy; (b) a decline in the social standing of religious roles and institutions; and 
(c) a decline in the extent to which people engage in religious practices, display beliefs of a 
religious kind, and conduct other aspects of their lives in a manner informed by such 
beliefs.” (p3) 
Drawing on the work of Casanova (1994), we can think of secularisation as 
having three key attributes that can be observed empirically. They are (1) 
separation of religion and state, (2) decline in religious belief and 
attendance, and (3) the privatisation of religion. Separation of religion and 
state, also known as laicism, is best summarised by quoting the First 
Amendment of the United States constitution: 
“Congress shall make no law [1] respecting an establishment of religion, or [2] prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof…” (The Constitution of the United States, Amendment 1) 
There are two attributes of the concept that is spelt out in the above 
illustrious extract. Firstly, there is the so-called establishment clause [1] 
that stipulates that the American legislature shall not pass laws which 
found themselves on religious precepts or establish an official state religion, 
as there is for example in the England where Anglicanism is the state 
religion. Secondly, there is the so-called free exercise clause [2] which grants 
individuals their right to choose and practice their religion (or even no 
religion) free from the interference of government and without fear of 
sanction. This legal application of the concept of separation of religion and 
state has been used in the social sciences as the basic definition for use in 
academic studies concerned with its measurement (e.g. Fox 2006). 
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The second indicator identified by Casanova is decline in levels of belief and 
attendance. These are self-explanatory. However, there is some conceptual 
conflict here between Casanova and Wilson. Remember, for Wilson 
secularisation means lack of social significance or religion, and it followed 
that religiosity could still exist in a secularised society. Yet for Casanova, 
declining faith is tantamount to a necessary indicator. Decline however, is 
not the same as non-existence. So a society that has experienced decline but 
still possessed some pockets of religiosity would be consistent with both 
theorists. Any remaining mismatch between can be cleared up by Bruce 
(2002b) - individual religiosity was for Wilson, not necessary for 
secularisation to be true but Bruce expands on this by expecting diminished 
levels of religiosity where religion has lost its social significance as 
something highly probable if not quite necessary. Thus, individual religiosity 
is seen as valid indicator of secularisation.  
Casanova (1994) identifies the privatisation of religion as his third indicator 
of secularisation. Privatisation is not to be understood here as the term is 
normally used in political and economic discourse – namely, the divesting of 
the state of its apparatuses and their transfer over to private ownership. 
Rather, Casanova is using the term to mean the condition of secularisation 
whereby religion is confined to the private sphere and is not welcome in 
public discourse or as the foundation for political deliberation, policy, and 
law. Privatisation refers to incidences whereby religious voices that explicitly 
articulate religious reasons for supporting or opposing something are 
unwelcome in public life.  
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2.8 Theoretical explanations for secularisation 
So far, we have seen how secularisation is defined and how the concept can 
be manifested empirically. Now we turn to explanations put forward for 
secularisation. For Bruce (2002b), the principle cause is modernisation. 
However, in Bruce’s authoritative reading of the literature, there is not one 
secularisation theory, but rather several that all point in the same direction, 
with the decline of religion under conditions of modernity as the outcome. In 
the summary that follows, the four most notable strands of secularisation 
theory are identified from the literature. They are termed Durkheimian 
secularisation, Weberian secularisation, Berger’s secularisation, and Norris 
& Inglehart’s secularisation. 
2.8.1 Durkheimian secularisation 
For Durkheim (1914|1997), religion was the essence of community for pre-
modern societies. It provided the community with ideology necessary to hold 
it together along with the rituals through which individuals could come to 
recognise themselves as bound to one another. For Durkheim, 
modernisation was the process of the change from mechanical solidarity 
characterised by community interrelations, to organic solidarity which is 
characterised by impersonal relationships between individuals. As society 
modernised and grew, new institutions arose, in a process known as societal 
differentiation, which took on the work that had previously been the 
responsibility of the religion to undertake. One such example would be the 
rise of state-welfare that took over the responsibility of caring for the poor. 
These functionally equivalent modern institutions were not governed by 
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religious precepts however. Instead, they have their own codes to govern 
themselves by – it is not the church that has dominion over them; instead 
they are increasingly autonomous. It is this institutional autonomy that is 
key to bringing about secularisation in that religion is no longer necessary 
for ordering societal interrelations as social institutions have their own 
function-specific integrative systems. The implication is that religion is no 
longer needed and falls into disuse, which is manifested in privatisation and 
declining incidences of individuals’ recourse to religion (Durkheim, 
1914|1997; Pickering, 1984; Furseth & Repstad, 2006). 
The influence of Durkheim can be seen in the writings of Wilson (1982). 
Secularisation for Wilson is primarily brought about by what he terms 
‘societalisation’. This is the process by which social organisation shifts from 
being defined by the community to the society. Whereas before, individual 
relations were personal and between already-acquainted people in the 
community, they have become impersonal and anonymous in society, 
Wilson argues. Societalisation as a process can be thought of as mapping 
onto the transition from gemeinschaft (community) to gesellschaft (society) 
that was put forward by Tönnies (1887|2002) as characteristic of the 
process of modernisation as it effects human social organisation. 
Relationships under modernisation are thought of as being between “role-
performers” and not “total persons” and this process is adjudged by Wilson 
to have occurred in every sphere of social life (p154).  
To understand why religion declines with societalisation, Wilson has to 
argue after Durkheim that religion is the guiding light of community 
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relations. It provides individuals with rules to follow and knowledge of how 
to do so, as part of the maintenance system of social order. With 
modernisation comes socialisation which breaks up the community meaning 
that the social order that religion affords it is no longer applicable to the 
modern world. Religion does not necessarily disappear; instead it struggles 
to find its place as in modern society, social systems run according to new 
function-specific rules.  
The Durkheimian strand of secularisation theory is fleshed out further by 
Bruce (2002b), for whom, modernisation means structural differentiation, 
which in turn means the fragmentation of social roles and institutions 
where they had once been unified (Bruce gives the family as an example 
which evolved from the primary unit of production to being concerned only 
with raising of children). Structural differentiation leads to societal 
differentiation, which refers to the extent that human beings are distinct 
from each other. This is because different groups have different interests 
and come to follow rules that are designed to reflect these interests that 
come into being at the expense of the original guiding social order, which 
just so happens to be religion, leading to its greater disuse.  
2.8.2 Weberian secularisation 
For Weber modernisation was characterised by the rise of rationality. 
Human behaviour becomes increasing guided by goal-orientated ways of 
thinking that no longer require religion as a source of motivation. 
Increasingly, modern societies are governed by bureaucracies that thrive on 
their rationality. This, results in what Weber famously called the 
 
 
~ 61 ~ 
 
“Entzauberung der Welt” meaning the disenchantment of the world. 
Modernisation is characterised by rationality which comes at the expense of 
tradition. Religion is traditional for Weber and so it is dispensed with. 
Modernity increasingly comes to represent what Weber pessimistically called 
a “stahlhartes Gehäuse” or ‘iron cage’ as it is famously translated. Forms of 
religious expression being part of the traditional exuberance of humanity, all 
became outmoded and what was left was something oppressive and 
restrictive of the human character, namely rationalised bureaucracy 
(Turner, 2000; Furseth & Repstad, 2006; Poggi, 2008). However, Weber’s 
theory of the hegemony of rationality is according to Furseth & Repstad 
(2006) at best only a description of modernity and no comprehensive theory 
of how exactly modernity leads to reason and instrumentality at the expense 
of religion is put forward, although causal effect is attributable to rationality 
and modernisation in his writings. 
It was thus down to Weber’s intellectual descendents to flesh out this line of 
thinking and it is for this reason that we should talk of a Weberian strand of 
secularisation rather than Weber’s secularisation. This strand is defined by 
its insistence on the modern mind, with its emphasis on rationality, 
technology, and scientific education, being accountable for secularisation. 
Weber proved highly influential on Wilson for instance, for whom the 
modern mind is a rational one with rationality perceived of as being 
encapsulated within the words ‘planning’, ‘calculable’ and ‘predictable’ 
(Wilson, 1982). Religion, with its focus on divine revelation and its inability 
to be held up to empirical and logical scrutiny will fall by the wayside, as the 
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rational mind commits itself to the “eradication of the incidental, the 
whimsical, the wayward, the poetic, and the traditional” (Wilson, 
1982:p156).  
Rationality also replaces religion as it is traditional and tradition is 
insufficiently placed to be useful in the modern world. Religious institutions 
are bound to lose out because their competitors can outdo them in “all the 
techniques of modern science and organisation” and are “unhindered by the 
types of impediment to the adoption of rational systemisation” (Wilson, 
1982:p177). New systems meet new problems wherever they arise in a new 
way that is based on “technical expertise and bureaucratic organisation” 
(Wilson, 1982:p177) which religion cannot do as well and thus it falls behind 
and into disuse. For Wilson, secularisation is in part brought about by an 
improvement on the prevailing mind-set that displaces the old system that 
was grounded on religious ideas by out-competing it in a changed social 
world. 
Religion is also hindered by the increase of levels of education that 
accompanies modernisation. For Wilson, it is as much the content of 
education as the level, with modern education stressing technical and 
scientific knowledge whereas traditionally it espoused moral religious truths. 
Religion loses its plausibility in the face of science because scientific 
knowledge through its openness as represented by its willingness to be put 
to empirical testing, bears the credibility that religion by its obliqueness and 
insistence on faith despite the evidence, does not (Wilson, 1982). 
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Bruce (2002b) also took up the baton from Weber. He maintains that the 
rise of modernisation entails the rise of rationality and the rise of technology 
that lead to a new way of thinking, which is characterised by the modern 
individual placing themselves at the centre of things rather than God, and 
recognising themselves as having mastery over their own fate through the 
application of technology. Because of rational thought and technology, 
human beings no longer need to make recourse to appeals to the gods in 
order to try to survive. Why should they pray for a bounteous harvest when 
they can develop an understanding of the science of agriculture and apply 
technologies that could make it a near surety? Thus, the argument goes, the 
rational individual in command of science and technology sees himself as 
the solution to his problems and God is no longer required. Thus, religion 
falls into disuse and decline. 
For Norris & Inglehart (2004) rationalism which is thought of as entailing 
“empirical standards of proof, scientific knowledge of natural phenomena, 
and technological mastery of the universe” (p8), is linked within the 
literature to secularisation as it is diametrically opposed to religion. 
However, there is no direct conflict by necessity whereby science ‘defeats’ 
religion, despite its insistence upon empirical evidence over mystical 
supposition or divine revelation through prophets (Bruce, 2002b). Science 
serves instead to weaken religion in the wake of its diffusion into different 
sects and denominations, precisely because it offers a coherent and unified 
discourse. Religion, being shattered with the growth of pluralism into jagged 
shards, cannot put forward a coherent defence against science which is 
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monolithic and strong, and thus its credibility is damaged (Bruce, 2002b). 
Bruce writes: 
“The gradual accumulation of scientific knowledge gave people insight into, and mastery 
over, an area that had once been a mystery; the need and opportunity for recourse to the 
religious gradually declined. Science and technology do not create atheists; they just reduce 
the frequency and seriousness with which people attend to religion.” (Bruce, 2002b:p27) 
Science in conjunction with technology as facets of modernisation tends to 
weaken religion by reducing the amount of ground that religion has to stand 
on. 
2.8.3 Berger’s secularisation 
There are two Bergers, young and old. The young Berger was a proponent of 
secularisation theory, the old Berger a critic. In this section we devote 
ourselves to outlining the theory that the young Berger put forward in the 
1960s as an explanation for secularisation. At a later stage, his about-turn 
will be discussed. 
The young Berger linked religious pluralism to secularisation as manifested 
in declining levels of religious influence at the individual and institutional 
levels (Berger, 1980).  For Berger, the transition to modernity was 
characterised by things such as religion becoming a matter of free will and 
personal taste. For Berger, religious beliefs could only be maintained in the 
presence of others who adhered to the same beliefs. His argument is that 
religious beliefs are vulnerable to empirical contradiction and thus require 
that the individual believer always be encouraged by others of the same 
belief so that what is lost in credibility is offset by united enthusiasm and 
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fervour. However, modernisation leads to pluralism, both institutional and 
religious. Different peoples are introduced into the social milieu with the 
effect being deleterious on the social plausibility structures surrounding the 
individual, so that religious beliefs no longer seem so credible. The social 
plausibility structure is in effect diluted. When an individual is surrounded 
by like-minded individuals, they are less exposed to doubts as to the 
veracity of their faith as belief is reinforced through mutual affirmation. In 
the presence of individuals with different and competing outlooks, there 
comes more doubt and more uncertainty, so that all religious belief systems 
come to look suspect and accordingly religious faith goes into decline. Also, 
for Berger the transition to modernity changes the character of religion. 
Whereas before, religion was a matter of fate, under modern conditions it 
becomes a matter of choice which increases the likelihood of religion being 
rejected (Berger, 1981). These ideas, however, date back to Durkheim 
(Pickering, 1984) who saw Protestantism as the beginnings of religious 
choice and this opened up the possibility of the rejection of religion. 
The link between secularisation and pluralism is also touched upon by 
Bruce (2002b). He wrote that modernisation also diminishes the stature of 
religion by bringing new peoples into the state through expansion of borders 
and migration. For smoother running and in the interests of social harmony, 
the state secularises so as to be inclusive and avoid antagonising sections of 
its society. In modern times, religion could find a new direction as the 
national identity as a form of civic religion but only in the absence of 
pluralism. Otherwise, national identity tended to be secular. Pluralism, 
 
 
~ 66 ~ 
 
Bruce argues, also undermines religion as the presence of competing 
religions tends in sum, to undermine the credibility of all religions, as they 
cannot all be true and thus perhaps all are false? 
2.8.4 Norris & Inglehart’s secularisation 
This contemporary theory of secularisation was put forward by Norris & 
Inglehart (2004). Using data from the World Values Survey, they found that 
secularisation was a universal social phenomenon in all advanced modern 
societies. However, the explanatory theory they put forward was a novel 
theory of secularisation, as the previous theoretical approaches they had 
found wanting. It is important to note that Norris & Inglehart are using a 
different definition of secularisation from Wilson and Bruce. Secularisation 
is merely the decline of “practices, values, and beliefs” (pp4-5), which are 
merely a sufficient indicator of the decline of the social significance of 
religion, albeit a highly probable one for others. It is frustrating that they 
have not used the same definition of secularisation since they cite Bruce’s 
work favourably as a conceptual clarification of secularisation. Concurrent 
with Wilson and Bruce’s secularisation is the idea of decline with societal 
advance, although rather than ‘modernisation’ being the key concept, the 
concept of ‘development’ is used. Development is seen as being typified by 
transition through three distinct levels – agrarian, industrial, and 
culminating in the post-industrial.  
Norris & Inglehart’s theory is that different countries, as distinguished by 
their level of development, will expose their inhabitants to varying degrees of 
threats and risks. Undeveloped countries will exert greater levels of threat 
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and risk on individuals than developed countries. The crucial variable is 
‘human security’ which is placed under threat by anything inclusive of 
“environmental degradation to natural and manmade disasters such as 
floods, earthquakes, tornadoes, and droughts, as well as the threat of 
disease epidemics, violations of human rights, humanitarian crisis, and 
poverty” (p14). Development in turn, serves to alleviate human insecurity 
with direct results of industrialisation being an alleviation of poverty, 
uncertainty, and threats to life. This is done through the creation of better 
sanitation, better nutrition, better access to clean water, better healthcare, 
and improvements in education. The establishment of state provision of 
welfare also helps to secure individuals against threats to their wellbeing. 
Thus, the transition from agrarian to industrial societies is pinpointed as 
the key stage in the reduction of human insecurity.  
The level of human security is related by Norris & Inglehart to religiosity. 
The theoretical reasoning for this is that religion provides sources of 
explanation and emotional reassurance which prove good and useful for 
human beings in conditions where they find themselves faced with assorted 
threats. The reassurance that religion provides - that all this suffering is 
part of some divine plan - allows people to bring their existential anxiety 
under control allowing them to go about their daily life. It is stated that 
religion is useful for existentially-insecure individuals because it gives them 
a framework that provides certainty of mind which enables them to tolerate 
greater threats and actual uncertainty. Those who are secure find ambiguity 
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and uncertainty of outlook more tolerable and thus have less need for 
religion.  
Religions exist to underwrite the uncertainty that goes with insecurity. Of 
the transition from agrarian to industrial society, Norris & Inglehart write: 
“... under conditions of existential insecurity that have dominated the lives of most of 
humanity throughout most of history, the great theological questions concerned a relatively 
narrow constituency; the vast majority of the population was most strongly concerned with 
the need for reassurance in the face of a world where survival was uncertain, and this was 
the dominant factor explaining the grip of traditional religion on mass publics.” (Norris & 
Ingelhart 2004:p20) 
Where modernisation/development can deliver advances that can reduce the 
uncertainty of living and surviving, so religion which offers a psychological 
crutch, is no longer requisite for individuals and thus will suffer a decline. 
In post-industrial societies, where industrialisation happened first and 
development followed, religion is expected to be at its weakest. Greater levels 
of human security are related to lessened levels of expressions of religiosity. 
 This is seen as a probalistic theoretical relationship which does not by 
necessity demand that religion disappear totally – indeed Norris & Inglehart 
state that religion in advanced economies may remain albeit in an 
attenuated form, such as the symbolic carrier of national identity. 
2.8.5 Commentary 
As we have seen there are numerous explanations but they are all pointing 
in the same direction – modernisation leads to secularisation. What it is 
about modernisation that matters varies depending on the explanation in 
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question. There are indeed other ways that we could think about 
modernisation resulting in religious decline (see Bruce, 2002b for a full 
exposition). For instance, once could reason that the rise of the free 
individual, who is faced with a rapidly expanding opportunity structure filled 
with thrills and delights that result from increased production and can cater 
for even the most specific of niche tastes, is less likely to opt for religion 
simply because it is just not exciting enough. Religion has always struggled 
to compete with rock ‘n’ roll, particularly among young people. Dobbelaere 
(1993) adds that secularisation can be brought about by the development of 
a youth-culture that celebrates individualism at the expense of community 
based values as espoused by religious precepts, that simultaneously makes 
up for the losses imposed by modernisation by offering outlets for 
“massification and emotionalism, pleasure and ecstasy” (p28).  
Thus, there are many different explanations and secularisation is more of a 
mish-mash of theories than one specific theory (Bruce, 2002b). However, 
their combined weight is theoretically strong enough for social scientists to 
presuppose an empirical link between modernisation and secularisation. 
The question now arises, what is modernisation, and what does it mean to 
be modern? 
2.9 Conceptualising modernisation 
Bruce (2002b) defines modernisation as:  
“Modernisation is itself a multifaceted notion, which encompasses the industrialisation of 
work; the shift from villages to towns and cities; the replacement of the small community by 
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the society; the rise of individualism; the rise of egalitarianism; and the rationalisation both 
of thought and societal organisation.” (p2) 
For Yi (2006) modernisation can be conceived of as having two distinct 
parts. Modernisation is thought of as being an object of individuals or 
countries. Yi maintains that individuals may be in possession of “intellectual 
modernisation” whilst countries may have “institutional modernisation”. 
These two forms of modernity are umbrella terms that encompass a series of 
dimensions. The conceptual distinctness of these dimensions is not thought 
to translate into a ‘multiple modernities’ approach. The dimensions fall 
together and are self-supporting so that, for Yi, we can speak of an “organic 
whole” that is all-encompassing of society itself.  
Intellectual modernisation for Yi, has the following dimensions: (1) 
individual subjectivity and self-consciousness – individuals are 
individualised and come to govern themselves; (2) a rational and contractual 
public cultural spirit – this rational spirit encompasses faith in technology 
and science and governs individuals in the dealings with others in an arena  
with distinct norms and values; and (3) a socio-historical ideological 
narrative – an optimistic cultural ideology that projects history as the 
movement towards increased rationality with liberation achieved through 
reason, technology and science.  
Institutional modernisation, Yi argues, is a necessary companion of 
intellectual modernisation that is manifested in: (1) the rationalisation of 
economic operation – production becomes more calculable and predictable 
and incorporative of science and technology; (2) the bureaucracy of 
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administrative management – society is organised by bureaucracy which is 
rational in direction; (3) the autonomy of public sphere – a civil society that 
is independent of the state and autonomous; (4) the democratisation and 
contradiction of public power – as established by democratic systems of 
selection of government and rule of law. 
The term ‘development’ also appears in the literature and has been used by 
Norris & Inglehart (2004) where others have used ‘modernisation’. Portes & 
Kincaid (1989) have defined development as having three distinct 
dimensions. They are: (1) economic growth brought about by 
industrialisation; (2) social welfare improvements through greater standards 
of living; and (3) citizenship through the establishment of political groups for 
individuals and social groups. Development has been conceived of in the 
following manner: 
“The essence of development is to improve the quality of life. This generally calls for higher 
incomes, which are the result of gains in productivity and technological advances among 
nations. Economic progress, in turn, depends on a number of other development objectives: 
better education, improved health and nutrition, a cleaner environment, a reduction of 
poverty, more equality of opportunity, an enhancement of individual freedoms, and a richer 
cultural environment.” (Gereffi & Fonda 1992: p420) 
From the above quote we can see that there is quite a great deal of division 
between the two concepts. Development as a concept seems to be an 
expression of how we would like our lives to be, rather than something 
descriptive of the way that societies evolve, which is one of the assumptions 
behind the concept of modernisation. However, many of the benefits that are 
seen as ‘development’ will be the result of modernisation. The above extract 
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mentions increased productivity which will be only possible with 
industrialisation and technology, which are fundamental to modernisation. 
Education is also mentioned and this is part of modernisation too. Better 
health and standards of living are likely to accompany modernisation as 
greater medical knowledge of treatments and cures will come with greater 
scientific inquiry. Thus, we can look at the term ‘development’ as more 
aspirational than ‘modernisation’. However, it is brought about by 
modernisation so that the two terms can be treated as synonymous as the 
causal correlation between them would be presumably sufficiently large 
enough to use them interchangeably. 
2.10 Empirical evidence for secularisation 
The studies referenced in this section for the most part either point to 
correlations between indicators of modernisation and religiosity, or declines 
in religiosity in advanced modern societies, or both. 
The chief conclusions of Norris & Inglehart (2004) are: (1) that all 
economically advanced societies have moved towards greater levels of 
secularisation; and (2) nevertheless, the world has gotten more religious due 
to the expanding population growth of less-advanced economies. Religious 
attendance has fallen they argue. Also, religiosity was linked to greater 
modernisation across a variety of indicators of both religiosity and 
modernisation. Effects however, are not purely the result of macro-level 
processes. One’s individual socio-economic standing within any given 
society may also bear effect. Whilst modernised societies tend to be richer 
societies, many nevertheless have substantial levels of poverty and 
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according to Norris & Inglehart’s theory those living in conditions of poverty 
would be expected to demonstrate greater religiosity. Indeed this 
relationship is born out empirically – in post-industrial countries the poor 
are almost twice as religious as the rich whilst inequality, as measured by 
the GINI index, is strongly and significantly correlated with religiosity.  
The link between insecurity and secularisation was further evidenced by 
Immerzeel & van Tubergen (2011) who found that higher religiosity is linked 
to job insecurity, unemployment, parental employment status, experience of 
war, loss of a partner, lower social welfare spending. Negative correlations 
were found with indicators of both religious attendance and intrinsic 
religiosity. They conclude that economic insecurity is more important than 
existential security in explaining religiosity. Also, in a study of 60 countries, 
Ruiter & van Tubergen (2009) found that religious attendance was greatly 
influenced by personal and social insecurity and also by level of 
urbanisation and level of education (both at the individual and country 
levels – although effects were slight). Wuthnow (1977), measuring religiosity 
through the number of religious books published per annum, found it 
correlated negatively with GDP per capita, and urbanisation. Conversely, the 
number of religious books published was correlated with literacy, university 
enrolment, number of scientific journals, and energy consumption. 
Dobbelaere (1993) locates a decline in religious adherence that stems from 
the 1960s and is common to European countries. This is a trend evidenced 
by the European Values Survey, which includes measures of church 
attendance and religious belief. Doebelaere argues that declines in religiosity 
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have occurred that are distinct from life-cycle patterns and that the only 
people to show no change are women excluded from the labour-market. This 
is interpreted as evidence of how modernity rationalises as employed women 
are subject to rationalising forces and a sense of technocratic mastery over 
fate whilst housewives are kept apart from this. Cohort and gender effects 
are explained according to the level of exposure to modernity. For 
Dobbelaere, decline began in the 1960s and at different rates for Protestants 
and Catholics. Belief was said to have declined long before and by the 1960s 
with attendance being merely the keeping up of appearances. It took the 
development of a “leisure culture” in the 1960s and 1970s to cut the bonds 
of duty between church and individual by promising more fulfilling 
alternatives (p27).  
Evidence for religious decline in advanced modern societies comes from 
Iannaccone (2002), who using ISSP data, reconstructed time-series trends 
for 30 countries leading back to 1920. This was done by using estimations 
of respondents’ religiosity when they were children and that of their parents 
at the same point in time. Iannaccone’s work shows overall decline in nearly 
all countries analysed. Whilst conceding his data offers much evidence of 
decline, Iannaccone does his best to construe the evidence unearthed as 
non-reflective of secularisation by arguing away certain cases and by 
conflating level of attendance with decline.  
Voas & Crockett (2005) who, using the British Household Panel Survey, 
found that decline has occurred in both measures of belief and religious 
attendance. Decline is seen as generational with approximately half of 
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parental religiosity handed down to the offspring.  These results were closely 
mirrored in another study by the same authors (Crockett & Voas, 2006), 
who found that religious affiliation was widespread at the start of the 20th 
century but was found in fewer than half of those born in the 1970s.  
In Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland, religiosity is low and getting 
lower, according to Bruce with declines having been evidenced in both levels 
of belief and attendance (Bruce, 2002a). Bruce also concluded that the 
Baltic countries showed a relationship between religiosity, industrialisation, 
and GDP per capita. In Australia too, decline has been evidenced. McCallum 
(1987) found declines occurring between 1966 and 1985 across an array of 
indicators although decline was much more pronounced among Protestants 
than Catholics. Also, McAllister (1988) found declines in Australian religious 
attendance across all denominations, which were attributed to generational 
changes brought about by changing patterns of socialisation. Results were 
also supportive, to a degree, of a link between socioeconomic development 
and declining religiosity, although observed declines were much more 
pronounced among Protestants than Catholics.  
For some, the collapse of communism in eastern Europe was supposed to 
refute secularisation due to what was seen as a religious renaissance in the 
immediate aftermath of the transition to free-markets and democracy. 
However, Need & Evans (2001) found no evidence of a rise in church 
membership in former communist countries amongst the youngest age 
group and that younger people were less likely to be religious after the 
transition and that this was in keeping with the expectation of generational 
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decline implicit in secularisation theory. Lack of religiosity was also linked to 
education and urban residence, being male, and having had membership of 
the communist party during the Soviet era. Declines have also been noted in 
both West and East Germany with East German religiosity becoming much 
more diffuse coupled by a collapse there in trust in church authorities 
(Pollack, 2002). It is in the former DDR that the collapse is most pronounced 
suggesting path-dependency pertaining to either its troubled history or 
greater share of Protestants. Traditional Christian beliefs were also found to 
have declined in Germany by Shand (1998) whilst Wolf (2008) found 
declines in German religious attendance and intrinsic belief.  
Declines in religiosity have also been evidenced among Jews although a 
small but growing minority is for stricter observance (Sharot, 1991). 
Elsewhere, it was found that immigrant Jews had declined in their levels of 
religiosity in modern societies. Across four Israeli migrant populations 
(Moroccan, Iraqi, Polish, and Romanian), declines had occurred but were 
greatest where older generations had been the most religious (Sharot et al., 
1986). Among Catholic adolescents, a weakening of traditional beliefs was 
found in the more modernised societies in a study by Weigert & Thomas 
(1974), although only one school from each of the five societies investigated 
was selected leading to problems relating to representativeness. Generally 
though, predominantly Catholic countries tend to escape the worst effects of 
secularisation although they are not immune to it (see also Norris & 
Inglehart, 2004). Presumably this is due to the ascribed nature of 
Catholicism as opposed to the more voluntary nature of Protestantism. 
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Not all studies support secularisation as evidenced through declining 
religiosity in advanced societies. For instance in Canada, Hartnagel & Klug 
(1990) found stable church attendance between 1973 and 1982 and 
evidence of increasing religious conservatism and support for the papacy 
amongst Catholics. However, the sample was restricted to one western 
Canadian diocese and was not reflective of the Canadian population as a 
whole. This finding is contradicted by Eagle (2011) who found using the 
Canadian General Social Survey, substantial declines between 1986 and 
2008. Eagle’s research is backed up by Clark (2000) who also found declines 
since the 1980s. Immigrants were found to attend more with attendance 
higher in rural areas with religious people being more connected with the 
community as a whole. Support for secularisation may also come from a 
study of immigrants in 8 western countries (van Tubergen, 2006) whereby it 
was found that immigrants from countries with higher levels of 
modernisation tended to be less religious. 
Much attention has been devoted to the study of religion in America. It is 
seen by some as being an exception to the general rule (Tiryakian, 1993) or 
as even refuting secularisation theory (Gill, 2001), since religion is 
apparently in rude health despite America being for so many the pinnacle of 
modernisation. The conventional wisdom is that in recent times American 
religious attendance has been relatively stable. For instance, Hout & Greeley 
(1987) found between 1940 and 1984 very little by way of change, although 
there was a decline in Catholics’ attendance that was attributed not to 
secularisation but rather due to the church’s inability to move with the 
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times, regarding sexual relationships and birth control. Presser & Chaves 
(2007) reviewed a variety of studies and also concluded stability. Caplow 
(1985), citing a myriad of sources also concluded American stability, which 
stood in stark contrast to decline across many European countries. This 
links to the work of Aarts et al. (2008) who found, using data from Western 
Europe and North America, the most common pattern was for a downward 
decline in religious belief and attendance, although there are some 
exceptions whereby stability is evidenced, most-notably the United States 
which showed decline in religious belief but stability in religious attendance. 
Researchers have studied American religious attendance, looking for overall 
trends but also have attempted to separate out age, cohort and period 
effects. Firebaugh & Harely (1991) concluded there had been stability of late 
in the United States which breaks down into a declining across-cohort trend 
offset by increases within cohorts, which transpires to be nothing more than 
life-cycle effects repeated in one birth cohort after another. Miller & 
Nakamura (1996) also concluded stability had occurred in the U.S., but 
explained this by arguing that age effects associated with an ageing 
population were being offset by declines in successive cohorts. This research 
was done using data from the General Social Survey (GSS) and Bayesian 
cohort analysis. Elsewhere, Sasaki & Suzuki (1987) concluded that the U.S. 
had seen stability between 1952 and 1982. This was contrasted with decline 
in the Netherlands, and stability in Japan.  
Such findings were questioned by Schwadel (2010) who argued that earlier 
studies focusing on trends in age, period and cohort in the United States, 
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have been flawed. This is because they have been reliant on questionable 
assumptions necessary to overcome the problem of identification inherent in 
any model that seeks to separate out age, period and cohort effects 
simultaneously. Schwadel argues that by using multilevel cross-classified 
models, this problem can be surmounted. Schwadel found using the GSS, 
that overall the picture of religious attendance can be described as one of 
stability although there was a “small period-based decline” occurring in the 
1990s (p21). Interestingly though, trends do emerge once certain controls 
are applied. For instance, a negative cohort trend emerges once controls are 
added for education and minority ethnic position. The interpretation is that 
more and more people have been exposed to these effects due to rising levels 
of education and minority populations which suppress cohort trends. 
The problem with these studies of American religious attendance that point 
to overall stability is they tend to rely on either the GSS or Gallop opinion 
polls that are highly subject to a social desirability response bias (Hadaway 
et al., 1993). One study found that the common figure of 40% weekly 
attendance fell to as little as 22% once a more sophisticated measurement 
was used (Hadaway & Marler, 2005). Time diaries have been confirmed as 
the more accurate measurement of religious attendance (Rossi & Scappini, 
2011). Presser & Stinson (1988) found that self-administered interviews and 
time-diaries reduced social desirability bias greatly; religious attendance fell 
by about one third when compared to interviewer-led surveys. Using time 
diary data collected from young people in the United States, it was shown 
that there were declines in religious attendance and that misreporting had 
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grown in recent times. Declines amongst American children using the time 
diary method were also found by Hofferth & Sandberg (2001). Thus, those 
studies using fancy models to separate out age, period, and cohort effects 
are flawed because they have tended to use GSS data which is subject to too 
high a social desirability bias and thus misleadingly reveal a picture of 
stability. What time-diary studies we have are not sufficiently representative 
to conclude firmly that decline is happening but nevertheless they utilise a 
better method and thus we can argue that further studies using more 
representative time diary data would in all probability show overall decline. 
Such thoughts gain credibility when one takes into consideration declines in 
levels of support for traditional beliefs concerning gender roles and 
homosexual rights, among all Christian groups in the United States 
(Petersen & Donnenwerth, 1998). This is backed up by a marked decline in 
confidence in American religious institutions (Hoffman, 1998). Stability may 
also be illusionary in the sense that demographic trends mask secularising 
trends. Norris & Inglehart (2004) found the United States was an outlier 
within the broader pattern of secularising modern societies, although it is 
within touching distance of Ireland on some of their indicators. 
Nevertheless, once controls are applied to account for large influxes of 
Hispanic immigration, “a significant movement toward secularisation” is 
evidenced (p25). 
Outside of the West, little work has been undertaken concerning religious 
trends of growth or decline. One study by Kim et al. (2009) found in Korea 
that religiosity had grown between 1985 and 1995 but then arrested by 
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2005. Growth was mostly located amongst Catholics. It is also important to 
keep in mind Norris & Inglehart’s (2004) finding that the non-developed 
world is becoming more religious due to population growth. 
Research into religiosity and academia has tended to show that academics 
can be quite religious. Gross & Simmons (2009) found that while professors 
are more likely to be less religious than the population as a whole, 
nevertheless many could be classified as religious moderates. Religiosity was 
found to decline with academic prestige with atheists most prevalent 
amongst the social sciences. Albrecht & Heaton (1984) found using 
American data that religion and education were negatively linked with the 
exception of Mormons, indicating only a sufficient negative relationship. It is 
stressed that these are studies of American individuals whereby the social 
context as a whole tends to be a lot more religious and thus this is not an 
absolute test of the link between religiosity and education. 
One study attempts to measure the level of separation of religion and state. 
Fox (2006) found that government involvement in religion has in fact 
increased slightly between 1990 and 2002 and that economic development 
is associated with higher governmental involvement. Muslim countries have 
higher levels of governmental support for religion; democracies have higher 
levels of separation of religion and state although only the United States had 
full separation. The actual increase of governmental involvement in religion 
could be seen as evidence against secularisation. As too can the positive link 
between economic development and government involvement. However, the 
rise is slight and over a short time span so it could be just a broader 
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fluctuation in a larger negative trend. Also, Fox shows an empirical 
relationship between birth mortality and separation of religion and state in 
the expected direction which serves to throw into question his results, as 
birth mortality should rise with modernisation (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). It 
is however most likely that separation of religion and state is most reflective 
of country-specific political settlements rather than broad social trends. 
This review of the supporting evidence of secularisation has shown, that 
there is a strong trend towards decline in advanced modern societies as we 
would expect from secularisation theory. Additionally, there is evidence of 
empirical relationships between religiosity and indicators of modernisation 
in the expected direction. These countries are increasingly pluralistic and 
often have high levels of separation of religion and state, which we will see 
later have been predicted to prompt religion in the other direction, towards 
growth. There is a great deal of evidence for declining religiosity amongst 
individuals, and thus lessening social significance. However, this has not 
stopped the emergence of more nuanced theoretical conceptions of 
secularisation and criticisms.  
2.11 Rethinking secularisation – Casanova’s public religions 
An important rethinking of secularisation theory was put forward by 
Casanova (1994). He argues that because of structural differentiation 
(increasing division of labour), institutions develop their own rules and the 
implication of this is that those who adhere to religious rules are frozen out 
as religious precepts are incompatible with modern institutions in the public 
sphere. Essentially, they have no object to which they can be applied 
 
 
~ 83 ~ 
 
because secular norms and rules based on rationality have supplanted 
them. Thus, religion retreats to the private sphere and is said to be 
privatised, or so the theory went. The term privatisation is thus used by 
Casanova to describe both a process and an end result. It is in no way 
referring to the way that state assets are transferred from public to private 
hands, as the term is commonly used in popular discourse. Religion under 
modernity becomes privatised due to the fact that functional differentiation 
of institutions is occurring as a necessary condition of modernisation, so 
Casanova maintains. Thus, privatisation would entail that religion would 
have no more influence upon public life such as in politics or civil society. 
Religion becomes effectively shut out as the norms and rules by which these 
institutions operate preclude the foundations upon which religion is based. 
Nevertheless, it is Casanova’s contention that privatisation is a sufficient 
indicator of modernisation that is commonly misunderstood to be necessary 
due to the liberal and enlightenment biases of academic discourse. Thus, 
Casanova’s work retreats from robust empirical analysis despite the fact 
that his book is littered with informative case studies. His intention is to lay 
out the terms in which religion may participate in the public sphere in a 
reaction against modernist/enlightenment chauvinism: 
“In modern differentiated societies it is both unlikely and undesirable that religion should 
again play the role of systemic normative integration. But by crossing boundaries, by 
raising questions about the autonomous pretensions of the differentiated spheres to 
function without regard to moral norms or human considerations, public religions may help 
to mobilise people against such pretensions, they must contribute to a public debate about 
such issues. Irrespective of the outcome or the historical impact of such a debate, religions 
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will have played an important role... they will have functioned as counterfactual normative 
critiques.” (p43) 
In essence, Casanova sees an opening for religion to renew itself by 
becoming some sort of moral custodian outside of the state and manifesting 
itself within civil society. The empirical examples of religion performing 
publically are the role of the Catholic Church in the Solidarity movement in 
Poland during the fall of communism, the role of Protestant Evangelicalism 
in rise of the New American Right, the role of Catholic bishops in the on-
going American abortion debate, and liberation theology as progressive 
Catholicism in Latin America. As a counter example of actual existing 
privatisation, the example of the Catholic Church in Spain is offered which 
suffered a marked decline and privatisation in the wake of the death of 
Franco and the fall of fascism.  
These case studies, whilst empirical, are not intended by Casanova as some 
sort of measurement of the extent of privatisation nor an empirical test as 
understood by quantitative social scientists. They are understood as 
assisting the formation of a normative critique by showing what indeed is 
possible for religions within modern societies that have undergone 
functional differentiation and separation of religion and state. Privatisation 
is thus to be understood as an “historical option” despite the fact that it is 
“dominant historical trend” occurring in most countries that simultaneously 
experience a decline in religious adherence (p213). It is important to 
Casanova for us to recognise that privatisation is optional and not pre-
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determined although it tends to be the “preferred option” nevertheless 
(p215). 
The presence of religions within civil society is termed ‘deprivatisation’: 
“... deprivatisation in the sense of relocation of religion from a premodern form of 
publicness to the public sphere of civil society is a transitional phase which is conditioned 
by the very success of the move.” (Casanova, 1994:p222) 
Deprivatisation is thus referring to the sense that religion has given up its 
claim to a privileged position in society through state establishment and has 
reconciled itself to a position within secularised society whereby it seeks to 
sway people through moral criticism. It will find greatest success in such a 
role when modern societies find themselves faced with an ideological deficit: 
“When secular ideologies appear to have failed or lost much of their force, religion returns 
to the public arena as a mobilising or integrating normative force.” (Casanova, 1994:p227) 
For Casanova, deprivatisation may take one of three forms. They are: (1) 
mobilisation against the violation of traditional values by state or market; (2) 
the attempt by religion to moralise state and market by challenging them on 
the assumption that they can exist by their own rules alone; and (3) an 
attempt to instil in society the idea of collective identity and a common good 
in opposition to prevailing liberal theories that reduce all to the level of 
individual choices. 
Casanova’s work is useful because it allows us to look at secularisation in a 
new way. However, it does nothing to actually measure the extent of 
privatisation, or deprivatisation for that matter. What empirical evidence 
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that is given is not intended as an attempt at scientific observation and 
measurement. Indeed, the case studies themselves do nothing to illustrate 
how religiosity is either linked to the public or the private spheres among 
everyday individuals. The evidence given refers solely to the policies and 
actions of religious institutional elites. What is missing is whether or not 
individual-level religiosity is public or privatised in the sense that it leads 
individuals either to or away from public participation. 
The idea that religions are not privatised in modern societies despite 
declining stature does however receive support from a European study of 
youth, wherein it was found in the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany, UK, 
Ireland, Finland, Croatia, Israel, and Poland, that young people favoured a 
public role for religion. Only in Turkey was privatisation favoured (Ziebertz, 
2011) and this can be accounted for by the traditions of Atatürk. Perhaps in 
the other countries, it is the case that democratic norms take precedence 
over norms of laicism and thus young people welcome religion in the public 
sphere because to do otherwise would be to remove a democratic privilege? 
Also, Bush (2007) has found an absolute decline in the number of religious 
civil society groups but also an absolute rise in the number of religious 
human rights organisations that could be reflective of the role of religion as 
transforming into some sort of social guardian with civil society, much as 
Casanova has theorised. 
2.12 Secularisation theory – sufficient and probabilistic 
Secularisation is seen as highly likely to occur in modernised societies. 
However there is not a causal relationship between modernisation and 
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secularisation that is both necessary and sufficient. Instead, the causal 
relationship is regarded as merely sufficient however probable it might be. 
There are some counter tendencies which buck the trend of declining social 
salience. Basically, religion is set to decline under modernity, unless it can 
find a task to fulfil that will make it useful. For Bruce (2002b), there are two 
possible causes that religion can adopt. First, there is cultural defence. 
Religion can re-emerge under modern conditions if secularism is forcibly 
promoted or if an ideology perceived as alien is seen as imposed upon an 
unwilling people. Unified resistance is however only possible in the absence 
of religious pluralism. In such circumstances, religion can revitalise itself to 
provide a source of resistance. Examples would be Poland during the 
collapse of Communism and the Iranian Revolution. A second instance in 
which religion can re-emerge is cultural transition. When individuals and 
societies undergo change at an alarming and threatening rate, they may fall 
back on religion as something familiar, comforting and reassuring (Bruce, 
2002b). Evidence for religion as some sort of cultural defence against foreign 
imposition can be seen in the work of Pollack (2002) who found that church 
attendance in the former DDR increased precisely around the time of the 
democratic revolution but declined palpably shortly thereafter. This is 
interpreted as the church providing some sort of independent space for 
resistance and assembly that allowed it a break from the longer-term trend 
of secularisation. 
Secularisation is not something that will occur evenly and at a consistent 
rate both within countries and across countries (Bruce, 2002b). There is 
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room within this theory for path dependency.  These sentiments are echoed 
in the work of Martin (2005) who stresses that allowances in the path from 
sacred to secular should be made, depending upon the distinct histories of 
the countries in question. For Martin, differences between Protestant and 
Catholic countries and religious pluralism have to be factored in to our 
theoretical reasoning although overall, secularisation remains valid.  
Religion can indeed arise as a reaction against modernisation, but not 
sufficiently to offset the wider downward trend (Bruce, 2002b). Wilson 
(1982) wrote that individuals left marginalised by the process of 
modernisation are susceptible to finding an emotional sustenance through 
religion. Also, the Fundamentalism Project (e.g. Marty & Appleby, 1994) has 
identified religious fundamentalism as a backlash against the losses 
sustained by religion in modern times. 
2.13 Criticisms of secularisation theory 
Secularisation theory has been criticised for necessitating some sort of 
‘golden age’ of faith, whereby everyone was religious. Critics of secularisation 
(e.g. Stark & Finke, 2000) rule the secularisation thesis as historically 
invalid as they can point to numerous instances from the medieval world 
whereby the people are distinctly untutored in religious ways. Wilson (1982) 
addresses such criticisms by arguing that it is enough to point out that on 
the whole religion had a greater social significance in the past than it plays 
today. This response is echoed by Bruce (2002b), who adds that in Britain 
each possible indicator of religiosity is in “regular and constant” decline over 
time, for between 50 and 100 years or so (p73). Thus, positing a golden age 
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as a rebuttal of secularisation is something of a fallacious argument – it is 
enough to show religious decline. Additionally, Stark & Finke’s (2000) 
evidence put forward in a chapter entitled Secularisation R.I.P. is highly 
selective; it is focusing on every example of non-religion they can muster 
with nothing added that might count in the other direction. 
The example of the United States is often held up to refute secularisation 
theory. After all, where could be more modern? Yet, religious rates of belief 
and attendance are markedly higher than most other developed economies 
(Campbell & Curtis, 1994; Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Bruce argues in 
response that there is evidence of decline in popularity of religion and that 
following Wilson, one can argue for an internal secularisation within 
American churches (Bruce, 2002, Wilson, 1982). He also states that despite 
the loud voices of the American religious right, attempts to conquer the 
mainstream are doomed to fail due to the strong secularisation of the 
American state and the insistence upon scientific values by the social and 
academic mainstream. Thus, religion cannot gain a foothold and can only 
remain truly religious in the margins. It is also noted that Americans tend to 
exaggerate church attendance for reasons of perceived social desirability and 
thus the actual occurrence may still be comparable to the standard of the 
rest of the developed world (Hadaway et al., 1993 – also see above 
discussion of American case). 
Criticism for secularisation theory also came from a surprising quarter. 
Whereas once Berger had been a major proponent of the theory, in 1999 he 
came out in his dotage as a critic. He wrote: 
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“My point is that the assumption that we live in a secularised world is false. The world 
today, with some exceptions... is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places 
more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social 
scientists loosely labelled ‘secularisation theory’ is essentially mistaken.” (Berger, 1999:p2) 
It is frustrating that Berger seems to treat the expectations of secularisation 
theory as applicable to the entire world. It is plainly apparent that the theory 
expects the declining social significance of religion in only the most 
modernised areas, since there is a causal link between modernisation and 
secularisation. It is also noted that both secularisation in advanced societies 
and increasing religiosity overall on a global scale are both possible, as 
Norris & Inglehart have argued (Norris & Inglehart, 2004).  
Berger (1999) came to regard secularisation theory as no longer valid 
because (1) counter-secular religious movements exist; (2) people are still 
quite religious even in modern societies; (3) more demanding religions have 
flourished than those seemingly better suited to a secularised world; (4) 
evidence of Islamic resurgence and greater assertiveness; and (5) an 
Evangelical upsurge in Asia, the South Pacific, sub-Saharan Africa, the 
former Soviet Union, and Latin America.  
The first criticism can be countered by stating that the numbers of the 
faithful in counter-secularisation movements that are growing are not 
enough to offset the losses made elsewhere (Bruce, 2002b) and consistent 
with Wilson’s idea of religion continuing on in the margins of society. Most 
of Berger’s criticisms fail to address the fact that secularisation is only to be 
expected in the most advanced societies, and even then one may still expect 
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to find religion within as access to modernisation is not equally distributed 
(Wilson, 1982, Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Thus, one may well expect religion 
to be there – what is most important is that it has declining relevance for the 
operation of the social system. The fact that religion seems to be resurgent 
in certain parts of the less modernised world is very interesting and perhaps 
a weakness of the sociology of religion is that it focuses far too much on 
religion in advanced countries and is theoretically as well as empirically 
blind elsewhere. That said such cases do nothing to trouble the validity of 
secularisation theory in advanced modern societies. 
A nuanced critique of secularisation has been attempted by Davie (1994). 
She has argued that Britons are characterised religiously as “believing 
without belonging” meaning that although people go to church less and less, 
they nevertheless are maintaining a commitment to religious belief despite 
this. Britons are to be seen as ‘unchurched’ rather than non-religious. Davie 
(1999, 2004) later extended this thesis to apply to Europe which she deems 
the exceptional case where “if nowhere else – the ‘old’ secularisation thesis 
would seem to hold” (Davie, 1999:p65). She goes on to ask if Europeans are 
not just “differently religious” (Davie, 1999:p65) as opposed to secular 
because they attend religious services less but retain religious belief. If 
Europe is indeed “differently religious” then, in Davie’s eyes the whole world 
is religious and secularisation is not true.  
Davie’s case for European exceptionalism can be criticised as it does not 
take into account declines in other non-European advanced economies such 
as Australia (McCallum, 1987; McAllister, 1988), Canada (Eagle, 2011; 
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Clark, 2000), Japan and New Zealand (Norris & Inglehart, 2004). Nor does it 
make allowances for the tendency for Americans to exaggerate their religious 
attendance thus putting them more in line with the European case. Finally, 
it does not take fully into account the definition of secularisation put 
forward by Wilson, and thus the level of European belief is irrelevant for the 
secularisation thesis if it is not manifesting itself socially in religious 
attendance. Essentially, Davie looks to discover vibrant religion in order to 
say something critical about secularisation. However, the very fact that it 
needs to be discovered speaks volumes about the European case that is not 
that exceptional once we take into account American exaggerations and 
secularising advanced non-European countries.  
Davie’s account of the British as ‘believing not belonging’ has been 
challenged empirically by Voas & Crockett (2005), who argued that decline 
in belonging has been accompanied by a decline in belief whilst what belief 
that does remain is dismissed as too vague to necessarily qualify as 
‘religion’. In short, those with meaningful religious belief tend also to be 
participating in religious services. These findings were echoed by Aarts et al. 
(2008) who found in most cases no widening of the gap between Christian 
believing and belonging in Western Europe and North America that would 
indicate a long-term trend towards believing not belonging. They too 
conclude that belief and belonging tend to accompany each other. Moreover, 
as this study will show, factor analysis will tend to load measurements of 
believing and religious attendance onto the same common factor (see 
Chapter 3 for details). 
 
 
~ 93 ~ 
 
2.14 Religious economies theory – a challenge to the secularisation 
paradigm 
Within the sociology of religion, there are two competing principle 
explanations for religion as a social phenomenon, secularisation theory and 
religious economies theory. The latter approach, being revisionist, 
controversial and something of an upstart, argues that religious practice is 
determined by the efforts of clergy who respond to pseudo-market forces 
within the religious economy. This theory is most prominently put forward 
by some combination of Stark, Finke, and Iannacone (e.g. Finke & Stark, 
1988; Stark & Finke, 2000; Stark & Iannaccone, 1996; Stark et al., 1995, 
Stark & Iannaccone, 1995). The theory receives its fullest explanation in the 
book of Stark & Finke (2000) entitled Acts of Faith: Explaining the Human 
Side of Religion. The theory presented therein stems from rational choice 
theory and the work of economist Gary Becker. Thus, the theory is also 
often referred to as the rational choice approach to the sociology of religion 
and also the supply-side approach.  
The point of departure for Stark & Finke’s theory is that religions need to be 
thought of as existing in a religious economy. A religious economy is 
considered as the sum total of the amount of religious activity in any given 
society. Stark & Finke, assume that individuals are rational in the sense 
that they attempt to make rational choices that satisfy their preferences and 
tastes, given whatever restrictions there might be on their information held 
and understanding. This is not to say that all goals are rational – the idea is 
that one can behave rationally in pursuit of an irrational goal if your 
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information is sufficiently deficient. Individuals look for the best possible 
deal when making religious choices and thus it follows that the deals on 
offer must play a role, so that it is down to ‘ecclesiastics’ (priests, imams, 
rabbis etc.) and religious organisations to provide the best possible religious 
product in order to entice adherents. This approach is often termed the 
supply-side approach to the sociology of religion, as it focuses on the efforts 
of religious organisations and their staff in order to explain religious vitality. 
 For religions to be convincing to adherents, sufficient for them to maintain 
their attachment but also to attract new followers, ecclesiastics have to 
“display levels of commitment greater than that expected of followers” 
(p112). Priests and their ilk have to demonstrate that they are the most 
committed in order to keep their flocks faithful and in attendance of 
religious services. Thus, Stark & Finke arrive at the crucial hypothesis, that: 
 “Vigorous efforts by religious organisations are required to motivate and sustain high levels 
of individual religious commitment.” (p113) 
Thus, we can expect countries to be more or less religious depending upon 
the efforts of religious providers – the clergy. The level of effort they put in is 
socially influenced. Two macro-level variables, which are essential in 
describing the religious economy as a whole, are identified by the 
proponents of religious economies theory. They are: (1) religious freedom as 
the absence of state regulation of religion, also conceived of as separation of 
religion and state; and (2) level of inter-religious competition.  
These two variables are interrelated. Regulation of religion, as conceived of 
as lack of separation of religion and state, is seen as a precondition for 
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religious pluralism which is a necessary condition for competition. Pluralism 
refers to the “number of firms active in the economy; the more firms there 
are with significant market shares, the greater the degree of pluralism” 
(p198). Religious firms capture a monopoly if they are forced upon the 
masses via means of forceful coercion by the state (p199). Religious 
monopolies will attempt to exert influence over other institutions and the 
extent of their success would allow us to describe such societies as 
sacralised. Conversely, religious deregulation of society will result in de-
sacralisation and rising pluralism as more suppliers are permitted access to 
the religious economy. 
Deregulation or more specifically, the greater separation of religion and 
state, is predicted to increase levels of religiosity: 
“Our model of religious economies holds that the demise of religious monopolies and the 
deregulation of religious economies will result in a general increase in individual religious 
commitment as more firms (and more motivated firms) gain free access to the market” 
(Stark & Finke, 2000:p200). 
This theoretical expectation is because religious providers who are not 
dependent upon the state for financial support will have to work harder in 
keeping up attendances and satisfying their followers than those who are 
assured an income regardless of what they do. Kept clergy are expected to 
be lazy clergy, Stark & Finke argue, because they get their money regardless 
of what they do and thus do not have to be quite so engaged and 
entrepreneurial. Also, when the state is actively hostile to religion, it crushes 
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the room for entrepreneurial clergy to operate through repressive measures, 
best exemplified by the practices of the Soviet Union.  
To summarise, ecclesiastics who are kept and/or have little freedom to 
proselytise will be less industrious and less fervent than those under 
conditions of religious freedom. This results in lower religious attendance as 
the product is simply not good enough. Stark & Finke also point out that 
laity under conditions of religious state establishment will come to regard 
religion as free, in which they have no immediate interest in up-keeping and 
thus tend to take it for granted and not attend. 
The second variable at the macro-level is religious competition: 
“To the degree that religious economies are unregulated and competitive, overall levels of 
religious participation will be high. (Conversely, lacking competition, the dominant firm[s] 
will be too inefficient to sustain vigorous marketing efforts, and the result will be a low 
overall level of religious participation, with the average person minimising and delaying 
payment of religious costs)” (Stark & Finke, 2000:p201). 
Competition is seen as having an increasing effect on levels of religious 
attendance. I have been unable to find a full explanation of this beyond the 
reiteration of the dogma that competition leads to efficiency and better 
produce. We can however improvise and argue that because religious 
providers in the presence of competitors are likely to lose out if they cannot 
satisfy their religious customers, as someone else in the religious market 
will take up that unmet demand and satisfy it. Thus, religious providers in a 
competitive market have the incentive to work harder at satisfying their 
followers, become more efficient, produce better products, and religious 
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attendance is accordingly greater. In non-competitive or monopolistic 
circumstances, the converse is true. Religious providers have no incentive to 
work as there is no risk that their followers will desert them to go over to 
another supplier as none exist. Thus, religious products are expected to be 
less desirable, less satisfying and production less efficient, so that people 
tend to drop out, resulting in low religious attendance. 
2.15 Empirical evidence for religious economies theory 
Stark & Finke (2000) are at lengths to present the empirical evidence for 
their case as being cut and dry: 
“So now, more than a decade later, only a few recusants continue to claim that religious 
phenomena are exempt from principles such as supply and demand. As ought to be the 
case, most social scientists changed their minds about these matters on the basis of a very 
large and still-growing empirical literature supporting the new approach, a literature 
notable for its diversity as to time and place” (p218). 
Finke & Stark (1988) found that pluralism was associated with greater levels 
of church membership, but only once controlling for the percentage of 
Catholics within the population. This result was replicated using data from 
1890, 1916, and 1926 by Finke (1992|cited in Stark & Finke, 2000). 
However, such studies have been criticised for producing results that stem 
from multicollinearity, which in turn stems from an autocorrelation between 
the percentage of Catholics and number of religious members (Olson 1999). 
Hamberg & Pettersson (1994) found in Sweden that competition increased 
religious attendance.  Bruce (1992) however, found the converse relationship 
when using data from England and Wales from 1851. Also, Aarts et al 
(2008) found that believers were no more likely to attend religious services 
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under conditions of religious pluralism than not. Chaves & Gorski (2001) 
carried out a mammoth review of the empirical evidence as available up 
until 2001. In total, 193 statistical empirical tests were found with the vast 
majority showing a negative relationship between pluralism and religious 
vitality. They also note that historical evidence points away from the 
religious economies school of thought. For instance, religious deregulation 
in the form of greater laicism has occurred in Europe and Canada where 
religious decline has been evidenced. 
The evidence then is far from offering the support that Stark & Finke 
claimed. That said, evidence in support along with that to the contrary was 
rendered highly questionable by the brilliant paper of Voas et al. (2002). 
They successfully argued that correlations between any measure pertaining 
to the concept of religiosity and pluralism (as measured in the standard way) 
are likely to be non-zero due to a mathematical truism rather than anything 
empirically factual. Simulations were run whereby no correlation was 
specified at the outset, yet analyses showed remarkably similar results to 
published findings elsewhere. It was thus inferred by Voas et al. that there 
was no additional relationship other than a mathematical one, and that the 
prospects for religious markets theory were bleak.   
After Voas et al., research into the effect of religious competition/pluralism 
was set back to year zero. Work has begun anew on the relationship 
between religious vitality and pluralism/competition, which takes into 
account the recommendations made by Voas et al. in order to avoid 
mathematical contamination. However, with such allowances made, 
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Borgonovi (2008) found no positive relationship between pluralism and 
religious vitality. Chaves & Gorski (2001) argued that research into 
completion/pluralism had to become more nuanced and to seek a 
patchwork of exceptions rather than a general rule. They also argued that 
competition is likely to occur within rather than between denominations and 
that religious markets are divided along class and ethnic lines; that where 
religious groups are manifested as voluntary associations, they must 
compete with others but also secular alternatives such as sports, politics 
and mass entertainment. Where religious identity is more akin to national 
identity, competition must be thought of as expressions of political, social or 
cultural conflict.  
Pluralism/competition is only one side of the religious economies argument. 
Elsewhere, state withdrawal has been associated with greater vitality, 
namely America and Russia (Chaves & Gorski, 2001). Fox & Tabory (2008) 
have shown that countries with greater degrees of separation of religion and 
state are characterised by higher levels of religious attendance which is 
interpreted as supportive of Stark & Finke’s theory. Ruiter & van Tubergen 
(2009) also found that religious regulation diminished religious attendance. 
Chaves et al (1994) found a strong negative relationship existing between 
state regulation and the religious participation of Muslims which extended 
to include those living in Christian majority societies. However, Bruce 
(2002a) concluded that Scandinavian religious decline has been 
accompanied by constant pluralism and relaxing religious regulation. Other 
cases that have not met the expectations of religious economies theory have 
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been Wales (N.B. disestablishment in 1920) (Crockett & Voas, 2006), 
Australia and Japan (Australia having high separation of religion and state, 
whilst in Japan these were separated after World War II) (Campbell & Curtis, 
1994).  
Indeed, correlations between separation of religion and state, and high 
religiosity, may be down to the overbearing influence of post-colonial 
societies, many of whom incorporated republican style constitutions or were 
forged in Marxist political ideologies, and thus have secular constitutional 
arrangements, even though overall religiosity in the country is high which 
can be attributed to a low level of modernisation. Furthermore, the effect of 
establishment on the Anglican Church has been overstated. Whilst it is 
indeed an established church, nevertheless, much of its income comes from 
the collection plate so that it has to fend for its own interests and yet has 
still suffered declines in attendance against a backdrop of ever increasing 
pluralism. 
2.16 Hypotheses for testing – situating an individual level theory of 
participation within the country-level social context 
Now we can turn back to our individual level theories and finally place them 
firmly within their social context. Gill (2001) has written that most 
comparative political scientists regard religion as something peripheral with 
this possibly being attributable to their belief in the secularisation thesis. 
This, Gill writes, is an error because “religious beliefs and organisations are 
deeply ingrained in almost every nation” and thus to ignore religion is 
perilous to the task of explaining politics (p118). Gill is correct that we need 
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to account for the role of religion in politics, due to the strong moral 
imperatives that it contains alongside the social capital that it can muster 
through its prolonged history often at the heart of the community. However, 
Gill in the same paper also dismisses secularisation because many people 
still believe in God and because religious organisations still exist. Rather, 
what we need to do is to take secularisation theory and incorporate it into 
our theoretical models linking religion and political participation, both in the 
conventional and unconventional modes, but also within civil society. This is 
necessary given the voluminous amounts of evidence presented above for 
secularisation occurring in advanced modern societies. We might also use 
religious economies theory to provide a contextualised theoretical counter-
point. I hesitate before doing this, as there is little empirical support linking 
pluralism/competition to religiosity and only patchy support linking 
religious deregulation. However, given there is a link between religiosity and 
separation of religion and state in some studies and that the effect of Voas et 
al.’s (2002) paper is effectively to reset such research back to year zero, I 
shall utilise this theoretical approach, although I remain sceptical as to the 
mechanisms it posits regardless of any such correlations. 
Why contextualise? Simply because our macro-level theories of the sociology 
of religion lead us to believe there is variation in individual-level religiosity 
across countries depending on their level of modernisation or religious 
freedom. It follows that we should not expect the behaviours of religious 
people to be uniform across these variables either. So, the question arises – 
how might we go about contextualising our individual level theory identified 
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prior? In previous sections of this chapter, it was argued that religiosity 
provides individuals with the motivation, the means, and the mobilisation, 
that are close to necessities for participation in conventional politics and 
civil society. Furthermore, it is also innately authoritarian which should 
guide people away from unconventional participation. The act of 
contextualising these individual level theories of participation is brought 
about through the positing of so-called cross-level interactions. These are 
models that state there is an effect of an individual level attribute on an 
individual level outcome that is moderated by a variable at the macro-, or in 
this case, the country-level. This macro-level variable thus alters the effect 
of the relationship between the individual-level attribute and individual-level 
outcome from country to country. 
From the above literature review of sources relevant to the testing of 
secularisation theory it is clear there is a substantial weakening of religion 
in the most modernised countries. Modernisation is thus identified as 
having theoretical and empirical links to secularisation, which manifests 
itself in declining religiosity among individuals. How might modernisation 
affect the relationship between religiosity and participation in public life?  
First we concern ourselves with conventional political participation. In 
societies that have not undergone pronounced modernisation, it is expected 
that religion will be both stronger and thus more vocal and assertive in 
advancing its moral teachings and interests on political discourse and the 
machinations of government. It is expected that religion will be welcomed as 
a source of legitimacy in which political actors can frame themselves, in 
 
 
~ 103 ~ 
 
order to justify their presence and actions and to win support. Thus, where 
modernisation is low, we expect the effect of religiosity to be positive on 
conventional political participation. However, in societies where 
modernisation has been greater, it is expected that religiosity is much 
weaker and that the public drive of religiosity has been significantly 
attenuated. This is because secularisation has occurred, whereby religion 
has become more diffuse and has been replaced by other sources of rational 
legitimacy resulting in religion’s privatisation. Essentially, we are expecting 
that religion is no longer welcome in conventional politics because 
politicians have instead to make recourse to rational sources of legitimacy 
and that potential supporters are no longer galvanised by religion so that 
they have no advantage over unbelievers. We expect, following Casanova, 
that religion will be unwelcome in this segment of the public sphere so that 
it serves to guide individuals away from it. It is predicted that where 
modernisation is higher, the effect of religiosity on conventional political 
participation will be lower than elsewhere. Thus, we can formerly state our 
first hypothesis: 
H1. The level of societal modernisation will interact with individuals’ 
religiosity in its effect on conventional political participation and the effect of 
the interaction will be negative. 
Now we turn our attention to constructing hypotheses relating to civil 
society, religiosity and modernisation. Casanova argued that in modernised 
societies that have undergone secularisation, religion must forgo 
participation in conventional politics as a means to contesting the 
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occupation of the state and the laws that it lays down.  Instead, they can 
find voice in civil society as moral commentators and self-appointed 
guardians. Building upon this, in civil society, we would expect religion to be 
welcomed as it is both a sphere where religion can prove itself as an 
alternative to the state and thus gain credibility and support, but also 
because of the values of civil society that preach democratic inclusiveness. 
However, we would expect civil society to be more populated by the religious 
in modernised societies, precisely because they have been frozen out of the 
contestation of the state and the legislative process – that is conventional 
political participation. To some extent, the religious have accepted defeat in 
the process of modernisation but those that remain still want to have 
societal influence nevertheless. Their religion, even in attenuated form 
commands it. Whereas conventional politics is closed to religion, in civil 
society it is welcomed due to the openness of this arena and its values of 
inclusiveness. Thus we have the hypothesis: 
H2. The level of societal modernisation will interact with individuals’ 
religiosity in its effect on civil society participation and the effect of the 
interaction will be positive. 
Now we turn our attention to unconventional political participation. 
Previously, I argued that religiosity, which has been linked empirically to 
authoritarianism, would tend to distance itself from unconventional political 
participation since the latter tends to be authority challenging. But how 
might this relationship be influenced by the societal-level of modernisation 
given what we know from secularisation theory? It is predicted that the 
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effect of modernisation will make religion less distinct from secular ways of 
life and thus we would expect a diminishing of the distinction between 
religion and non-religion. We are expecting that religion will become less 
authoritarian as it blends into secular ways of thinking and acting. Thus, we 
expect in societies that have undergone modernisation to find that religiosity 
may still steer individuals away from authority challenging behaviour, but 
that this effect is much less than that in societies that have so far not 
undergone modernisation. Thus, we can state the hypothesis that: 
H3. The level of societal modernisation will interact with individuals’ 
religiosity in its effect on unconventional political participation and the effect of 
the interaction will be positive (i.e. the effect of religiosity becomes less 
negative). 
Now we turn our attention to constructing cross-level interaction hypotheses 
derived from religious economies theory. The macro-level variable identified 
as having a possible role in moderating the effect of religiosity is the level of 
separation of religion and state. This variable is interpreted as being a 
measure of the extent to which the religious economy is regulated and thus 
is constitutive of the amount of religious freedom which is a precondition for 
religious competition according to Stark & Finke (2000). This variable has 
been selected because of some of the empirical studies cited above that have 
shown a link in the expected direction as predicted by religious economies 
theory. Religious pluralism/competition is not identified as such, because of 
the methodological problems associated with its measurement and 
application in regression based analyses. 
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First, we concern ourselves with conventional political participation. 
Following religious economies theory, it is predicted that where the religious 
market is less regulated, religious firms will have more need to work harder 
in order to secure their income and will have more freedom which is 
expected to enliven them. We would expect this enthusiasm to transfer from 
religious firms and their staff to religious followers because as everyone 
knows, enthusiasm is contagious. If religious people are more enthused by 
their religion, we would expect them to be more forceful in attempting to 
have influence through conventional politics in order to have their moral 
beliefs enacted on a wider scale. Where religions are heavily regulated and in 
the presence of established religion, we would expect that religious firms 
would become lazy and their messages would be less transferred to their 
followers who thus have less motivation in order to get involved.  We can 
also argue that where religious providers are supported by the state, they 
will become lazy and thus the religious institutions themselves, namely the 
churches and mosques etc. will become less effective in linking individuals 
into politics than they would otherwise be. Thus, we have the hypothesis 
that: 
H4. The level of separation of religion and state will interact with individuals’ 
religiosity in its effect on conventional political participation and the effect of 
the interaction will be positive. 
Now we turn our attention to the theoretical relationship between civil 
society, religiosity and separation of religion and state. From the religious 
economies school of thinking, we would predict that where the religious 
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economy is less regulated, where there is no established religion and no 
restraints on religious activity, religion will be more vibrant and will thus be 
more assertive of its ideas and morals in an attempt to order the wider 
society along religious lines. Thus, we would expect more religious activity in 
civil society when separation of religion and state is greater. Otherwise, we 
would expect religious activity in civil society to be lessened, as when the 
state restricts religious freedom or when there is an established faith, we 
would expect religious firms to be lazy and less capable of doing what is 
necessary to get people excited by religion, and thus there will be less 
religious activity in civil society. The same argument about religious 
institutions becoming less effective as sites of mobilisation under conditions 
of religious establishment can also be used to justify this theory. This 
hypothesis is stated thus: 
H5. The level of separation of religion and state will interact with individuals’ 
religiosity in its effect on civil society participation and the effect of the 
interaction will be positive. 
Now we turn out attention to religiosity, unconventional political 
participation and separation of religion and state. Religious economies 
theory can be used to predict that greater separation of religion and state 
means greater deregulation of the religious economy and thus more vibrancy 
amongst the religious which is accompanied by greater attention to religious 
teaching. Through better teaching it is expected that the authoritarian drive 
within religion will come more to the forefront as clergy become better at 
conveying religion’s true message. Thus, we have the hypothesis: 
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H6. The level of separation of religion and state will interact with individuals’ 
religiosity in its effect on unconventional political participation and the effect of 
the interaction will be negative (i.e. the effect of religiosity becomes more 
negative). 
In case this exposition has not been enough, the theoretical model for 
conventional political participation is presented graphically in Figure 2 as an 
example of the kinds of theories that are being specified here. 
Figure 2: Cross-level interactions - a theory of religiosity, country context, and 
conventional political participation 
Conventional
political
participation
Religiosity
Modernisation
Separation of
religion and
state
Individual level
Country level
- +
 
These hypotheses are put forward in the knowledge that to date nothing 
quite like this has been done and are further justified as contributing to a 
literature that has not too much to offer by way of contextualised individual-
level effects. It is stressed that these theories are derived from secularisation 
and religious economies theories and do not represent the ideas of their 
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original proponents. It is my contention that these derivations are 
reasonable given the foundations of these theories and serve to actually 
advance them by looking at their ‘knock-on’ effects rather than just using 
them to explain religious attendance levels. With reflection, there is much 
more to the idea of vitality than mere numbers in the houses of worship and 
any good theory that looks to explain this must look further afield to its 
effect on society at large. These hypotheses are to be used as a launch point 
for empirical inquiry. If they do not find empirical confirmation then 
theoretical revisions shall be necessary. 
2.17 Summary 
This chapter has laid out the theoretical groundwork for this thesis. 
Arguments were made drawing on the literature of political participation, 
that religiosity will encourage activity in conventional political participation 
and civil society, because it is a source of motivation, means to participate, 
and opportunities for mobilisation. However, because religiosity is linked to 
authoritarianism, it was argued that religiosity would be negatively 
associated with unconventional political participation as this tends to be 
authority challenging in nature. Then we turned to the literature on 
secularisation and religious economies theory. From these theories, it was 
identified that the country level of modernisation and the level of separation 
of religion and state could be theoretically expected to influence individuals’ 
levels of religiosity, and that indeed there was a (varying) degree of empirical 
evidence that could be interpreted as providing support for these theories. 
Secularisation theory and religious economies theory were then synthesised 
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with individual level theories of participation in order to propose some 
hypotheses to be tested in subsequent chapters. These are summarised in 
Table 1. Before we go onto our empirical analyses, it is necessary to have a 
discussion of data, methods, operationalistion, and validity, in order for us 
to have any confidence in the results that follow. 
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Table 1: The principle hypotheses and their theoretical expectation 
 
 
 
  
Hypothesis Expectation 
1. Modernisation decreases the effect of religiosity on conventional political 
participation. 
- 
2. Modernisation increases the effect of religiosity on civil society 
participation. 
+ 
3. Modernisation increases (makes less negative) the effect of religiosity on 
unconventional political participation. 
+ 
4. Religious free-market conditions increase the effect of religiosity on 
conventional political participation. 
+ 
5. Religious free-market conditions increase the effect of religiosity on civil 
society participation. 
+ 
6. Religious free-market conditions decrease (makes more negative) the effect 
of religiosity on unconventional political participation. 
- 
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Chapter 3 - Data, measurement, and validity across cultural 
contexts 
3.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify appropriate measurements of the 
concepts identified in the theoretical outline that was laid out in the last 
chapter. This is done through a meticulous analysis of validity across 
cultural contexts. It must be remembered that such labours are necessary, 
particularly in country comparative research. This is because the 
application of questionnaires may be uneven despite the best intentions of 
the survey designers, and may be understood and thus responded to 
differently due to cultural differences that filter and distort the intended 
meanings of the concepts alluded to in surveys. This can lead potentially to 
culturally specific responses that are in effect incomparable across contexts. 
Thus, comparisons between their responses would be a fool’s errand.  
This chapter offers an analysis of validity across cultural contexts, of the 
principal measurement instruments used in this study, namely measures of 
religiosity, conventional political participation, unconventional political 
participation, civil society participation, modernisation, and separation of 
religion and state. This chapter opens with a brief account of the data used 
and an exploration of why context might matter, before continuing to offer a 
summary of the ways in which each key concept in this study is conceived of 
and measured in the social sciences along with original empirical analyses 
of validity. 
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3.2 The World Values Survey 
The individual level data used throughout this study come from the World 
Values Survey series (WVS, 2009). This project began in 1981 and the first 
wave consisted of 20 countries. Since then, four other waves have followed, 
which were carried out between 1989-1993, 1994-1998, 1999-2004, and 
2005-2008. This study uses wave 5 only due to questions of measurement 
availability and the desire to test hypotheses on the same dataset. Where 
possible, country samples were collected using probability sampling (WVS). 
This dataset is not a random sample as inclusion is dependent on the 
resources and willingness of the country in question to participate, so 
results should be treated with caution as they are not representative of the 
world as a whole. Accordingly, it should be kept in mind that statistical tests 
applied will suffer as a result and thus should bear the caveat of being 
heuristic rather than purely scientific.  
Nevertheless, what the WVS loses by way of it being non-random can be 
offset to a degree by its scope. The WVS provides data on a substantial 
number of countries which cover the majority of the world’s population 
(WVS). The use of this data set can be defended not only on grounds of its 
inclusiveness but also by the fact that there is no alternative if one wants to 
entertain hypotheses relating to such broad macro trends as modernisation 
and separation of religion and state. Thus, whilst the WVS is imperfect, it is 
the best resource available that provides a large enough range of countries 
for country-level and cross-level interaction hypotheses to be investigated. 
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Wave 5 of the WVS contains data on 80 countries. These are: Andorra, 
Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Canada, Chile, China, Taiwan, 
Colombia, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, 
Great Britain, Ghana, Guatemala, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, 
Italy, Japan, Jordan, South Korea, Malaysia, Mali, Mexico, Moldova, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, Romania, 
Russia, Rwanda, Serbia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Turkey, Ukraine, United States, 
Uruguay, Vietnam, and Zambia. In total, it contains data on 82,992 
individuals. 
Regrettably, not all this data can be used due to missing measurements. In 
each instance it is strived after to keep the number of countries as large as 
possible so that results are as representative as possible and also for 
reasons pertaining to the application of multilevel analysis which this study 
makes copious use of. 
The WVS is extensive in the broad range of themes that it amasses data on. 
It contains data on individuals’ attitudes and behaviour germane to the 
fields of work, family, religion, politics, and leisure time. It supplies also a 
full set of basic demographics so that the effects of social stratification on 
individual attitudes and behaviour can be observed. The WVS is thus, the 
appropriate data source that offers information on beliefs and behaviour 
across the world that allows us to investigate the hypotheses proposed in 
the preceding chapter. 
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The research design is in the terms of Prezworski & Teune (1970) a most-
different systems design rather than a most-similar one as we are looking to 
test for the relevance of systemic factors. As Norris (2002) notes, the 
disadvantage of such an approach is the loss of “richness and depth” (p10) 
that comes with case studies of countries with much in common. Increasing 
the range of dissimilarity increases the complexity according to Norris since 
cultural and political traditions have greater variance. She is however keen 
to stress that there are advantages too – most-different systems design allow 
us to test grand theories pertaining to the macro-level such as societal 
modernisation, for instance. They cannot be tested where there is not 
enough range in the macro-variables in question. Choosing a most-similar 
systems research design might increase the comparability of the data but 
this would be at the expense of the validity of the research design due to 
insufficient variance at the country-level. 
3.3 The influence of cultural context on survey methodology 
Why might the social context be important when considering comparative 
datasets and what contextual factors may play a role? Let us imagine two 
individuals, the interviewer and the respondent. The interviewer has some 
ideas, in the form of a question, which he or she wishes to convey to the 
respondent, whom it is hoped will then relay a truthful answer. Culture 
could alter the reception of content due to the fact that different words and 
ideas may have different connotations in different cultures or different 
meanings. For instance, asking an Irishman, an American, and a 
Frenchman if they were ‘republicans’ might elicit the same response, but the 
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intended meanings would be totally different. Thus, when survey designers 
intend one thing, culture may act as such, that the survey question is 
understood in a different manner, and thus the response is not indicative of 
what is desired and cannot stand as a measurement of the concept under 
investigation when it is applied across contexts simultaneously. 
Country of residence is identified as the cultural-specific factor that could 
most affect responses. This may affect things because translations of 
surveys across languages are never exact and thus certain words may have 
certain connotations unique to the culture and history of the country in 
question that will result in responses being incomparable to those taken 
from other cultural contexts. For instance, Gary King and his associates 
(King et al., 2004) have shown that what is interpreted as political efficacy 
differs between countries. Before we begin to describe the key concepts and 
their measurement, it must be stated exactly what is mean by validity. Then 
we turn to assessing the validity of our measurements. 
3.4 Different types of validity 
The understanding of validity and its different types as applied within the 
social sciences is taken from an authoritative paper by Adcock & Collier 
(2001). Validity is understood as being the process “specifically concerned 
with whether operationalization and the scoring of cases adequately reflect 
the concept the researcher seeks to measure” (p529). Validity is to be 
distinguished from reliability. Reliability assumes validity and is concerned 
with the accuracy of a valid measurement. A measurement can be valid in 
the sense that it is tapping into the desired concept, but unreliable in the 
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sense that there is a great deal of measurement error resulting from the 
measurement process. At this point, we are thus concerned with whether or 
not our measurements truly reflect the concepts that interest us.  
Firstly, a measurement instrument is deemed to be valid when:  
“scores… derived from a given indicator… can meaningfully be interpreted in terms of the 
systemized concept… that the indicator seeks to operationalise.” (Adcock & Collier, 
2001:p531)  
There are three processes of validation identified by Adcock & Collier. They 
are (1) content validation, (2) convergent/discriminant validation, and (3) 
nomological/construct validation.  
Content validation is the assessment of whether or not the measurement 
instrument is capturing the ideas expressed in the systematised concept. 
This process is based on a reasoned discussion of the possible measurement 
instruments with primary focus on the wording of the questions used, and 
having no statistical or empirical moment. 
Convergent/discriminant validation is when it is asked if an indicator is 
empirically associated with other indicators that are all closely related 
conceptually.  It is thus a statistical procedure. Convergent validation asks if 
indicators perform in the same manner as other conceptually related 
indicators. Discriminant validation asks if the indicator performs differently 
in relation to other non-conceptually related indicators that are reflective of 
other concepts. Validity is determined if the items perform in the same 
manner and do not relate empirically to other conceptually distinct items. 
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Related to this, is criterion validation, whereby one conceptually-related 
variable (known as a criterion variable) is assumed to be the gold standard 
by which all other possible measurement instruments are judged. This 
process can be criticised due to the fact that criterion variables are few and 
far between and if they indeed represent a gold standard of measurement, 
then why not use them in your research instead? (Adcock & Collier, 2001) 
Nomological/construct validation is according to Adcock & Collier, when an 
item is said to be valid if it performs in an expected manner when tested 
against another variable that is reflective of something conceptually distinct 
but is known to bare a cast-iron empirical relationship to the concept of 
which the item is hoped to be reflective of. If prior research told us that 
educational attainment was strongly and consistently related to subjective 
well-being then we would judge a new measurement of educational 
attainment to be valid if it correlated strongly with subjective wellbeing. This 
approach can be criticised for validating an instrument by another that in 
itself may not be valid, whilst also the availability of such a cast-iron 
empirically-related variable may be lacking (Adcock & Collier, 2001).  
3.5 Existing approaches to measuring religiosity 
Systematisation is the process of identifying the attributes of a concept and 
stipulating their relationships to the underlying concept and to each other, 
through bonds of necessity and/or sufficiency (Adcock & Collier, 2001). A 
quick appraisal of the literature however reveals, as we shall see, that there 
is in fact no consistent systematisation (and thus operationalization) of the 
concept of religiosity.  
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One approach is to consider religiosity as conceptually simple, so that it is 
possible to measure it by a single variable. Religiosity is thus operationalised 
by one indicator alone, be it some measure of belief or religious institutional 
participation (Witter et al., 1985; Kendler et al., 1997). This approach is 
common, particularly when religiosity is used as a control variable, but it 
has also been used when it constitutes the key explanatory variable.  For 
instance Ruiter & De Graaf’s (2006) paper on civil society participation used 
religious service attendance to measure religiosity. This approach is 
insufficient to capture the full gamut of religiosity because, as Davie would 
counter, belonging is not the only facet of religiosity that matters. Thus, it is 
generally considered best to measure religiosity by treating it as a multi-
dimensional concept with multiple indicators in order to capture the 
nuances that escape single variable measurements. However, as we shall 
see, there is some question as to whether or not these more subtle 
theoretical approaches to measurement actually are born out empirically. 
The first attempt to consider religiosity as multi-dimensional was made by 
Stark & Glock (1968). Religiosity was thought of as having five distinct 
dimensions. These were belief, practice, knowledge, experience, and the 
consequential. Belief referred to the extent that the individual was accepting 
of religious teachings. Practice was the extent to which individuals were 
participating in religious services, along with rites and rituals. Knowledge 
referred to the level of mastery of the theology of the religion in question. 
Experience meant the personal experiences of religious phenomena and 
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feelings of the individual. Finally, the consequential dimension was the level 
of impact that religion had upon the day-to-day life of the individual. 
Stark & Glock offer us what may serve as a systematized conceptualization 
of religiosity, with each dimension seen as an attribute of the concept of 
religiosity as well as being a continuous variable in its own right. However, 
Stark & Glock say nothing about the relationships between these attributes 
in terms of necessity and sufficiency. Another criticism of this approach is 
noted by Mueller (1980), who wrote that the dimension of knowledge would 
identify as religious those who have some knowledge of religion but are 
hostile to it - for instance, staunch atheists such as Richard Dawkins or 
Christopher Hitchens. On a similar theme, the knowledge dimension was 
found to be least empirically related to the other dimensions of religiosity 
(Weigert & Thomas, 1974). Elsewhere, high correlations were found between 
these dimensions, which would suggest that they are in a sense measuring 
the same thing or that each is a precondition for the other (Gibbs & Crader, 
1970). Support for the idea of belief as the fundamental cause of the other 
dimensions is given weight by Clayton & Gladden (1974) who found that the 
dimension of ideological commitment had the strongest bearing on their 
data whilst a common factor was found so that they concluded religiosity 
was not multidimensional. Mueller in turn has concluded that the 
dimensions of practice, feeling, experience, and emotion are empirically 
indistinct whilst belief is all-encompassing (Mueller, 1980). There is also 
some support for distinctiveness of these dimensions (e.g. Weigert & 
Thomas, 1974). 
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The multidimensional approach to religiosity was further refined by 
Cornwall et al. (1986). They argued that Stark & Glock were correct to 
assume a multi-faceted conceptualisation of religiosity but had erred in the 
sense that they had included dimensions that were more peripheral than 
essential. Instead, the kernel of religiosity could be found in only three 
dimensions of religiosity. They were (1) belief/cognitive – referring to that 
specifically believed, (2) affective – detailing the strength of emotional 
attachment to religious beliefs, and (3) practice – meaning individuals’ 
upholding of certain behaviours that are encouraged by the religions. 
Additionally, there are 2 modes of religiosity, namely the personal and the 
institutional. The former relates to religiosity as something more intimate 
and acquired through individual discovery, whilst the latter refers to religion 
as it is handed down from long-established institutions such as churches 
and mosques. Thus, when cross-tabulated, six distinct attributes of 
religiosity emerge. They are: traditional orthodoxy, particularistic orthodoxy, 
spiritual commitment, church commitment, religious behaviour, and 
religious participation. Empirically, these dimensions were found to have a 
large degree of distinctness, although data was restricted to Mormons. 
Those criticisms pertaining to necessity and sufficiency and weighting 
levelled at Stark & Glock would apply equally as well here. 
The Duke Religion Index (DRI) measures religiosity by decomposing it into 
such dimensions as the organisational, non-organisational, and the intrinsic 
(Koenig & Büssing, 2010). Essentially, what we have here are two aspects 
that deal with behaviour, be it in the presence of others and 
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institutionalised, or done in solitary confinement, and one that is to do with 
the inherent quality of the individual’s subjective relationship to religious 
belief (Storch et al., 2004). Storch et al. in their empirical analysis of the 
three dimensions identified by the DRI found that despite its theoretical 
underpinnings that specify distinct dimensions, all items indicative of these 
dimensions were found to be loading onto a common factor, and thus each 
could be concluded to be a valid indicator of the same concept. 
Another approach is that of Kendler et al. (1997), who found two dimensions 
of religiosity, which they labelled personal devotion and personal 
conservatism. Personal devotion was composed of the importance of 
religious beliefs, frequency of church attendance, consciousness of religious 
purpose, frequency of seeking spiritual comfort, frequency of private prayer, 
and satisfaction with spiritual life. The second dimension of personal 
conservatism was made up of items measuring a literal belief in the bible, a 
belief in being ‘born again’, belief in God, and belief in a rewarding and 
punishing God. This approach suggests that there is one common 
dimension of religiosity for the majority but that there is a minority who are 
subscribing to a fundamentalist outlook that distinguishes them from the 
rest.  
Chatters et al. (1992) theorised a 3 dimensional conception of religiosity. The 
three dimensions they identified were (1) organisational religiosity, (2) non-
organisational religiosity, and (3) subjective religiosity. These are understood 
as two measures of practice and one pertaining to the individual’s intrinsic 
belief. The practice dimensions are related to that done with others (most 
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notably church attendance) and that done privately (prayer for instance). 
The subjective dimension was operationalised in a way that attempts to 
grasp how vital religious beliefs are and is analogous to the affective 
dimension as outlined by Cornwall et al. (1986). Empirically, these 
dimensions were sustained, but were considered likely to be inter-correlated 
so that we can think of these dimensions as being distinct but nevertheless 
part of the same concept of religiosity, which acts as a kind of ‘umbrella’ 
term for these sub-concepts. 
It would seem that a multi-dimensional framework is best theoretically. The 
question is: Are there empirically distinct dimensions of religiosity or merely 
one common factor despite all these multi-dimensional theoretical outlooks? 
The studies explored above would point towards there either being one 
common factor or several dimensions which are in fact sub-dimensions of 
an over-arching concept and are accordingly highly inter-correlated. Thus, if 
one assumes a common factor approach, reflective of empirical 
indistinctness, one would not be erring by too much as even if two items are 
reflective of two different dimensions of religiosity, they are nevertheless part 
of the over-arching concept of religiosity and are merely measuring different 
facets of the same thing and thus, miss-measurement is not occurring. 
3.6 Operationalising religiosity 
The literature tends to posit the concept of religiosity as having multiple 
dimensions or components. Many of these approaches, particularly those 
stemming from psychology are designed for small scale designs whereby the 
researcher has control over what goes into the survey and what does not. 
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This study does not however have any power over the survey design, nor 
would a multi-indicator measurement of some 40 indicators be appropriate 
in the WVS, given limitations of time and space and the desire of the 
principle investigators to measure as wide a variety of attitudes and 
behaviours as possible. This study follows Cornwall et al. in assuming three 
theoretical dimensions of religiosity – belief, affect, and attendance – as this 
approach is striking a nice balance between detail and parsimony. Then it is 
assumed that these will tend to presuppose one another so that empirically, 
these dimensions will be indistinct. This approach to measurement is 
defended on grounds of parsimony and availability of indicators within the 
WVS. 
Now we have to come up with some sort of measurement using the existing 
items within the WVS that is valid across country-specific contexts. This 
segment thus proceeds by identifying three indicators of religiosity in the 
WVS, and provides a discussion of their content validity. The WVS is 
possibly over laden with potential indicators of religiosity. However most are 
not of use as they are asked in a minority of countries, or, tend to offer only 
binary responses meaning that the gradation of religiosity of the individual 
is impossible.  
The first indicator of interest is an assessment of the importance religion 
plays in the life of the individual: 
For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life [...] Religion [...] 
Would you say it is: 
(1) Very important 
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(2) Rather important 
(3) Not very important 
(4) Not at all important 
This item, subsequently referred to as IMPREL2 is found in the vast majority 
of country-samples. It is reverse coded so that higher values come to mean 
greater levels of religiosity.  
This item is deemed to pass the requirements of content validation, as it is 
clearly referring to religiosity although it does not refer to a specific attribute 
or dimension of religiosity – it could be in fact all-encompassing. There is a 
small chance that an atheist who feels oppressed by religion might adjudge 
religion to be important in their life regardless of their non-belief; the 
likelihood of such an interpretation would be small however.  
The second variable of interest is a subjective measure of the importance of 
the character of God to the individual respondent: 
How important is God in your life? Please use this scale to indicate – 10 means very 
important and 1 means not at all important: 
(1) Not at all important… (10) Very important 
This item appeared in nearly all countries and will subsequently be referred 
to as IMPGOD.  
This item can be interpreted as capturing the dimensions of belief and 
religious affect, as it presupposes that the individual believes in the religious 
claim that there is a god and that they have some sort of emotional 
                                       
2 Each variable used in this study is assigned a signifier in similar fashion. In case it gets 
confusing a full list of all variables and their signifiers is supplied in Appendix A. 
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attachment to it. God is a central figure in most religions. Thus, this item 
passes content validation. 
The third indicator of religiosity that is of interest is a measure of religious 
service attendance. Respondents were asked: 
Apart from weddings, funerals and christenings, about how often do you attend religious 
services these days? 
(1) More than once a week 
(2) Once a week 
(3) Once a month 
(4) Only on special holy days/Christmas/ Easter days 
(5) Other specific holy days 
(6) Once a year 
(7) Less often 
(8) Never practically never 
This item also appeared in most country-samples. Although categorical and 
ordinal, it is treated as capturing an underlying continuous variable of 
religious service attendance. Categories (4) and (5) are merged into each 
other. This variable is reverse coded so that greater numbers mean higher 
attendance. Hereafter, this variable will be referred to as RELATT. 
This item is on the surface a valid measurement of the attendance 
dimension of religiosity. One possible hang-up could be that it would label 
people as religious who only go out of social convention and have no faith. 
However studies have shown believing and belonging tend to accompany 
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each other in practice (Voas & Crockett, 2005; Aarts et al., 2008). One 
question of validity is whether or not those items used are equally and fairly 
applicable to all cases (Adcock & Collier, 2001). We might ask if it is fair to 
use a measurement of religious attendance for measuring religiosity within 
Islam-dominant social contexts? The problem of the Islamic case for any 
measurement strategy is well illustrated by Gonzalez (2011): 
“In Kuwait, men are encouraged to attend mosque for their prayers and women are 
encouraged to pray at home. While the reading of the Qur’an is facilitated by the imam for 
men, women will read during their prayers or worship time at home by themselves or with 
other women.” (p346) 
On this basis, it is apparent that the application of some measurements will 
favour men and reflect more their religiosity, whilst others will be more 
favourable to women and would be measuring their religiosity better but 
possibly at the expense of men. However, question wording in the WVS as 
applied in Islamic countries makes allowances for this problem so that it is 
surmounted. Elsewhere, religious attendance is recognised as subject to 
social desirability response bias (Hadaway et al., 1993), although it has been 
concluded that if indeed it does lack reliability in itself, it retains validity as 
an indicator of overall religiosity, as those that over-report, tend to be 
intrinsically highly religious (Brenner, 2011). 
Having determined the face-value appropriateness of these indicators, we 
progress with some simple correlation analyses before moving onto factor 
analysis in order to assess convergent validity. 
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3.6.1 Correlation analysis of indicators of religiosity 
In Table 2 are presented the pairwise correlations of items IMPREL, 
IMPGOD, and RELATT along with their statistical significance (at the 5% 
level) and some descriptive statistics. Along with the overall correlation, 
correlations are given for each country-specific sample. When aggregated 
across all countries, the correlations are positive and substantial. That 
between IMPREL and IMPGOD is highest at 0.70. Correlations between 
these two variables and RELATT - 0.54 and 0.50 respectively - are slightly 
lower but nevertheless substantial by social science standards and seem 
promising for building a case to establish validity. Needless to say, all these 
correlations are statistically significant at the 5% level. Table 2 also presents 
the correlations of IMPREL, IMPGOD and RELATT as they stand within each 
country.  
Table 2: Indicators of religiosity – descriptive statistics and correlations 
  IMPREL(1) IMPGOD(2) RELATT(3) Pairwise correlation (* 5% significance) 
 N mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. (1)~(2) (1)~(3) (2)~(3) 
Overall  82,992 3.09 1.05 7.79 2.99 4.03 2.19 0.70* 0.54* 0.50* 
Sample  specific           
Andorra  1003 1.97 0.96 5.36 3.34 2.13 1.66 0.63* 0.58* 0.51* 
Argentina  1002 2.84 1.00 8.32 2.62 3.32 2.06 0.50* 0.49* 0.44* 
Australia  1421 2.29 1.09 6.09 3.37 2.61 1.97 0.74* 0.68* 0.57* 
Bulgaria  1001 2.52 0.98 5.70 2.77 3.19 1.57 0.48* 0.29* 0.42* 
Burkina Faso  1534 3.80 0.51 9.11 1.68 5.70 1.90 0.24* 0.24* 0.18* 
Canada  2164 2.82 1.05 7.41 2.97 3.45 2.10 0.69* 0.64* 0.54* 
Chile  1000 2.99 0.97 8.66 2.19 3.51 2.13 0.40* 0.39* 0.32* 
China  2015 1.82 0.93 3.58 2.91 2.93 1.87 0.53* 0.50* 0.56* 
Cyprus  1050 3.21 0.97 8.51 2.35 3.56 1.81 0.47* 0.31* 0.29* 
Egypt  3051 3.95 0.25 9.91 0.71 4.28 2.38 0.00 0.01 0.03 
Ethiopia  1500 3.73 0.63 9.21 1.56 5.81 1.50 0.05 0.45* 0.22* 
Finland  1014 2.48 0.95 6.01 3.00 2.90 1.58 0.73* 0.56* 0.52* 
France  1001 2.26 1.02 4.68 3.14 2.20 1.71 0.69* 0.54* 0.56* 
Georgia  1500 3.77 0.52 9.20 1.36 4.00 1.57 0.34* 0.16* 0.20* 
Germany  2064 2.07 1.02 4.48 3.20 2.65 1.76 0.73* 0.68* 0.71* 
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  IMPREL(1) IMPGOD(2) RELATT(3) Pairwise correlation (* 5% significance) 
 N mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d. (1)~(2) (1)~(3) (2)~(3) 
Ghana  1534 3.88 0.40 9.78 0.75 5.98 1.48 0.16* 0.31* 0.08* 
Great Britain  1041 2.35 1.07 5.58 3.35 2.74 2.07 0.73* 0.67* 0.57* 
Guatemala  1000 3.77 0.56 9.72 0.94 5.59 1.66 0.23* 0.36* 0.21* 
Hong Kong  1252 2.23 0.70 4.31 2.77 2.22 1.68 0.41* 0.34* 0.43* 
India  2001 3.27 0.90 7.52 3.07 4.86 1.78 0.27* 0.23* 0.18* 
Indonesia  2015 3.93 0.31 9.57 1.34 5.43 1.65 0.24* 0.15* 0.16* 
Iran  2667 3.72 0.61 9.43 1.54 4.24 2.18 0.23* 0.28* 0.05* 
Iraq  2701 3.95 0.25 9.84 0.68 3.39 2.49 0.27* -0.01 0.01 
Italy  1012 3.04 0.89 7.84 2.31 4.44 1.72 0.65* 0.60* 0.57* 
Japan  1096 1.81 0.90 5.01 2.67 3.30 1.26 0.48* 0.26* 0.33* 
Jordan  1200 3.95 0.25 9.90 0.73 6.56 1.56 -0.01 0.17* 0.03 
Mali  1534 3.89 0.36 9.17 1.59 5.68 1.89 0.23* 0.11* 0.05* 
Mexico  1560 3.41 0.82 9.43 1.49 4.66 1.90 0.38* 0.43* 0.28* 
Moldova  1046 2.98 0.89 8.13 2.32 3.67 1.55 0.57* 0.36* 0.41* 
Netherlands  1050 2.08 1.05 4.69 3.22 2.49 1.92 0.73* 0.67* 0.62* 
New Zealand  954 2.19 1.08 5.35 3.47 2.52 1.96 0.81* 0.72* 0.66* 
Norway  1025 2.17 0.93 4.21 3.07 2.42 1.53 0.73* 0.55* 0.55* 
Peru  1500 3.22 0.91 8.98 1.87 4.66 1.76 0.37* 0.27* 0.28* 
Poland  1000 3.31 0.78 8.70 2.00 5.17 1.47 0.55* 0.53* 0.43* 
Romania  1776 3.46 0.73 9.17 1.63 4.30 1.57 0.43* 0.26* 0.27* 
Russian Fed  2033 2.42 0.94 6.02 3.09 2.66 1.56 0.55* 0.48* 0.53* 
Rwanda  1507 3.35 0.56 9.45 1.37 6.67 0.94 0.08* 0.10* 0.02 
Serbia  1220 2.86 0.88 7.12 2.58 3.82 1.49 0.46* 0.37* 0.39* 
Slovenia  1037 2.32 1.02 5.42 3.21 3.38 1.90 0.66* 0.57* 0.59* 
South Africa  2988 3.59 0.73 9.16 1.54 4.81 2.00 0.35* 0.43* 0.30* 
South Korea  1200 2.52 1.01 5.65 2.82 3.89 2.18 0.60* 0.62* 0.62* 
Spain  1200 2.24 1.04 5.34 3.03 2.71 1.97 0.61* 0.55* 0.60* 
Sweden  1003 2.09 0.93 3.93 3.05 2.12 1.40 0.63* 0.54* 0.55* 
Switzerland  1241 2.41 1.02 6.35 3.14 3.09 1.88 0.66* 0.64* 0.55* 
Taiwan  1227 2.51 0.85 6.13 2.40 2.53 1.68 0.44* 0.37* 0.32* 
Thailand  1534 3.50 0.62 7.98 1.42 5.32 1.39 0.28* 0.25* 0.23* 
Trinidad & Tob  1002 3.67 0.70 9.67 1.29 4.71 1.89 0.20* 0.33* 0.05 
Turkey  1346 3.64 0.72 9.36 1.53 3.75 2.27 0.47* 0.27* 0.22* 
Ukraine  1000 2.57 0.95 7.19 2.66 3.36 1.64 0.53* 0.51* 0.60* 
United States  1249 3.11 0.99 8.25 2.66 3.88 2.26 0.68* 0.60* 0.44* 
Uruguay  1000 2.43 1.11 7.32 3.07 3.63 2.15 0.53* 0.36* 0.28* 
Viet Nam  1495 2.20 0.84 4.83 3.06 2.63 1.79 0.30* 0.29* 0.32* 
Zambia  1500 3.70 0.61 9.18 1.55 5.45 1.75 0.27* 0.28* 0.16* 
 
The majority of samples show correlations between the variables. In sum, 47 
out of 53 samples showed positive and significant correlations amongst all 3 
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variables. The strength of these correlations tends to vary, suggesting that 
while the variables may very well have measured religiosity successfully, 
some samples have been more successful than others. In 5 countries, no 
complete sets of correlations were found – this is put down to the fact that 
religiosity in such countries is so high that there is insufficient variance in 
the variables to produce correlations. Thus, these indicators may well be 
valid but correlation analysis is not necessarily helping us here to determine 
this. 
3.6.2 Exploratory factor analysis of indicators of religiosity 
The best method of establishing that measurements are both valid and 
comparable across groups is confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) (Tran, 2009; 
Gregorich, 2007). This is a form of factor analysis that imposes a theoretical 
framework upon the data and allows one to undertake hypothesis testing 
(Tran, 2009; Gregorich, 2007, Kline, 1993). CFA was attempted but 
problems relating to convergence and identification proved so difficult (and 
time consuming) to surmount, that results could only be achieved through 
the imposition of major constraints on the model that could not be 
theoretically justified. With such constraints in place, the CFA model was 
not passing the appropriate tests to establish model fit, even at their most 
basic, namely the establishment of configural invariance (a common factor 
structure), and when the dataset had been rigged by using countries already 
known to hold a factor structure in common. Thus, we regretfully dispense 
with CFA and instead turn to exploratory factor analysis (EFA). This method 
does not allow one to impose a theoretical framework but is advantageous in 
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that it always produces results. EFA is applied to the 3 indicators of 
religiosity using the principle factor method of extraction. To better grasp 
the structure of the data, varimax rotations of the original factor matrix are 
presented in Table 3.  
Overall, the variables IMPREL, IMPGOD and RELATT all load onto the same 
factor, with IMPREL and IMPGOD having slightly higher factor loadings than 
RELATT. EFA returns a one factor solution which suggests that there is only 
one dimension of religiosity despite the multiple dimensions proposed by 
some notable scholars as discussed above. Of that underlying latent 
variable, IMPREL, IMPGOD and RELATT are manifestations and the fact 
that they are loading onto a common factor and are inter-correlated would 
be indicative that they are each and on their own, valid indicators of 
religiosity. How does it transpire when one looks at each sample specifically? 
In Table 3, we can see that the majority of cases returned via EFA, one 
factor solutions. In only 6 cases out of 53 was a 2 factor solution returned 
and in all these incidences, no substantial loadings onto that second factor 
were registered. The cases of Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Trinidad & 
Tobago all did not present first factors onto which all three variables were 
loading substantially (defined as less than 0.3 following Tran (2009)). There 
are also incidences were a one factor solution onto which all three variables 
did not load. The cases of Ghana, Mali, and Rwanda, returned 1 factor 
solutions only not all three variables had substantial loadings. Our 
conclusion here echoes that made after the correlation analysis – that there 
is within country specific samples, evidence for the validity of these items 
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but there are exceptions where EFA is not producing the expected results. 
This problem is swept aside since factor analysis is not a good method when 
dealing with highly skewed variables where there is little variance. As such, 
models where no 1 factor solution onto which all variables load are returned 
do not necessarily represent a test of validity so well. With this in mind, we 
conclude that the weight of the evidence points towards a single factor with 
three attributes. Religiosity is thus measured by standardising these three 
variables, so that their scales are comparable (OECD, 2008), and averaging 
them. The resulting index has a Chronbach’s alpha of 0.81 (0.71 un-
standardised). It is termed RELIGIOSITY and is deemed to be valid within 
reason across different cultural contexts. Weighting is assumed equal and 
averaging across the three indicators is used in order to capture the wider 
gamut of religiosity whilst reducing the likelihood of mis-measurement 
inherent in a one-item approach. 
Table 3: Exploratory factor analysis of indicators of religiosity (varimax rotated 
solutions) 
Sample IMPREL IMPGOD RELATT Variance 
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Overall 0.80 - 0.36 0.78 - 0.40 0.62 - 0.61 1.63 n/a 
Sample specific            
Andorra  0.78 - 0.40 0.72 - 0.48 0.68 - 0.54 1.58 n/a 
Argentina  0.68 - 0.54 0.64 - 0.59 0.63 - 0.61 1.26 n/a 
Australia  0.86 - 0.26 0.79 - 0.38 0.73 - 0.47 1.89 n/a 
Bulgaria  0.58 - 0.66 0.68 - 0.54 0.52 - 0.73 1.06 n/a 
Burk Faso  0.45 - 0.80 0.40 - 0.84 0.39 - 0.85 0.51 n/a 
Canada  0.82 - 0.32 0.76 - 0.43 0.70 - 0.50 1.75 n/a 
Chile  0.59 - 0.65 0.54 - 0.71 0.54 - 0.71 0.92 n/a 
China  0.74 - 0.46 0.75 - 0.44 0.65 - 0.57 1.53 n/a 
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Sample IMPREL IMPGOD RELATT Variance 
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Cyprus  0.61 - 0.62 0.60 - 0.64 0.44 - 0.80 0.94 n/a 
Egypt    1.00   0.98   0.98 0.03 0.00 
Ethiopia  0.47  0.78   0.92 0.53  0.71 0.55 0.04 
Finland  0.82 - 0.32 0.80 - 0.36 0.64 - 0.60 1.72 n/a 
France  0.78 - 0.39 0.79 - 0.37 0.66 - 0.57 1.68 n/a 
Georgia  0.47 - 0.78 0.51 - 0.74 0.31 - 0.90 0.58 n/a 
Germany  0.82 - 0.33 0.83 - 0.31 0.80 - 0.36 2.00 n/a 
Ghana  0.49 - 0.76  - 0.94 0.45 - 0.80 0.50 n/a 
Great Britain  0.85 - 0.27 0.78 - 0.39 0.73 - 0.47 1.87 n/a 
Guatemala  0.52 - 0.73 0.38 - 0.86 0.51 - 0.74 0.67 n/a 
Hong Kong  0.55 - 0.69 0.62 - 0.61 0.58 - 0.67 1.03 n/a 
India  0.46 - 0.79 0.42 - 0.83 0.39 - 0.85 0.53 n/a 
Indonesia  0.40 - 0.84 0.42 - 0.83 0.31 - 0.90 0.43 n/a 
Iran  0.49  0.76   0.90 0.39  0.85 0.47 0.02 
Iraq  0.43  0.81 0.43  0.81   1.00 0.37 0.00 
Italy  0.78 - 0.39 0.76 - 0.43 0.72 - 0.49 1.69 n/a 
Japan  0.60 - 0.65 0.63 - 0.60 0.45 - 0.80 0.96 n/a 
Jordan  0.31  0.90   0.99 0.32  0.90 0.20 0.01 
Mali  0.39 - 0.85 0.36 - 0.87  - 0.96 0.32 n/a 
Mexico  0.63 - 0.60 0.50 - 0.75 0.55 - 0.70 0.95 n/a 
Moldova  0.67 - 0.55 0.71 - 0.50 0.51 - 0.74 1.22 n/a 
Netherlands  0.84 - 0.29 0.80 - 0.36 0.75 - 0.44 1.91 n/a 
New Zeal  0.89 - 0.21 0.85 - 0.28 0.78 - 0.39 2.12 n/a 
Norway  0.81 - 0.35 0.81 - 0.34 0.65 - 0.58 1.72 n/a 
Peru  0.53 - 0.72 0.54 - 0.71 0.44 - 0.80 0.77 n/a 
Poland  0.73 - 0.47 0.66 - 0.56 0.63 - 0.61 1.36 n/a 
Romania  0.57 - 0.67 0.58 - 0.66 0.42 - 0.83 0.84 n/a 
Russian Fed  0.68 - 0.54 0.72 - 0.48 0.65 - 0.57 1.41 n/a 
Rwanda   - 0.93  - 0.97  - 0.95 0.15 n/a 
Serbia  0.62 - 0.61 0.64 - 0.59 0.54 - 0.71 1.08 n/a 
Slovenia  0.76 - 0.42 0.78 - 0.40 0.71 - 0.50 1.68 n/a 
South Africa  0.60 - 0.64 0.50 - 0.75 0.57 - 0.68 0.93 n/a 
South Korea  0.74 - 0.45 0.75 - 0.44 0.76 - 0.42 1.69 n/a 
Spain  0.72 - 0.48 0.76 - 0.42 0.72 - 0.48 1.62 n/a 
Sweden  0.75 - 0.44 0.75 - 0.44 0.68 - 0.54 1.58 n/a 
Switzerland  0.81 - 0.34 0.74 - 0.45 0.72 - 0.49 1.72 n/a 
Taiwan  0.62 - 0.62 0.58 - 0.66 0.51 - 0.74 0.97 n/a 
Thailand  0.47 - 0.78 0.45 - 0.79 0.43 - 0.82 0.60 n/a 
Trinidad & Tob  0.51  0.73   0.92 0.45  0.80 0.52 0.04 
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Sample IMPREL IMPGOD RELATT Variance 
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Turkey  0.59 - 0.66 0.55 - 0.69 0.39 - 0.85 0.81 n/a 
Ukraine  0.66 - 0.56 0.74 - 0.45 0.72 - 0.48 1.50 n/a 
United States  0.83 - 0.30 0.73 - 0.47 0.65 - 0.58 1.64 n/a 
Uruguay  0.55 - 0.69 0.50 - 0.75 0.51 - 0.74 0.82 n/a 
Viet Nam  0.49 - 0.76 0.51 - 0.74 0.50 - 0.75 0.75 n/a 
Zambia  0.50 - 0.75 0.40 - 0.84 0.42 - 0.83 0.59 n/a 
 
3.7 Operationalising political participation 
Like religiosity, political participation is also thought of as having distinct 
dimensions. Verba & Nie (1972) identified four modes of participation. They 
are voting, campaign activity, communal activity, and particularised 
contacting. The first two are found only during election times. Voting is an 
individual’s participation in the electoral process. Campaign activity was 
reflected by measures relating to participation in political campaigns, 
attending meetings, and persuading others how to vote. Communal activity 
and particularised contacting are the modes of political activity that take 
place independently of the election process. It is defined by measures 
relating to participation in voluntary associations that predominantly aim to 
solve a local community problem, as well as the contacting of political 
figures with a social problem in mind. This is distinguished from the final 
mode of political participation, particularised contacting, which reflects 
individuals operating on their own by contacting officials with the aim of 
solving solely a personal problem. These modes of participation were found 
to bear up in empirical application in a follow-up work by Verba, Nie & Kim 
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(1978), where they were tested using data from seven countries with distinct 
cultural backgrounds.  
The establishment of cross-cultural validity is encouraging but Verba and 
his colleagues did not account for the distinction between conventional and 
unconventional participation. Such a distinction can be found in the work of 
Barnes & Kaase (1979) for whom conventional political participation could 
be thought of as encompassing such things as political discussion, party 
organisation, attendance of political meetings, whilst the unconventional 
forms of participation were considered to be inclusive of boycotts, illegal 
strikes, damage to property and violence against the person. This distinction 
can be criticised however for over-simplifying things by ignoring internal 
sub-divisions within the categories of conventional and unconventional 
participation. For instance Sabucedo & Arce (1991) found that political 
participation was divided along two meaningful dimensions, the first of 
which was ‘within system versus out of system’ which can be easily mapped 
onto the dimensions of conventional and unconventional. The second 
empirical dimension that was found corresponded to whether or not the 
action was perceived of as ‘progressive versus conservative’. The resulting 
typology of Sabucedo & Acre of political participation was fourfold. The four 
types of political participation, two of which might be seen as conventional 
and two unconventional, were: (1) electoral persuasion – political meetings, 
persuading others; (2) conventional participation – voting, correspondence 
with the press, legal public demonstrations, authorised strikes; (3) violent 
participation –damage to private property and armed violence; (4) direct non-
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violent participation – boycotts, non-authorised strikes, non-authorised 
demonstrations, taking possession of buildings and disrupting traffic. 
The WVS contains several items pertaining to the concepts of conventional 
and unconventional political participation. Conventional political 
participation is understood as behaviour that takes place within the 
executive or legislative branches of the political system (however democratic 
or otherwise). Thus, two possible indicators of political party involvement are 
available. The first is: 
Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organisations. For each one, could you tell me 
whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of 
organisation (read out and code one answer for each organisation) […] Political Party […] 
2. Active member 
1. Inactive member 
 0. Don’t belong 
This sub-item is subsequently referred to as PARTY.  It is a sub-item that is 
part of wider series of questions discussed below in relation to the concept of 
civil society. It is recoded as 1-0 with categories 1 and 2 collapsed into one 
category that is representative of overall participation, be it active or 
inactive. 
The second item measuring political party participation as an indicator of 
conventional political participation is as follows: 
Did you vote in your country’s recent elections to the national parliament? 
1 Yes 
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2 No 
This item is subsequently referred to as VOTE. It is recoded as 1-0 with 1 
representing having voted. Such self-reported indicators of voting behaviour 
have been noted to be subject to social-desirability response bias (Katosh & 
Traugott, 1981; Anderson & Silver, 1986). However Katosh & Traugott found 
that alternating between a validated and self-reported measurement of 
voting behaviour did nothing to alter the empirical relationship between 
voting and its various predictors. Additionally, this indicator is not too likely 
to be misunderstood across country contexts since voting is not an abstract 
concept but a real process common across the globe, regardless of how free 
and fair elections might be. Thus, we can conclude such a measure to have 
content validity although some questions of reliability remain. 
Concerning party membership, we resort to something akin to criterion or 
construct validity. It is not quite exactly either of these since we do not have 
a criterion variable whilst we do not know enough about party participation 
across the full spectrum of development in order to attempt construct 
validation through comparison to a conceptually distinct variable that bears 
a cast-iron empirical relationship. What is done is to compare PARTY to a 
variable that is highly likely to bear an empirical relationship to it. 
Respondents to the WVS were asked: 
I am going to name a number of organisations. For each one, could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not 
very much confidence or none at all? [...] Political parties 
1 A great deal 
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2 Quite a lot 
3 Not very much 
4 None at all 
This variable was reverse coded so that high numbers represent greater 
confidence in political parties and is referred to as CONFPARTY. It stands to 
reason that those involved in political parties would be more likely than 
those who are not to have more confidence in them. PARTY was regressed 
on CONFPARTY (for full details see the Appendix B). Indeed, across all 
countries, CONFPARTY bares a positive relationship to PARTY although the 
amount of explained variance as measured by pseudo-R2 is not very great. 
Within countries, in the vast majority of cases, the relationship is both 
positive and significant. There are some exceptions, enough to raise some 
doubts, but nothing to challenge one’s perception that this is a valid 
measurement given the weight of the evidence. The amount of explanatory 
power does vary from country to country but this variance is not especially 
large. Thus, we term PARTY a valid measurement if not quite exact. 
Indicators of unconventional political participation are also available in the 
WVS. Respondents were asked if they had ever or would ever participate in a 
particular form of unconventional political action in recent times. The exact 
wording was: 
Have you or have you not done any of these activities in the last 5 years?  
 Have done Not done 
Signing a petition 1 2 
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Joining in boycotts 1 2 
Attending peaceful/lawful demonstrations 1 2 
These items are subsequently referred to as PETITION, BOYCOTT, and 
PROTEST. These variables were selected as the best way of measuring 
unconventional political participation as they specifically identify a time 
scale – i.e. the last 5 years. Alternative approaches in the WVS have no such 
time scale. This is a problem because if I protested when I was 21 and am 
now 81, this approach would identify me as a protester, even though that 
was a long time ago. The approach used here is best as it locates 
unconventional activity close to the specific point in the life course when it 
is taking place. These items are all recoded as 1-0 with 1 representing a 
positive score. 
3.7.1 Exploratory factor analysis of indicators of political participation 
An attempt at validation of these variables is attempted using EFA. As the 
literature often points not only to a conceptual distinction but also a 
repertoire of political action of which some tend to specialise in some 
activities more than others (Verba & Nie, 1972), it is expected that 
PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST will all load onto one common factor 
representing the unconventional mode of political participation. 
Furthermore, it is expected that PARTY and VOTE will load onto a different 
common factor representing conventional political participation. People tend 
to specialise in some political methods over others but also will use the 
appropriate method when it is most suitable. Thus, we expect some 
correlation between these two dimensions in line with Barnes & Kasse 
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(1979) and allow for this by using an oblique method of rotation in our EFA 
(promax). Since all these variables are binary, a tetrachoric correlation 
matrix is first computed as the basis for our EFA. EFA was asked to return 
2 factors. This process is carried out across and within countries. 
The results of EFA can be found in full in Table 4. To summarise, overall it 
is the case that PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST all load onto a common 
factor (1) whilst VOTE and PETITION onto a separate factor (2). The factor 
loadings are strongest for factor 1 with all above 0.7, suggesting that those 
who sign petitions also are likely to boycott and protest. On factor 2, the 
loadings of VOTE and PARTY are substantially lower and are surpassed by 
their uniqueness. This is probably down to the possibility that party 
members are likely to vote but most voters are not party members. We 
conclude that there is overall a conventional and an unconventional 
dimension of political participation. The repertoire of the latter is much more 
predictable than that of the former. Indeed, it is also true that there is a 
weighty correlation between both factors at 0.55 suggesting that although 
people can specialise in different behaviours, specialisation is not always at 
the expense of other methods. 
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Table 4: Exploratory factor analysis (promax rotations) of conventional and unconventional political participation 
 VOTE PARTY PETITION BOYCOTT PROTEST Factor 1 Factor 2 Correlation 
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Overall  0.37 0.87  0.39 0.80 0.71  0.52 0.82  0.30 0.73  0.45 1.85 1.09 0.86 0.51 0.55 
Andorra  0.50 0.74  0.46 0.79 0.72  0.41 0.79  0.41 0.77  0.42 1.79 1.03 0.66 0.38 0.31 
Argentina   0.93  0.52 0.73 0.82  0.32 0.43 0.43 0.45 0.80  0.33 1.81 0.96 1.10 0.58 0.49 
Australia 0.32  0.90  0.40 0.84 0.82  0.33 0.84  0.28 0.68  0.43 1.96 1.03 0.32 0.17 0.11 
Brazil  0.82 0.34 0.39  0.78 0.72  0.48 0.90 -0.38 0.10 0.92  0.06 2.32 0.70 0.93 0.28 0.08 
Bulgaria  0.68 0.57  0.64 0.53 0.84  0.31 0.98  0.06 0.81  0.31 2.42 0.78 1.05 0.34 0.28 
Burkina Faso  0.56 0.76  0.42 0.77 0.43 0.40 0.47 0.91  0.16 0.90  0.20 2.20 0.95 1.37 0.59 0.56 
Canada   0.91  0.42 0.79 0.77  0.47 0.87  0.23 0.70  0.29 2.10 1.01 0.80 0.39 0.45 
Chile  0.45 0.80   0.97 0.84  0.30 0.67  0.55 0.74  0.40 1.72 1.01 0.29 0.17 -0.14 
Cyprus  0.45 0.82  0.45 0.67 0.75  0.39 0.86  0.27 0.89  0.21 2.28 0.96 0.73 0.31 0.36 
Ethiopia  0.40 0.81 0.50  0.77 0.95  0.12 0.88  0.23 0.73 0.30 0.23 2.62 0.98 0.70 0.26 0.35 
Finland  0.52 0.69  0.47 0.80 0.71  0.47 0.80  0.30 0.82  0.38 1.89 0.98 0.73 0.38 0.31 
France  0.40 0.85  0.46 0.57 0.73  0.49 0.70  0.49 0.72  0.33 2.01 1.07 1.18 0.63 0.57 
Georgia  0.34 0.89  0.39 0.76 0.87  0.31 0.85  0.14 0.84  0.28 2.37 0.97 0.81 0.33 0.43 
Germany  0.55 0.72  0.52 0.68 0.75  0.40 0.75  0.43 0.79  0.38 1.98 1.01 1.12 0.57 0.52 
Ghana  0.43 0.82  0.39 0.81 0.76  0.39 0.81  0.34 0.66  0.59 1.73 1.05 0.51 0.31 0.29 
GB  0.80 0.34  0.84 0.29 0.91  0.16 0.85  0.25 0.99  0.01 2.54 0.51 1.41 0.28 0.02 
India   0.92  0.46 0.80 0.50  0.54 0.98  0.21 0.80  0.20 2.22 1.04 1.56 0.74 0.77 
Indonesia   0.93  0.35 0.76 0.43  0.62 0.80  0.35 0.72  0.46 1.67 1.11 0.80 0.53 0.50 
Japan  0.55 0.71  0.52 0.68 0.71  0.45 0.54  0.71 0.66  0.58 1.45 1.04 0.97 0.69 0.52 
Malaysia  0.65 0.62   0.59 0.58 0.69  0.53 0.77  0.39 0.88  0.23 1.99 0.79 1.04 0.41 0.36 
Mali  0.36 0.88  0.36 0.67 0.67  0.60 0.73  0.42 0.67  0.47 1.75 1.15 0.86 0.56 0.52 
Mexico  0.60 0.69  0.38 0.82 0.69  0.42 0.91  0.29 0.60  0.47 1.83 0.94 0.99 0.51 0.46 
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 VOTE PARTY PETITION BOYCOTT PROTEST Factor 1 Factor 2 Correlation 
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Moldova  0.41 0.87  0.39 0.77 0.69  0.55 0.85  0.28 0.50  0.57 1.71 1.02 0.98 0.59 0.58 
Morocco  0.57 0.69  0.70 0.38 0.64  0.29 0.83  0.32 0.85  0.24 2.51 0.88 1.92 0.67 0.61 
Neth  0.53 0.70  0.55 0.69 0.71  0.47 0.75  0.48 0.70  0.45 1.77 1.03 1.06 0.62 0.51 
Norway  0.44 0.72  0.47 0.80 0.64  0.62 0.73  0.42 0.66  0.54 1.56 1.05 0.78 0.53 0.46 
Peru  0.35 0.89  0.51 0.74 0.75  0.44 0.77  0.43 0.50 0.32 0.51 1.58 1.03 0.82 0.54 0.41 
Poland  0.35 0.84  0.32 0.91 0.74  0.35 0.85  0.29 0.51 0.40 0.37 1.96 0.99 1.12 0.56 0.52 
Romania   0.94  0.71 0.50 0.73  0.18 1.02  0.13 0.78  0.18 2.56 0.89 1.44 0.50 0.51 
Russ fed  0.30 0.89   0.97 0.63  0.43 0.88  0.27 0.73  0.43 1.88 1.07 0.65 0.37 0.47 
Serbia  0.48 0.79   0.52 0.72 0.73  0.34 0.92  0.16 0.92  0.20 2.42 0.97 1.19 0.47 0.53 
Slovenia  0.48 0.77  0.52 0.74 0.59  0.53 0.81  0.31 0.81  0.40 1.75 0.90 0.76 0.39 0.33 
South Africa  0.36 0.83   0.83 0.66  0.58 0.88  0.22 0.86  0.21 2.06 1.04 0.43 0.22 0.25 
South Korea   0.94  0.38 0.75 0.78  0.41 0.73  0.44 0.68  0.37 1.87 1.08 0.55 0.31 0.33 
Sweden  0.49 0.77  0.50 0.71 0.73  0.48 0.67  0.51 0.70  0.51 1.54 0.92 0.62 0.37 0.27 
Switz  0.55 0.67  0.55 0.70 0.60  0.59 0.55  0.65 0.64  0.63 1.32 1.04 1.00 0.78 0.54 
Taiwan  0.56 0.72  0.43 0.75 0.93  0.24 0.84  0.21 0.63  0.37 2.35 0.96 1.46 0.59 0.61 
Thailand  0.48 0.76 0.36  0.74 0.69  0.56 0.82  0.32 0.73  0.36 1.90 1.02 0.60 0.32 0.29 
Trin & Tob3  1.01 0.00  0.30 0.88 0.93  0.11 1.01  0.04 0.94  0.01 2.85 0.69 1.33 0.32 -0.24 
Turkey   0.89 0.38  0.86 0.91  0.20 0.97  0.02 0.98  0.02 2.90 0.97 0.19 0.06 -0.15 
Ukraine  1.06 0.00 0.43  0.68 0.89  0.28 0.39 0.77 0.01 0.88  0.22 2.32 0.53 2.20 0.51 0.41 
USA  0.71 0.37  0.77 0.46 0.60  0.53 0.74  0.46 0.71  0.50 1.88 0.86 1.66 0.75 0.54 
Viet Nam 0.98  0.05  1.00 0.00 0.46  0.77 0.98  0.04 0.93  0.12 3.02 0.60 1.08 0.22 0.15 
Zambia  0.44 0.82   0.47 0.63 0.71  0.48 0.79  0.40 0.74  0.30 2.08 1.05 1.25 0.63 0.59 
                                       
3 A so-called Heywood case with an incidence of a negative uniqueness – to be interpreted with caution but given the solution to this model 
fits the general pattern both across and within countries, it is not too much of a problem. 
 
 
~ 143 ~ 
 
When we look within countries, we see a similar pattern. In all countries, 
PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST all loaded onto factor 1 (although there 
were some incidences of cross-loadings). The difference was in the loadings 
onto factor 2 – often VOTE and PARTY would load onto the same factor but 
sometimes one or the other or both would be absent or would cross-load. 
Correlations between the two factors also varied in strength.  
It is difficult to infer convergent/divergent validity in this case since these 
are concrete and real behaviours that whilst they may very well be reflective 
of the same concept or not, do not have to be present together in real life 
simultaneously. In short correlation is not the same as causation as we all 
know, and equally not the same as conceptual belonging. Also, there is no 
reason why in some incidences, voters for example might not be using the 
unconventional repertoire as they are particularly radicalised due to political 
circumstance and thus it does not necessarily mean we have non-validity. 
However, the fact that PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST are being 
responded to in the same manner across all countries suggests that these 
items are being understood in the same manner. Given that the questions 
are fairly similar, and that there is a recurring pattern within countries, we 
can be reasonably confident of validity regarding our measures of 
unconventional political participation. 
3.8 Operationalising civil society 
Civil society is conceived of by Anheier et al. (2004) as being composed of 
four distinct dimensions. They are: (1) structural – measuring the scale of 
civil society in terms of it actual numbers, including measures of economic, 
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social and organisational composition; (2) legal and political space – the 
extent to which civil society actors are free to move, as guaranteed mostly by 
law; (3) impact-related – the actual contributions and effect upon society at 
large; and (4) value-related – pertaining to the norms and cultural 
expectations of civil society.  
Malena & Heinrich (2007) build upon the framework of Anheier et al. They 
provide an extended list of valid indicators for each dimension, although no 
empirical validation is undertaken. The first dimension is structure and 
looks to assess the extent of civil society organisation within a country. It 
has the following attributes: (1) the breadth of citizen participation – 
stressing the extent of civil society organisation in terms of its spread across 
wider society with indicators being the number of individuals who 
participate in non-partisan politics, donate to charity, belong to civil society 
organisations, do volunteer work, or participate in collective community 
activities; (2) depth of citizen participation – the frequency and extent of 
individuals’ engagement with indicators being how much time and effort the 
devote along with the number of associational memberships they have; (3) 
diversity within civil society – the extent to which civil society is open to the 
meek and marginalised, as indicated by the level of female and minority 
involvement along with rural populations; (4) level of organisation – being 
the stability and maturity as well as the ability to exert a collective will as 
indicated by the presence of broad coalitions within civil society, both 
internally and internationally; (5) interrelations – the extent that 
organisations are communicating with one another; (6) resources – the 
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amount that civil society has to offer, in terms of its financial, human, and 
technological resources.  
The second dimension of Malena & Heinrich pertains to the environment in 
which civil society actors operate. It is not part of civil society itself, but 
outlays the rules of the game, which either enable of disable action. This 
dimension is focusing on whether or not democratic rights such as freedom 
of conscience and assembly, along with regime stability (political, economic, 
societal), are present.  
The third dimension of civil society described by Malena & Heinrich, reflects 
the values that individual actors hold, practice and promulgate. Reflective 
values pertain to support of democracy, transparency, tolerance, non-
violence, gender equity, poverty eradication, and environmental stability, 
and it is stressed that not every actor within civil society will hold them. 
Thus, the ratio of those who uphold civil society values versus those who do 
not, is taken as the approved country-level indicator. 
The fourth dimension of civil society is the impact that is has on wider 
society. It deals with the level of activity and how effectual and successful it 
might be. This encompasses four indicators, these being the influence on 
public policy, the holding of state and private corporations to account, 
response to social interests, and the empowering of citizens. 
The approach of Malena & Heinrich and Anheier et al. is very well developed. 
It provides a conception of civil society that allows us to grasp what civil 
society is, who its actors are, what they believe, and what they can achieve 
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within the limits imposed upon them by the social order. They provide a 
powerful theoretical construct and an abundance of indicators are put 
forward. However, here we only need concern ourselves with dimension 1, 
namely that concerning structure because we are interested in the effects of 
religiosity on individual behaviour in civil society. Thus, voluntary 
organisations are taken as our indicator of civil society participation. 
Voluntary associations are also identified as indicators of civil society by 
Fukuyama (2001). Civil society organisations are by nature, voluntary, 
autonomous, and are capable of collective action in pursuit of common 
interests (Anheier et al., 2004). What sort of organisations can be included 
within this umbrella concept? Diamond (1994) identifies in total seven 
distinct types. They are (1) economic – organisations representing the 
interests of production and commerce; (2) cultural – representing ethnic or 
religious interests that promote or protect rights and cultural practices; (3) 
informational and educational – organisations devoted to promulgation of 
ideas and information; (4) interest-based – representing the interests of 
certain groups such as pensioners or war veterans; (5) developmental – 
organisations looking to improve the quality of community life; (6) issue-
orientated – representing some sort of cause such as environmental 
protection or land reform; (7) civic – nonpartisan groups working to improve 
the political system in a manner supportive of democracy. 
It has already been noted that civil society does not always attract virtuous 
characters. Civil society should be operationalised to include all types of 
organisation and actors, regardless of their ideological colour. Additionally, 
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with regard to the problem of comparing across countries, Malena & 
Heinrich (2007) state that whilst civil society is distinct within countries in 
its particular flavour, nevertheless they have enough in common to allow us 
to make comparisons. 
The WVS contains two approaches that could be used to serve this purpose, 
that have been employed at different times in different waves. The first reads 
as follows: 
Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organisations. For each one, could you tell me 
whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of 
organisation (read out and code one answer for each organisation) 
 Active member Inactive member Don’t 
belong 
Church or religious organization 2 1 0 
Sport or recreational organization 2 1 0 
Art, music or educational organization 2 1 0 
Labour union 2 1 0 
Political party 2 1 0 
Environmental organization 2 1 0 
Professional association 2 1 0 
Humanitarian or charitable 
organization 
2 1 0 
Consumer organization 2 1 0 
Any other (write in) 2 1 0 
Such items are usually treated by summing them, and then either treating 
the summations as either a count variable or recoding them into a binary 
variable (e.g. Curtis et al. 1992, Ruiter & De Graaf 2006). This approach is 
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termed total aggregation. A more subtle approach to aggregation of these 
sub-items has been proposed by Van der Meer et al. (2009). They argued 
that the civil society voluntary associations could be classified into three 
broad categories. They were: (1) activist organisations – such as 
environmental organisations, humanitarian groups and peace organisations; 
(2) interest organisations – such as trade unions, professional associations 
and consumer groups; and (3) leisure organisations – such as sports clubs, 
cultural and social organisations.  
Van der Meer et al.’s classification system is based on the “primary aims” of 
the voluntary association in question4. Leisure organisations are aimed 
towards the personal sphere, interest organisations concern themselves with 
the market, and activist organisations focus their attention on the state. 
Leisure organisations exist to offer opportunities to socialise. Interest 
organisations serve to advance or defend the interests of a particular social 
group. By contrast, activist organisations exist to advance the cause of 
others beyond the immediate social circles of the activists themselves. 
Strong differences were recorded across countries in terms of frequency of 
occurrence, and patterns of correlates differed across organisation types. 
These differences show that total aggregation can be dangerous and that 
important distinctions could be lost. This is not to say there are not 
similarities among groups, in terms of correlates (Van der Meer et al., 2009).  
                                       
4 It is worth noting that this system of classification was done theoretically and not 
empirically due to the fact that constraints on the individual’s time budget mean that one is 
often likely only to participate in one organisation if at all, and thus any method that looks 
for correlations from which to infer conceptual belonging of types of behaviour, would be of 
limited value simply because in the real (busy) world, they are unlikely to exist together – 
there are simply not enough hours in a day! 
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Van der Meer et al. attempt to find a system of aggregation that does not fall 
into the pitfall of total aggregation whereby important differences might be 
lost in terms of patterns of correlates. They pose a solution whereby the 
researcher finds somewhere reminiscent of the middle ground between total 
aggregation and none at all. Nevertheless, an intermediate level of 
aggregation still may result in the problem associated with total aggregation, 
and this is because they base their system of classification on the 
commonality of aims of the different groups rather than on the specific 
locations of society from which they stem. By way of example this can be 
better explained. Take Arthur Scargill, former British miners’ union leader 
and Digby Jones, former leader of the British City Board of Industry. Under 
Van der Meer et al.’s system of classification, both would qualify as being 
involved in interest organisations and thus would be lumped together in the 
same analysis. Yet both have strongly contrasting social backgrounds 
(bourgeois vs. proletarian) that entail separate interests and thus advocate 
the positions of totally opposing social types (bosses vs. workers). How could 
we expect a regression of interest group activity on class background in this 
case to be trustworthy? Van der Meer et al.’s approach is welcome and 
technically very impressive but they are liable to falling into the very trap 
they hoped to avoid.  
Ultimately, any system of aggregation will lead to problems of correlates 
being obscured. Perhaps it is best just to select those organisations that are 
of theoretical interest and avoid aggregation altogether? Another criticism 
that can be levelled at Van der Meer et al. is that they do not allow for 
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organisations that provide welfare services and that some organisations, 
such as religious organisations escape classification. For instance, religious 
organisations can advocate religious positions, or those of the oppressed 
and downtrodden, or provide services of the sick and needy, or opportunities 
to socialise and pass the time – thus, what are they? The variety of religious 
organisations has been evidenced by Chaves & Tsitsos (2001). Best, is to 
select those groups that are of substantive interest as identified by theory 
and where possible avoid aggregation altogether.  
Thus, this study selects only those items measuring civil society involvement 
that are reflective of some sort of desire to organise the world along religious 
lines, rather than focus on organisations that only go as far as to meet a 
desire, as this is more in keeping with our theory. Four items are selected as 
being of particular theoretical interest. Religious organisations are seen as of 
interest as they represent that niche of civil society that is on religion’s own 
terms. This variable is termed RELORG. It is through charities and 
humanitarian organisations that civil society is found to be at its most 
politically involved and influential, whilst religion has always been 
historically involved in both. Thus charitable/humanitarian organisations 
are chosen and this variable is termed CHARORG. The environmental 
movement is seen as part of the new politics (Norris, 2002) and is perhaps 
archetypal as a new social movement, since it makes no appeal to 
traditional class-based politics. Thus, environmental organisations is 
selected and termed ENVORG. Lastly, art, music, or educational 
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organisations5 are chosen, since religion often wants to impose itself on 
society, and culture and education are important battle grounds in this 
regard. Debates over evolution and decency in popular culture in the United 
States testify to this. This variable is termed CULTORG. All these variables 
are re-coded in the same fashion as PARTY, so that simple binary 
measurements, spanning active and inactive organisational memberships 
are produced. 
One imperfection of these items is that they only measure if someone is 
involved in voluntary associations or not; they do not however measure the 
number of associations to which one belongs (Norris, 2002). Thus, someone 
with 1 association membership will score equally with someone with several 
memberships. These items are taken as valid in terms of the content for the 
breadth of civil society, but not the depth (Malena & Heinrich, 2007). There 
are also some questions relating to their reliability. Morales (2002) has 
argued that the wording of the questions can have substantial impact on 
measurements and that there are both effects pertaining to the principal 
investigators of the survey in question (house effects) and effects produced 
by different waves of the same series (within-house effects). In criticism, she 
is far too keen to point out discrepancies without stating that her own data 
show a lot of consistency within some measurements and as such, it 
appears she is extenuating the negative. 
Again, we attempt something similar to criterion or content validation. Using 
the same wording as used in CONFPARTY, respondents were asked how 
                                       
5 Subsequently referred to as cultural/educational organisations for brevity’s sake. 
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much confidence they had in religious institutions, charitable/humanitarian 
organisations, and the environmental movement. These variables were all 
reverse coded in the same manner as before and are termed CONFREL, 
CONFCHAR, and CONFENV respectively. In the case of RELORG, overall it 
is positively linked to CONFREL. Within countries, the effect is near 
uniformly positive and significant with only 6 exceptions, of which the 
Peruvian case is the only one to show a significant (and negative) 
relationship. The amount of variance explained in these regressions tends to 
be small but not insubstantial by social science standards. Additionally, 
there is little variance in this amount as measured by pseudo R2. A similar 
story can be told of CHARORG in its relationship to CONFCHAR – only 14 
cases did not show a positive and significant relationship. There is variance 
in both the magnitude of the β-coefficient and pseudo R2 but not too much. 
The case of ENVORG is slightly more troubling. Overall, the relationship 
with CONFENV is as expected – positive and significant. When one looks 
with countries problems emerge - 21 out of 54 cases did not return positive 
and significant effects of CONFENV. Of these, only 7 were negatively related. 
Pseudo R2 was again low and relatively invariant. Thus, we conclude that 
the weight of the evidence points towards successful measurement. Those 
cases where the expected results were not found may not necessarily mean 
lack of successful measurement – it could be that in these countries the 
environmental movement for instance has been unsuccessful so that 
confidence is low amongst members. The evidence presented is not intended 
to be unequivocal but only as a pointer towards validity and thus we persist 
with each dependent variable analysed so far despite their imperfections as 
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the methods used so far have not been sufficient to damn them in their 
entirety. For fuller description of these analyses of validity, the reader is 
referred to Appendix B. No exploration of CULTORG was possible as no 
variable was immediately forthcoming to validate it. We generalise from the 
other dependent variables that this is likely to be valid since in most cases 
the other variables seem valid6. 
3.9 Operationalising modernisation 
The concept of modernisation is often split between that of the individual 
and that of the wider social milieu (Yi, 2006). The idea of modernity being 
split between the individual and the institution is also found in the work of 
Smith & Inkeles (1966). They write: 
“The term may refer to two quite different objects. As used to describe a society, ‘modern’ 
generally means a national state characterised by a complex of traits including 
urbanisation, high levels of education, industrialisation, extensive mechanisation, high 
rates of social mobility, and the like. When applied to individuals, it refers to a set of 
attitudes, values, and ways of feeling and acting, presumably of the sort either generated by 
or required for effective participation in a modern society.” (p353). 
Again, we see here modernity divided between the individual and the 
institution, but that both tend to accompany each other. Indicators of 
individual modernity include: a sense of efficaciousness, openness to new 
experiences, forward-thinking, civic-mindedness, a scientific worldview, 
autonomous decision making, and belief in control over fertility and 
reproduction. Smith & Inkeles found, using data from Argentina, Chile, 
                                       
6 Participation in civil society tends to be positively related to higher social statuses, as we 
saw in Chapter 2. A quick look at Table 18 shows CULTORG is positively linked to higher 
educational attainment and subjective social class. 
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India, Pakistan, Israel, and Nigeria, that the scale they derived from the 
above mentioned indicators was internally consistent within contexts. These 
findings have been challenged by Armer & Schnaiberg (1972) who replicated 
Smith & Inkeles’ scale. They found overall that these approaches had 
reasonably internal consistency as assessed through convergent validation 
but failed tests of divergent validation – indicators conceptually related to 
modernity were found to have a stronger relationship to theoretically distinct 
concepts (namely alienation, anomie and socio-economic status) than they 
did to each other.  
At the macro-level, VVD & CGG7 found by using factor analysis that certain 
indicators of modernisation were all loading onto a common factor. The 
indicators they selected as representative of modernisation were: literacy 
rate, urban population ration, percentage of people living in towns, per 
capita consumption of electricity, number of automobiles, work force 
composition, road coverage, agricultural mechanisation, wealth, and 
number in higher education.  
In the last chapter it was argued that development and modernisation may 
be thought of as synonymous as they share common indicators. The most 
influential approach to measuring development is through the Human 
Development index (HDI) which is compiled by the United Nations. It is 
measuring three indicators of development, namely, life-expectancy, 
standard of living (GDP per capita in dollars adjusted for PPP), and level of 
education. It has been criticised for the equal weighting of its component 
                                       
7 This is how these authors are credited. What these initials stand for is anyone’s guess. 
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measures (Despotis, 2005). Elsewhere, Lai (2003) has shown that with 
weights derived empirically and using principal component analysis, that 
different rankings will emerge with different weightings, but that the original 
HDI with assumed equal weighting is closely correlated with its weighted 
cousin. However, the HDI is taken as valid as it has criterion validity due to 
its correlation with internet usage and CO2 output which are taken as sound 
indicators of modernisation8. 
For the purposes of this thesis, modernisation is treated as something that 
is a property of countries which is deemed to weaken or strengthen the 
relationship between religion and forms of political and civil society 
participation. Modernisation is measured by the human development index 
(HDI) made available by the United Nations. Scores range from between 0 
and 1 with higher scores indicative of greater development. The HDI was 
used by Norris & Inglehart (2004) as an indicator of modernisation. They 
stress that its advantage is that it provides more clues as to the condition of 
the actual living conditions of human beings, than purely monetary 
measures such as GDP per capita. 
3.10 Operationalising the separation of religion and state 
Separation of religion and state is measured using the Religion and State 
index (RAS) as developed by Fox (2006; 2008). This measures:  
“(a) state support for one or more religions either officially or in practice; (b) state hostility 
toward religion; (c) comparative government treatment of different religions, including both 
benefits and restrictions; (d) government restrictions on the practice of religion by religious 
                                       
8 The relationships between these variables and others can be seen by following this link: 
http://hdr.undp.org/en/data-explorer 
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minorities; (e) government regulation of the majority religion; and (f) legislation of religious 
laws” (Fox, 2006).  
As we can see, in terms of content validity, this index is clearly measuring 
both the extent to which religious institutions are beholden to the state and 
the extent to which it imposes constraints on religious activity. Thus, it fits 
very nicely with the theoretical ideas of Stark & Finke outlined in the last 
chapter. Data are taken from 2002 as it is the closest time point to the WVS 
data. In its original form, it runs from 0 to 77.6, with the United States 
comprising the zero-point whilst Saudi Arabia has the maximum score. So 
that it represents separation of religion and state, it is reverse coded. The 
resulting variable is referred to as RAS. 
Because its methodology derives from qualitative binary coding undertaken 
by a team of expert researchers, it is assumed that there is not too much 
measurement error as the compilers will have acquired direct knowledge of 
state-religious affairs. It is also found to be strongly correlated with the level 
of religious pluralism (r=0.66, countries =55)9, as we might expect from 
Stark & Finke, as religious pluralism presupposes religious freedom in their 
line of thinking (Stark & Finke, 2000). However, there is the problem of 
equal weighting with us once more and Fox’s solution is to brush it aside 
because he cannot think of a better one (Fox, 2006). Whilst factor analytic 
methods might provide a better weighting system, we would not expect a 
different weighting to radically alter the index from its original form. 
                                       
9 The index of pluralism is measured as 1- ∑pi2 with p being the probability of belonging to 
the ith denomination (Voas et al., 2002) and using WVS data. Higher values mean greater 
pluralism. For details of denominational classification, see below. 
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3.11 Control variables 
To ensure that effects are independent of other effects and that we are not 
dealing with spurious correlations, controls are applied within our models at 
both the individual and country-levels. Denominational affiliation was 
measured using two questions. The first asked: “Do you belong to a religious 
denomination?” Responses were either yes or no. Those who answered in the 
affirmative were then asked to identify the denomination in question. From 
these two items, one variable was constructed, with those answering in the 
negative to the first question coded as having no denominational 
identification. The rest were classified as belonging to the major world 
religions – namely Catholicism (CATHOLIC), Protestantism (PROTESTANT), 
Orthodoxy (ORTHODOX), Islam (MUSLIM), Judaism (JEW), Hinduism 
(HINDU), and Buddhism (BUDDHIST). Finally, those who were not easily 
classified were lumped together in an ‘other’ category (OTHER). Gender was 
coded as 1 for female and 0 for male (FEMALE). Age was measured in years 
(AGE). Education was measured as either ‘low’, ‘medium’, or ‘high’ (EDUC). 
Class was identified on a 5-point scale based on respondents’ subjective 
self-appraisal (CLASS). Finally, post-material values were measured using 
the 4-item index provided in the data set (POSTMAT). This measures 
whether people value maintaining order in the nation, giving people more 
say in political decision making, fighting rising prices, and protecting 
freedom of speech (Carmines & Layman, 1997). Extensive research has been 
undertaken to assert its validity (Carmines & Layman, 1997). It is treated as 
a continuous variable. In addition to the HDI and RAS, the level of political 
freedom is controlled for at the country-level, by the Polity IV index 
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(Marshall & Jaggers, 2001). This ranges from -10 to 10 and represents the 
opposing poles of autocracy and democracy (POL_IV). 
3.12 Summary 
It is necessary to note that measurement invariance at the individual level is 
unlikely across country contexts. We can however demonstrate validity if not 
reliability. Conclusions however must be taken with a pinch of salt as such 
problems are only ever managed and not surmounted in comparative 
research. This has to be defended on pragmatic grounds, as if comparative 
social scientists insisted on strict measurement invariance then simply there 
would be no comparative social science. Furthermore, Adcock & Collier 
(2001) make the point that evidence of validity is only ever indicative and 
never final and this is what I have demonstrated. If the reader has any 
doubts remaining, then they would do well to read the next few chapters 
wherein consistency in the relationships is often evidenced whilst clear 
patterns in the effects of religiosity are seen across countries – if indeed the 
data were nonsensical due to their incomparability, then this would not be 
occurring. The effect may be impressionistic but like all impressionist 
paintings, recognisable forms can still be seen. 
This chapter has taken extensive care to select data and measurements that 
are best suited to answering the research questions proposed in Chapter 2. 
The WVS was chosen as a data source because it contains the widest range 
of countries in order to fully gauge the effects of modernisation and religious 
freedom. Appropriate items for the key individual level dependent variables 
and independent variables were selected based on previous approaches and 
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their content validity. These were then validated empirically. Finally, a 
discussion of the operationalization of the key macro-level variables was 
provided, with valid measurements proposed. Now we have our theory, data 
and our measurements, it is time to put them to work with some empirical 
analyses, starting with conventional political participation and religiosity. 
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Chapter 4 – The effect of country context on the relationship 
between religiosity and conventional political participation 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter is concerned with the effect of religiosity on conventional 
participation as moderated by the country-level context. The qualities of the 
hosting country that may moderate this relationship were identified in 
Chapter 2, by drawing on the two competing macro-level theories of the 
sociology of religion, namely secularisation theory and religious economies 
theory. The two macro-level variables that were identified in Chapter 2 and 
operationalised in Chapter 3 were the country’s level of modernisation and 
level of separation of religion and state. It was argued that modernisation 
would have the effect of reducing the effect of religiosity on conventional 
political participation (Hypothesis 1), whilst the level of separation of religion 
and state would have an increasing effect (Hypothesis 4). This chapter is 
concerned with testing these hypotheses. This is done using the WVS along 
with those macro-level data sources identified in Chapter 3. Analyses are 
conducted of two indicators of conventional political participation, namely 
voting (VOTE) and membership of a political party (PARTY). Multi-level 
logistic regression models are estimated in order to test these theories. 
It is found that voting behaviour does not vary across countries as measured 
by their level of modernisation or their level of separation of religion and 
state. It is concluded that the effect of religiosity is positive on voting 
behaviour. Thus, both Hypotheses 1 and 4 do not find confirmation with 
regard to voting. Regarding participation in political parties, it is found that 
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the likelihood of participation is increasing in line with the country level of 
modernisation but showing no variation with separation of religion and 
state. Thus, Hypotheses 1 and 4 are in these instances also not confirmed. 
4.2 Modelling conventional political participation 
Both dependent variables, PARTY and VOTE are binary in nature and so the 
appropriate form of analyses would be the logistic family of regression 
models. However, it is not appropriate to run a standard logistic regression 
model since we have clustered data, whereby individuals are found to be 
nested within countries. This presents a mathematical problem for us since 
the assumption of the independence of observations, made when running 
logistic regressions, is violated. This is potentially a problem as it leads to 
the underestimation of standard errors which would affect significance 
testing and could lead to Type I errors whereby true null hypotheses are 
rejected (Hox, 2010; Luke, 2004; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Accordingly, 
multi-level models are estimated that account for this problem (Hox, 2010, 
Luke, 2004; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). 
For both dependent variables the same modelling procedure is carried out. 
All models are estimated using HLM 6.06 and with full maximum-likelihood 
estimation. First, an empty model is estimated whereby the dependent 
variable is regressed without any predictor variables (Model 1) along with a 
random intercept component. This allows us to decompose the variance in 
the dependent variable between micro and macro levels. Next, the dependent 
variable in question is regressed on the index of religiosity (RELIGIOSITY) 
compiled in Chapter 3, in order to estimate its direct effect along with 
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random slope and random intercept components (Model 2). Then controls 
are introduced at the individual level for denominational affiliation (Model 3). 
This in order to separate out from the effect of RELIGIOSITY any faith-
specific effects, which might be compounding its effect. Further controls for 
basic individual characteristics and socio-demographics are then introduced 
(Model 4), in order to weed out confounding statistical influences and to test 
for spurious dependencies. These controls are age (AGE), gender (FEMALE), 
educational attainment (EDUC), subjective social class (CLASS), and post-
material values (POSTMAT). Additionally, a quadratic term is fitted for age 
(AGE2). Once these possible individual level effects have been accounted for, 
controls are introduced at the macro-level. They measure the level of 
modernity (HDI), the level of separation of religion and state (RAS), and the 
level of democracy (POL_IV) (Model 5). Then two further models are 
estimated. First, a model is estimated with a cross-level interaction term 
between RELIGIOSITY and HDI (Model 6). This is in order to test Hypothesis 
1. Subsequently, a model is estimated with a cross-level interaction term 
between RELIGIOSITY and RAS (Model 7), so that we can test Hypothesis 4. 
This completes the modelling process, which is carried out for both the 
dependent variables, PARTY and VOTE.  
Model 6 is expressed algebraically in the equation below. Model 7 is identical 
except that the interaction is between RELIGIOSITY and RAS: 
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log (
𝜋𝑖𝑗
1 − 𝜋𝑖𝑗
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2. 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3. 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽4. 𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐻𝑂𝐷𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5. 𝑀𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽6. 𝐽𝐸𝑊𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7. 𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽8. 𝐵𝑈𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9. 𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10. 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11. 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽12. 𝐴𝐺𝐸
2
𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13. 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶_𝑀𝐼𝐷 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14. 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶_𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆2𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽16. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆3𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽17. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽18. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆5𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽19. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽20. 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑗 + 𝛽23. 𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑗 + 𝛽24. 𝑃𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑉𝑗 + 𝛽25. 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗
+ 𝑢1𝑗 . 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗 +∈𝑖𝑗 
π is the probability of conventional political participation (be it VOTE or 
PARTY), 𝑖 is the 𝑖th individual and 𝑗 is the 𝑗th country. In addition, robust 
standard errors are estimated to take into account any inflation of standard 
errors brought about by heteroskedasticity. All continuous variables are 
grand mean centred in order to limit possible effects of multicollinearity, 
particularly where interactions and quadratic effects are concerned, and to 
ease interpretation of the constant10. RAS and AGE have been divided by 
100, so that coefficients are not too small so that they cannot be presented 
when rounded up to two decimal places. Population averaged models are 
reported. Robustness testing of the results is carried out, in order to test for 
any influential country cases that might be serving as the exception that 
forces the rule by exerting too much influence on the regression analysis 
(Van der Meer et al. 2010). Conditional regression coefficients are then 
estimated in order to gauge any uncovered interactions properly. Tables 5 
and 6 present descriptive statistics for each country included in our 
analyses. 
                                       
10 With the exception of POL_IV and POSTMAT for which the zero-point is meaningful. 
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Table 5: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 4: Individual level variables 
Country VOTE PARTY RELIG AGE FEMALE EDUC CLASS POSTMAT 
  mean sd mean sd mean Sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
                 
Argentina 0.79 0.41 0.11 0.31 -0.13 0.76 42.55 17.59 0.53 0.5 1.65 0.74 2.46 0.82 1.87 0.65 
Australia 0.95 0.21 0.1 0.31 -0.66 0.91 50.45 16.86 0.55 0.5 2.4 0.74 2.9 0.88 2.09 0.61 
Brazil 0.88 0.32 0.1 0.3 0.42 0.5 39.96 15.68 0.58 0.49 1.57 0.75 2.16 0.86 1.79 0.62 
Bulgaria 0.68 0.47 0.05 0.22 -0.53 0.67 47.36 16.51 0.54 0.5 1.98 0.68 2.31 0.83 1.46 0.54 
Burk Faso 0.62 0.49 0.18 0.38 0.64 0.47 34.31 13.92 0.49 0.5 1.25 0.54 1.97 1.01 1.62 0.58 
Canada 0.74 0.44 0.16 0.37 -0.21 0.86 48.21 17.8 0.58 0.49 2.04 0.73 2.92 0.91 2.18 0.59 
Chile 0.72 0.45 0.14 0.35 -0.02 0.69 42.93 16.98 0.55 0.5 1.78 0.73 2.64 0.92 1.84 0.63 
China   0.13 0.33 -1.29 0.83 44.76 13.32 0.54 0.5 1.54 0.61 2.34 0.89 1.56 0.58 
Cyprus 0.87 0.34 0.19 0.39 0.05 0.64 41.63 15.98 0.51 0.5 2.07 0.76 3.17 0.88 1.79 0.65 
Egypt 0.31 0.46 0.03 0.18 0.56 0.39 41.02 14.5 0.62 0.49 1.65 0.7 2.53 1 1.59 0.53 
Ethiopia 0.8 0.4 0.26 0.44 0.64 0.47 29.93 10.21 0.49 0.5 1.6 0.69 2.38 1.08 1.89 0.64 
Finland 0.77 0.42 0.14 0.35 -0.56 0.76 47.52 17.49 0.52 0.5 1.93 0.75 2.84 0.85 1.86 0.6 
Georgia 0.77 0.42 0.01 0.1 0.37 0.41 45.41 17.19 0.53 0.5 2.29 0.54 2.64 0.93 1.65 0.58 
Germany 0.8 0.4 0.05 0.22 -0.9 0.85 50.44 17.49 0.56 0.5 1.74 0.71 2.8 0.85 1.94 0.63 
Ghana 0.8 0.4 0.51 0.5 0.78 0.33 33.86 14.07 0.49 0.5 1.38 0.59 2 1.04 1.73 0.56 
India 0.92 0.28 0.66 0.47 0.16 0.64 41.37 14.71 0.43 0.5 1.72 0.8 2.52 1.17 1.68 0.56 
Indonesia 0.91 0.29 0.16 0.37 0.69 0.37 36.1 13.94 0.48 0.5 2.14 0.72 2.97 0.87 1.6 0.58 
Iran   0.09 0.28 0.43 0.49 32.69 12.77 0.5 0.5 1.87 0.77 3.11 0.99 1.64 0.61 
Italy 0.89 0.31 0.1 0.31 0.06 0.7 45.62 15.62 0.5 0.5 1.93 0.78 2.84 0.92 2.01 0.61 
Japan 0.75 0.43 0.07 0.25 -0.8 0.6 48.15 15.74 0.56 0.5 2.17 0.58 2.69 0.86 1.84 0.56 
Jordan   0.01 0.08 0.91 0.28 37.59 14.4 0.51 0.5 1.88 0.81 3.02 0.85 1.56 0.56 
Malaysia 0.53 0.5 0.24 0.42 0.38 0.48 31.84 11.93 0.5 0.5 1.94 0.58 2.79 1.04 1.74 0.58 
Mali 0.62 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.68 0.4 37.25 14.85 0.5 0.5 1.3 0.6 2.88 1.1 1.64 0.59 
Moldova 0.67 0.47 0.09 0.29 -0.05 0.62 42.78 16.85 0.53 0.5 2.06 0.53 2.8 1.03 1.67 0.61 
Morocco 0.34 0.48 0.03 0.17 0.69 0.32 37.17 13.38 0.51 0.5 1.29 0.54 2.38 0.78 1.55 0.61 
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Country VOTE PARTY RELIG AGE FEMALE EDUC CLASS POSTMAT 
  mean sd mean sd mean Sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
New Zealand   0.17 0.37 -0.78 0.93 49.25 16.39 0.55 0.5 2.43 0.6 2.93 0.92 2.11 0.56 
Norway 0.83 0.37 0.17 0.38 -0.93 0.76 45.78 16.06 0.5 0.5 2.29 0.76 3 0.88 2.12 0.49 
Peru 0.9 0.3 0.07 0.26 0.27 0.58 37.62 14.9 0.51 0.5 1.86 0.74 2.42 0.88 1.95 0.64 
Poland 0.68 0.47 0.08 0.26 0.35 0.58 45.96 17.82 0.49 0.5 1.62 0.71 2.44 0.92 1.76 0.58 
Romania 0.89 0.31 0.04 0.19 0.32 0.49 48.68 17.38 0.54 0.5 1.83 0.73 2.4 1.03 1.57 0.59 
Rwanda 0.29 0.45 0.68 0.3 0.02 0.14 34.65 14.15 0.51 0.5 1.21 0.47 1.7 0.98 1.87 0.68 
Slovenia 0.72 0.45 0.07 0.25 -0.61 0.84 46.19 17.84 0.54 0.5 2 0.7 2.8 0.88 1.95 0.59 
S. Africa 0.69 0.46 0.37 0.48 0.44 0.55 38.82 16.58 0.5 0.5 1.84 0.53 2.38 1.23 1.7 0.61 
S. Korea 0.76 0.42 0.07 0.26 -0.43 0.84 41.38 14.01 0.5 0.5 2.44 0.66 2.98 0.81 1.48 0.55 
Spain   0.05 0.21 -0.74 0.83 46.21 18.48 0.5 0.5 1.6 0.74 2.71 0.63 1.76 0.65 
Sweden 0.86 0.35 0.11 0.31 -1.04 0.73 47.73 16.99 0.5 0.5 2.34 0.73 3.16 0.9 2.2 0.51 
Switzerland 0.75 0.43 0.16 0.36 -0.52 0.84 52.45 16.14 0.55 0.5 2.2 0.64 3.37 0.78 2.08 0.63 
Taiwan 0.76 0.43 0.07 0.26 -0.59 0.61 43.88 16.05 0.49 0.5 2.16 0.78 2.83 0.91 1.48 0.57 
Thailand 0.95 0.23 0.17 0.37 0.36 0.41 45.35 15.73 0.51 0.5 1.51 0.71 2.85 0.77 1.78 0.5 
Trin & Tob 0.69 0.46 0.19 0.39 0.51 0.47 42.61 17.33 0.55 0.5 1.65 0.65 2.74 1.05 1.72 0.57 
Turkey 0.76 0.43 0.05 0.22 0.31 0.57 36.48 13.86 0.5 0.5 1.62 0.69 2.97 0.92 1.81 0.65 
Ukraine 0.87 0.34 0.07 0.25 -0.35 0.72 42.38 16.77 0.66 0.47 2.27 0.63 2.66 0.91 1.55 0.56 
USA 0.78 0.42 0.51 0.5 0.04 0.83 47.96 17.03 0.5 0.5 1.95 0.5 2.87 0.92 1.98 0.63 
Uruguay   0.08 0.27 -0.44 0.88 46.53 18.65 0.56 0.5 1.44 0.74 2.39 0.9 2.08 0.65 
Vietnam 0.92 0.28 0.16 0.37 -0.82 0.65 40.75 15.85 0.49 0.5 1.51 0.63 2.16 0.57 1.8 0.54 
Zambia 0.64 0.48 0.41 0.49 0.58 0.46 29.79 11.88 0.49 0.5 1.7 0.69 2.5 1.27 1.82 0.6 
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Table 6: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 4: Country characteristics 
Country Proportion of... HDI POL_IV RAS 
  NONE CATH PROT ORTH MUS JEW HIND BUD OTH    
Argentina 0.17 0.74 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.02 0.75 8 30 
Australia 0.4 0.23 0.31 0.02 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.93 10 2.5 
Brazil 0.13 0.6 0.23 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.68 8 2.29 
Bulgaria 0.16 0 0 0.74 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.73 9 36.72 
Burk Faso 0.02 0.31 0.08 0 0.53 0 0 0 0.05 0.3 0 1.88 
Canada 0.29 0.4 0.16 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.12 0.88 10 3.52 
Chile 0.23 0.6 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.76 10 20.33 
China 0.89 0 0.04 0 0.02 0 0 0.03 0.01 0.64 -7 48.14 
Cyprus 0.05 0 0 0.49 0.45 0 0 0 0 0.8 10 16.54 
Egypt 0 0 0.06 0 0.94 0 0 0 0 0.61 -3 62.92 
Ethiopia 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.65 0.11 0 0 0 0.02 0.31 1 21.05 
Finland 0.14 0 0.83 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.86 10 32.88 
Georgia 0.02 0 0 0.94 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.7 6 32.83 
Germany 0.43 0.21 0.33 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.88 10 19.88 
Ghana 0.03 0.21 0.55 0.04 0.15 0 0 0 0.03 0.46 8 4.32 
India 0.06 0 0.03 0 0.08 0.01 0.76 0.02 0.05 0.49 9 22.87 
Indonesia 0.01 0 0.07 0 0.92 0 0 0 0 0.57 8 45.22 
Iran 0.01 0 0 0 0.98 0 0 0 0.01 0.67 -6 66.59 
Italy 0.12 0.87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.84 10 13 
Japan 0.64 0.01 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.31 0.03 0.87 10 8.5 
Jordan 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.98 0 0 0 0 0.71 -3 60.51 
Malaysia 0.02 0.07 0.05 0 0.57 0 0.08 0.2 0.01 0.73 3 57.52 
Mali 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0.93 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.35 7 17.42 
Moldova 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.92 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.61 8 32.34 
Morocco 0 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0.6 -6 51.86 
New Zealand 0.34 0.14 0.48 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.02 0.89 10 10.5 
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Country Proportion of... HDI POL_IV RAS 
  NONE CATH PROT ORTH MUS JEW HIND BUD OTH    
             Norway 0.32 0.01 0.63 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.02 0.93 10 25.27 
Peru 0.12 0.71 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.7 9 22 
Poland 0.02 0.94 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.76 10 22.21 
Romania 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.86 0 0 0 0 0 0.77 9 24.5 
Rwanda 0.52 0.3 0 0.15 0 0 0 0 0.51 0.43 -3 9.77 
Slovenia 0.29 0.65 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.81 10 11.96 
S. Africa 0.17 0.12 0.59 0 0.02 0 0.02 0 0.07 0.59 9 2.5 
S. Korea 0.29 0.21 0.23 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.02 0.85 8 1.88 
Spain 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.89 10 22.46 
Sweden 0.26 0.02 0.71 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.89 10 12.17 
Switzerland 0.2 0.41 0.33 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.04 0.9 10 20.5 
Taiwan 0.31 0.01 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.19 0.45 0.94 10 1.67 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0.97 0 0.64 -1 21.5 
Trin & Tob 0.07 0.2 0.44 0 0.05 0 0.23 0 0 0.72 10 4.79 
Turkey 0.01 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0.65 7 47.21 
Ukraine 0.31 0.07 0 0.6 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.7 7 19.99 
USA 0.3 0.2 0.32 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.15 0.9 10 0 
Uruguay 0.55 0.34 0.07 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.74 10 8.54 
Vietnam 0.21 0.06 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.15 0.56 0.55 -7 53.5 
Zambia 0.05 0.34 0.46 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.12 0.36 5 29.94 
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4.3 Empirical analysis of conventional political participation 
4.3.1 Voting 
In Table 7 are presented the results of the multilevel analysis of the 
dependent variable VOTE. There are 49,402 cases at level-1 and 39 cases at 
level-2. Model 1a is the so-called empty model that is estimated in order to 
calculate the variance patrician coefficient (VPC) that is used to determine 
the proportion in the dependent variable at level-2, in this case countries. In 
this incidence, it is also the same as the intra-class correlation (ICC) which 
denotes the similarity between two members of a level-2 unit. It is calculated 
using the formula (Snijders & Bosker, 1999): 
𝑣𝑝𝑐 =
𝜎𝑣
2
𝜎𝑣2 +
𝜋2
3
 
𝜎𝑣
2 is the variance at level-2 whilst the variance at level-1 is constant in a 
multilevel logistic regression at 
𝜋2
3
. From Model 1a, the VPC tells us that 17% 
of the variance in the dependent variable can be found at the country-
level11. Model 2a introduces RELIGIOSITY along with a random slope in 
addition to the random intercepts component. In this model the effect of 
religiosity is both positive and highly significant.  
 
 
 
                                       
11 Random effects by way of the variance components are made reference to in the following 
analyses but can be found in full in Appendix D. 
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Table 7: Multilevel logistic regression of having voted (VOTE) 
 Model 1a Model 2a Model 3a Model 4a Model 5a Model 6a Model 7a 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT 1.17*** 1.11*** 0.91*** 1.11*** 0.85* 0.85* 0.84* 
 (0.13) (0.13) (0.15) (0.21) (0.48) (0.48) (0.48) 
RELIGIOSITY  0.31*** 0.26*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) 
CATHOLIC   0.26*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.28*** 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
PROTESTANT   0.27*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
   (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
ORTHODOX   0.29*** 0.36*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.37*** 
   (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
MUSLIM   0.21* 0.30** 0.32** 0.32** 0.32** 
   (0.13) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
JEW   0.41 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 
   (0.27) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) 
HINDU   0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.24 
   (0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
BUDDHIST   0.19*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
OTHER   -0.08 -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 
   (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
FEMALE    -0.15*** -0.16*** -0.16*** -0.16*** 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
AGE    4.66*** 4.77*** 4.78*** 4.76*** 
    (0.57) (0.51) (0.51) (0.51) 
AGE2    -0.13*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13*** 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
EDUC MID    0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
EDUC HIGH    0.48*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLASS 2    -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
CLASS 3    0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 4    0.14 0.14 0.14 0.14 
    (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
CLASS 5    -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
    (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
POSTMAT    0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI     -0.50 -0.37 -0.53 
     (0.75) (0.72) (0.76) 
RAS     1.17 1.16 1.28 
     (0.84) (0.84) (0.86) 
POL_IV     0.03 0.03 0.04 
     (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
HDI*REL      -0.24  
      (0.24)  
RAS*REL       -0.20 
       (0.26) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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There is also significant variance in slopes across countries (at the mean of 
RELIGIOSITY), as demonstrated by the variance component for 
RELIGIOSITY (0.13, p=0.00), indicating that while the trend is overall 
positive between religiosity and voting, the effect is not uniform across 
countries. In Model 3a, controls are introduced for religious denominational 
identification. The effect of this is to slightly reduce the effect of religiosity on 
voting although it remains both positive and highly significant. As the 
reference category for denominational identification is ‘NONE’ we can draw 
some inferences as to the effect of denominational identification as a whole. 
In Model 3a, we can see that identification as Catholic, Protestant, 
Orthodox, Muslim and Buddhist significantly increases the likelihood of 
voting. However, those who identify as Jewish, Hindu, or some ‘Other’ 
religion are not significantly different from those with no denominational 
identification. Thus, we can say that identifying with a religion, independent 
of the level of commitment is sufficient to raise the likelihood of voting 
although only in the cases of some of the major world faiths (and not all). 
Next in the modelling process, we add more individual level control variables 
in order to test for any spurious relationships between religiosity and voting 
(Model 4a). Introducing these control variables reduces the effect of 
religiosity quite substantially but not enough to either change the polarity of 
the regression coefficient or to alter its level of significance – these remain 
positive and high respectively. Also, the effects of religious denominational 
identification are not substantively changed from how they were in Model 
3a. As for the newly introduced controls themselves: women are significantly 
less likely to vote than men; AGE follows a significantly curvilinear trend 
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with increasing age linked to increased voting up to a point whereby the 
effect tails off. EDUC is significantly linked to greater voting with roughly a 
linear trend evidenced. However, there is no stratification of voter turnout by 
CLASS nor does POSTMAT make any difference. In Model 5a, controls are 
introduced at the country-level. As we can see, there are no significant direct 
effects of either HDI or RAS on the level of voting. Nor does their inclusion 
do anything to alter the results substantively from the last model. POL_IV is 
also insignificant. Now we turn our attention to the hypotheses proposed in 
Chapter 2 and how they relate specifically to voting behaviour. Model 6a 
introduces an interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and HDI. The effect is 
negative but insignificant. Thus, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 1 as it 
pertains to voting behaviour – there is no interaction between level of 
modernisation and religiosity in their effect on the likelihood of voting.  
One after another, each country is removed from the data set and each time, 
Model 6a is re-estimated in order to test for the possibility that individual 
countries are exerting an overbearing influence on the regression results. In 
not one incidence, did the interaction effect prove anything other than 
negative and insignificant. Thus, we can have a degree of confidence that 
this result is robust with respect to overly-influential cases at the country-
level and can continue to uphold our failure to confirm Hypothesis 1. 
In Model 7a, an interaction is introduced between RELIGIOSITY and RAS. 
Again, the interaction coefficient is negative and insignificant, so we must 
reject Hypothesis 4 vis-à-vis voting behaviour and conclude there is no 
interaction between religiosity and separation of religion and state in their 
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effect on the likelihood of voting. Again, the same procedure was undertaken 
in order to test for overly-influential countries. There were no incidences 
whereby a significant interaction effect was found. The Egyptian case was 
exceptional in that in its absence, the interaction effect was positive in 
contrast to all the others, whereby a negative effect was found. However, it 
was insignificant – there are influential cases, but none strong enough to 
force us to alter our conclusion, that Hypothesis 4 can be rejected and so we 
can be confident within reason, to its robustness. Thus, we have to go with 
Model 5a and conclude that religiosity is positively linked to the likelihood of 
voting, in line with our general theoretical reasoning, but that this 
relationship does not vary across countries, at least in regard to their level of 
modernisation or separation of religion and state. What variation there is in 
the effect of religiosity across countries is picked up only by the random 
effects structure of the modelling. 
4.3.2 Party membership 
Next, we can turn our attention to participation in political parties, as 
measured by the dependent variable PARTY. The results of the multivariate 
multilevel logistic regression analyses are displayed in Table 8. The step-
wise modelling process is identical to that just outlined above. At level-1 
there are 58,683 cases and at level-2 there are 46. Model 1b is again the 
empty model from which the VPC can be estimated. Indeed, the proportion 
of variance at the macro-level is put at 27%.  
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Table 8: Multilevel logistic regression of membership of a political party (PARTY) 
 Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b Model 6b Model 7b 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -1.64*** -1.59*** -1.64*** -1.97*** -2.35*** -2.34*** -2.35*** 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.13) (0.21) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
RELIGIOSITY  0.06** 0.04 0.06** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.09** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
CATHOLIC   0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
   (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
PROTESTANT   0.15* 0.15** 0.16** 0.16** 0.16** 
   (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
ORTHODOX   0.11 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 
   (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
MUSLIM   0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 
   (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
JEW   0.11 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
   (0.29) (0.24) (0.23) (0.24) (0.23) 
HINDU   -0.09 -0.10 -0.16 -0.17 -0.17 
   (0.46) (0.46) (0.37) (0.37) (0.37) 
BUDDHIST   -0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
   (0.11) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
OTHER   -0.07 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
   (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
FEMALE    -0.30*** -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.34*** 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
AGE    1.03*** 1.14*** 1.15*** 1.15*** 
    (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
AGE2    -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EDUC MID    0.26*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 0.29*** 
    (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
EDUC HIGH    0.42*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 0.48*** 
    (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 2    0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
CLASS 3    0.15*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
CLASS 4    0.23*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 
    (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
CLASS 5    0.14 0.15 0.15 0.15 
    (0.15) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) 
POSTMAT    0.10*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 
    (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI     -3.38*** -3.53*** -3.39*** 
     (0.86) (0.86) (0.86) 
RAS     1.62* 1.64* 1.59* 
     (0.90) (0.90) (0.90) 
POL_IV     0.03 0.03 0.03 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI*REL      0.59***  
      (0.16)  
RAS*REL       0.09 
       (0.23) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Model 2b introduces RELIGIOSITY as the sole independent variable in the 
model along with an accompanying random slope term. The effect of 
RELIGIOSITY upon belonging to a political party is both positive and highly 
significant with variance across countries when this is held at its mean 
(variance component 0.11, p=0.00). 
Next, in Model 3b, controls are added for denominational identification. By 
doing so, the effect of RELIGIOSITY reduces and is no longer significant. On 
this basis, we would say that the link between religiosity is more to do with 
certain cultural influences imparted by certain religious traditions rather 
than the level of religious commitment per se. It is indeed the Protestant 
tradition that matters, as from Model 3b we can see that it is the only 
denomination that is significantly distinct from no denominational 
identification. However, once controls are further added for basic individual 
characteristics and demographics in Model 4b, we see that RELIGIOSITY 
independent of denominational flavour is both positively tied to party 
participation and returned to statistical significance at the 5% level – 
religiosity does indeed matter! Their addition does nothing too much to 
dramatically alter the effects of denominational identification from as they 
were in Model 3b – Protestantism remains the only one of the major world 
faiths to be linked to party participation. As for these control variables 
themselves, women participate less than men whilst AGE follows a 
curvilinear effect whereby there is growth in the likelihood of participation 
with age up to a point before the onset of decline, much the same as was 
revealed in our empirical analysis of voting. Again, EDUC is a strong 
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predictor of participation, with roughly a linear increase in the likelihood of 
participation evidenced with increasing educational attainment. However, 
unlike voting, this form of participation is stratified by CLASS, with 
something like an up-turned U-shape found. It is evident that those in the 
middle and upper-middle classes are involved in political parties the most, 
but that those at the extremities of the class system tend to be withdrawn. 
Additionally and again unlike voting, post-material values matter with 
greater levels being associated positively with party participation. Model 5b 
sees the introduction of HDI, RAS and POL_IV.  Both RAS and HDI are 
negatively and significantly linked to the party mode of conventional 
participation. POL_IV is insignificantly linked. These variables do nothing to 
change the results from as they were in Model 4b. Next, we introduce 
interaction terms in order to address the theoretical questions that this 
chapter is concerned with. In Model 6b, an interaction term is introduced 
between HDI and RELIGIOSITY. The effect is both highly significant and 
positive. This is not in line with the theoretical prediction and thus we must 
reject Hypothesis 1 as it pertains to party participation as a mode of 
conventional political participation - this being the hypothesis that 
modernisation will be coupled with a step back from the conventional mode 
of political participation by the religious. In fact, on the basis of this model, 
the converse is true. Greater modernisation is associated with greater 
likelihood of participation in political parties by the more religious.  
Once more, the possibility of countries with overbearing influence on the 
results was considered. In no incidence did the removal of any country prove 
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sufficient to provide anything other than a positive and highly significant 
interaction. Thus, we can consider the conclusion made regarding Model 6b 
as robust in this regard and uphold the rejection of Hypothesis 1. 
In order to fully understand the effects of religiosity as the level of 
modernisation varies, conditional regression coefficients have been 
calculated and are presented in Table 9. Here we can see that at the 
minimum level of HDI in our dataset, the effect of RELIGIOSITY is negative 
and significant if only at the 10% level. By the mean level, the effect has 
become positive and highly significant and by the maximum the effect is 
more positive still and also highly significant. 
Table 9: Effect of religiosity on party membership by country modernisation 
(conditional regression coefficients Model 6b) 
 Minimum HDI Mean HDI Maximum HDI 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -0.94*** -2.34*** -3.23*** 
 (0.31) (0.18) (0.33) 
RELIGIOSITY -0.14* 0.10*** 0.24*** 
 (0.08) (0.03) (0.05) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The interaction in Model 6b is presented in its fullest by way of a conditional 
effects plot12 in Figure 3. There we can see that participation in political 
parties is more likely in less modern societies, but that the effect of 
                                       
12 All conditional effects plots used in this thesis take each categorical variable at its 
reference point, whilst all continuous variables with the exception of POL_IV and POSTMAT 
are grand mean centered. Ideally, all plots would be presented so that the y-axis is 
measuring predicted probabilities. The problem is that when coefficients are exponentiated, 
logit models become multiplicative rather than additive so that the slopes for RELIGIOSITY 
across the spectrum of the macro-level variable in question, become weighted by their 
constants. This results in a distorting of the interaction effects found in the modelling. 
When the distorting effect is too great, conditional effects plots are presented with the 
logarithm of the odds of whatever the dependent variable might be as the y-axis. Otherwise, 
they are presented with predicted probabilities, as this is more comprehendible option and 
allows the reader to better judge the scale of the effects. 
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religiosity is something of an equalising one, whereby two individuals, each 
from different ends of the modernisation spectrum, who are both highly 
religious, are more comparable in terms of the likelihood of participation 
than two individuals who have no religiosity. The fact that the conditional 
regression coefficient is positive and significant in countries with a mean-
level of modernisation and above, is consistent with existing research 
referenced earlier which tends to stem from advanced societies. The fact that 
the effect is seen as negative in undeveloped societies, is something of a 
novel finding, and is worthy of further inquiry. 
Figure 3: The effect of religiosity on party participation - conditional effects plot for 
Model 6b 
 
Another way to view this interaction is to regress PARTY on RELIGIOSITY 
plus individual level controls, within each country and then to present the 
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β-coefficients for RELIGIOSITY graphed against HDI, as seen in Figure 413. 
There we can clearly see an upward effect in the strength of the effect of 
RELIGIOSITY on participation in political parties, as modernisation rises. 
Figure 4: The effect of modernisation on the effect of religiosity on participation in 
political parties (results of country-specific logistic regressions with controls) 
 
Model 7b sees the introduction of an interaction term between RAS and 
RELIGIOSITY. Its effect is negative but insignificant. Thus, we can reject 
Hypothesis 4 that the effect of religiosity on party politics will be greater 
where levels of separation of religion and state are higher.  
Once again, overly-influential cases were tested for. The removal of not one 
country from the dataset was sufficient to produce a significant interaction 
                                       
13 These graphs could be very easily presented for other interactions, but for the sake of 
brevity, they are not. They are presented only to give the reader some idea of how the cross-
level interaction might be working in a visual manner, so we can be confident of linear 
trends. 
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effect, although the removal of Vietnam did cause the regression coefficient 
to flip its polarity although it was highly insignificant. Thus, we uphold the 
conclusion that Hypothesis 4 cannot be sustained. 
4.4 Summary 
In this chapter, conventional political participation has been analysed using 
the contextualised individual level theories derived from secularisation 
theory (Hypothesis 1) and religious economies theory (Hypothesis 4). 
Multivariate multilevel logistic regressions were carried out on two 
indicators of such behaviour, namely voting and participation in political 
parties. In both instances, were the theories found not to have empirical 
support. The effect of religiosity on voting was found to be neither influenced 
by the level of modernisation of the country nor the level of separation of 
religion and state. What was found was that across all countries, religiosity 
is tied to voting despite certain unmeasured country-specific idiosyncrasies. 
With regard to political party participation, the effect of religiosity was found 
to increase with the level of modernisation, contrary to our theoretical 
expectation. The level of separation of religion and state was found not to be 
having any meaningful effect as a moderator of the relationship between 
religiosity and political party involvement. These unexpected results will be 
discussed with explanations put forward in Chapter 7. Next, our attention is 
turned to participation in civil society and the effects of religiosity and 
country context. 
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Chapter 5 – The effect of country context on the relationship 
between religiosity and participation within civil society 
5.1 Introduction 
The theory of religiosity, modernisation and civil society participation 
posited that religiosity would be frozen out of conventional political 
participation in more modernised countries but would re-manifest itself in 
civil society as something politically neutered but nevertheless interested in 
being involved in directing and ordering society as some sort of moral 
guardian. However, in the last chapter we saw that modernisation was not 
serving to exclude religiosity from conventional political participation. In fact 
it seemed if anything that the converse was happening with regard to the 
involvement of the religious in party politics. However, this does not 
preclude that an energising of religiosity in civil society is not also 
happening in more modernised societies (Hypothesis 2). It is this theme that 
is addressed here in this chapter along with our hypothesis that religious 
free-market conditions should serve to energise religions so that they have 
more desire for involvement in civil society (Hypothesis 5). In this chapter 
are presented multilevel logistic regression models of several indicators of 
civil society participation in order to test these hypotheses.  
It is found that level of modernisation does increase the likelihood of 
participation in civil society organisations, so that we can confirm support 
for Hypothesis 2. However, only with regard to religious organisations and 
cultural/educational organisations do we find support for Hypothesis 5. 
Thus, this hypothesis is only partially confirmed. 
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5.2 Modelling participation within civil society 
In Chapter 3, several indicators of civil society participation were identified 
as being both reasonably valid and of use in this study. They were religious 
organisations (RELORG), charitable/humanitarian organisations 
(CHARORG), environmental organisations (ENVORG), and cultural 
/education organisations (CULTORG). It was further argued that 
aggregation of these items in the WVS, whilst desirable on the grounds of 
parsimony, would in all probability have the undesired effect of masking 
effects that were unique to certain types of civil society organisation behind 
‘averaged out’ explanations that were true for none. Thus, these items are 
analysed in their own right with aggregation avoided. As these variables are 
all coded as binary, the logistic family of regression models is again used. 
Due to the nested structure of the data, multilevel techniques are applied 
with individuals deemed nested in countries. This is in order to deal with the 
problem of the violation of the assumption of independence of observations. 
In fact, the modelling process is identical to that employed in the last 
chapter, with the sole difference being the dependent variables in question. 
Again, the modelling begins with (1) the estimation of empty models in order 
to decompose the variance between macro and micro levels. Then a model 
(2) with civil society participation regressed on RELIGIOSITY with a random 
slopes component, is estimated. This forms the base for all further models. 
Subsequent stages in the modelling process are: (3) the adding of controls 
for denominational identification; (4) the adding of further controls at the 
individual level; (5) the adding of controls at the macro level; (6) testing an 
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interaction between religiosity and HDI (Hypothesis 2); and (7) the testing of 
an interaction between religiosity and RAS (Hypothesis 5). 
Again, the cross-level interaction in Model 6 can be expressed formally as: 
log (
𝜋𝑖𝑗
1 − 𝜋𝑖𝑗
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2. 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3. 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽4. 𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐻𝑂𝐷𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5. 𝑀𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽6. 𝐽𝐸𝑊𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7. 𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽8. 𝐵𝑈𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9. 𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10. 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11. 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽12. 𝐴𝐺𝐸
2
𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13. 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶_𝑀𝐼𝐷 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14. 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶_𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆2𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽16. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆3𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽17. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽18. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆5𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽19. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽20. 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑗 + 𝛽23. 𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑗 + 𝛽24. 𝑃𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑉𝑗 + 𝛽25. 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗
+ 𝑢1𝑗 . 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗 +∈𝑖𝑗 
π is the probability of civil society participation, 𝑖 is the 𝑖th individual and 𝑗 
is the 𝑗th country. In addition, robust standard errors are estimated in order 
to make allowances for possible heteroskedasticity in the models. 
RELIGIOSITY, HDI, RAS, and AGE have all been grand mean centred so that 
any possible effects of multicollinearity are reduced14. Variables AGE and 
RAS have been divided by 100 so that results can be presented as rounded 
up to 2 decimal places. Population averaged models are reported with 
robustness testing for overly-influential cases at level-2 also carried out. In 
Tables 10 and 11 are presented the descriptive statistics of the dependent 
variables for each country included in our analyses. 
                                       
14 Again with the exception of POL_IV and POSTMAT since the 0 points are meaningful. 
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 5: Individual level variables 
Country RELORG CHARORG ENVORG CULTORG RELIG FEM AGE EDUC CLASS POSTMAT 
  mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Argentina 0.4 0.49 0.15 0.36 0.1 0.31 0.17 0.38 -0.13 0.76 0.53 0.5 42.6 1.76 1.65 0.74 2.46 0.82 1.87 0.65 
Australia 0.45 0.5 0.31 0.46 0.15 0.36 0.32 0.47 -0.66 0.91 0.55 0.5 50.5 1.69 2.4 0.74 2.9 0.88 2.09 0.61 
Brazil 0.77 0.42 0.2 0.4 0.07 0.26 0.15 0.35 0.42 0.5 0.58 0.49 40 1.57 1.57 0.75 2.16 0.86 1.79 0.62 
Bulgaria 0.04 0.2 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.12 0.03 0.17 -0.53 0.67 0.54 0.5 47.4 1.65 1.98 0.68 2.31 0.83 1.46 0.54 
Burkina Faso 0.49 0.5 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.64 0.47 0.49 0.5 34.3 1.39 1.25 0.54 1.97 1.01 1.62 0.58 
Canada 0.52 0.5 0.31 0.46 0.15 0.36 0.33 0.47 -0.21 0.86 0.58 0.49 48.2 1.78 2.04 0.73 2.92 0.91 2.18 0.59 
Chile 0.43 0.5 0.22 0.41 0.13 0.34 0.26 0.44 -0.02 0.69 0.55 0.5 42.9 1.7 1.78 0.73 2.64 0.92 1.84 0.63 
China 0.1 0.3 0.08 0.27 0.1 0.3 0.14 0.35 -1.29 0.83 0.54 0.5 44.8 1.33 1.54 0.61 2.34 0.89 1.56 0.58 
Cyprus 0.14 0.35 0.13 0.33 0.07 0.26 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.64 0.51 0.5 41.6 1.6 2.07 0.76 3.17 0.88 1.79 0.65 
Egypt 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.1 0.01 0.12 0.56 0.39 0.62 0.49 41 1.45 1.65 0.7 2.53 1 1.59 0.53 
Ethiopia 0.79 0.41 0.29 0.45 0.29 0.45 0.45 0.5 0.64 0.47 0.49 0.5 29.9 1.02 1.6 0.69 2.38 1.08 1.89 0.64 
Finland 0.79 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.1 0.3 0.19 0.39 -0.56 0.76 0.52 0.5 47.5 1.75 1.93 0.75 2.84 0.85 1.86 0.6 
Georgia 0.07 0.26 0 0.07 0 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.37 0.41 0.53 0.5 45.4 1.72 2.29 0.54 2.64 0.93 1.65 0.58 
Germany 0.37 0.48 0.1 0.3 0.05 0.22 0.14 0.34 -0.9 0.85 0.56 0.5 50.4 1.75 1.74 0.71 2.8 0.85 1.94 0.63 
Ghana 0.92 0.27 0.22 0.41 0.27 0.44 0.4 0.49 0.78 0.33 0.49 0.5 33.9 1.41 1.38 0.59 2 1.04 1.73 0.56 
India 0.68 0.47 0.57 0.5 0.59 0.49 0.64 0.48 0.16 0.64 0.43 0.5 41.4 1.47 1.72 0.8 2.52 1.17 1.68 0.56 
Indonesia 0.67 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.37 0.48 0.3 0.46 0.69 0.37 0.48 0.5 36.1 1.39 2.14 0.72 2.97 0.87 1.6 0.58 
Iran 0.39 0.49 0.24 0.43 0.1 0.3 0.19 0.39 0.43 0.49 0.5 0.5 32.7 1.28 1.87 0.77 3.11 0.99 1.64 0.61 
Italy 0.22 0.42 0.21 0.41 0.08 0.27 0.17 0.38 0.06 0.7 0.5 0.5 45.6 1.56 1.93 0.78 2.84 0.92 2.01 0.61 
Japan 0.12 0.33 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.16 0.36 -0.8 0.6 0.56 0.5 48.2 1.57 2.17 0.58 2.69 0.86 1.84 0.56 
Jordan 0.03 0.17 0.03 0.17 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.1 0.91 0.28 0.51 0.5 37.6 1.44 1.88 0.81 3.02 0.85 1.56 0.56 
Malaysia 0.34 0.47 0.14 0.35 0.1 0.3 0.22 0.41 0.38 0.48 0.5 0.5 31.8 1.19 1.94 0.58 2.79 1.04 1.74 0.58 
Mali 0.67 0.47 0.4 0.49 0.44 0.5 0.39 0.49 0.68 0.4 0.5 0.5 37.3 1.48 1.3 0.6 2.88 1.1 1.64 0.59 
Moldova 0.33 0.47 0.08 0.27 0.07 0.26 0.15 0.36 -0.05 0.62 0.53 0.5 42.8 1.69 2.06 0.53 2.8 1.03 1.67 0.61 
Morocco 0.05 0.21 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.07 0.26 0.69 0.32 0.51 0.5 37.2 1.34 1.29 0.54 2.38 0.78 1.55 0.61 
Norway 0.38 0.49 0.32 0.47 0.07 0.26 0.2 0.4 -0.93 0.76 0.5 0.5 45.8 1.61 2.29 0.76 3 0.88 2.12 0.49 
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Country RELORG CHARORG ENVORG CULTORG RELIG FEM AGE EDUC CLASS POSTMAT 
  mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
New Zealand 0.43 0.5 0.38 0.49 0.21 0.4 0.39 0.49 -0.78 0.93 0.55 0.5 49.3 1.64 2.43 0.6 2.93 0.92 2.11 0.56 
Peru 0.38 0.49 0.12 0.33 0.07 0.25 0.15 0.35 0.27 0.58 0.51 0.5 37.6 1.49 1.86 0.74 2.42 0.88 1.95 0.64 
Poland 0.23 0.42 0.11 0.31 0.08 0.27 0.12 0.33 0.35 0.58 0.49 0.5 46 1.78 1.62 0.71 2.44 0.92 1.76 0.58 
Romania 0.1 0.3 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.32 0.49 0.54 0.5 48.7 1.74 1.83 0.73 2.4 1.03 1.57 0.59 
Rwanda 0.86 0.34 0.29 0.45 0.2 0.4 0.16 0.37 0.68 0.3 0.51 0.5 34.7 1.41 1.21 0.47 1.7 0.98 1.87 0.68 
S. Africa 0.83 0.38 0.22 0.41 0.22 0.41 0.3 0.46 0.44 0.55 0.5 0.5 38.8 1.66 1.84 0.53 2.38 1.23 1.7 0.61 
S. Korea 0.47 0.5 0.1 0.3 0.08 0.27 0.27 0.44 -0.43 0.84 0.5 0.5 41.4 1.4 2.44 0.66 2.98 0.81 1.48 0.55 
Slovenia 0.29 0.45 0.17 0.38 0.07 0.25 0.17 0.37 -0.61 0.84 0.54 0.5 46.2 1.78 2 0.7 2.8 0.88 1.95 0.59 
Spain 0.21 0.41 0.09 0.29 0.05 0.21 0.09 0.29 -0.74 0.83 0.5 0.5 46.2 1.85 1.6 0.74 2.71 0.63 1.76 0.65 
Sweden 0.54 0.5 0.33 0.47 0.1 0.3 0.25 0.43 -1.04 0.73 0.5 0.5 47.7 1.7 2.34 0.73 3.16 0.9 2.2 0.51 
Switzerland 0.47 0.5 0.35 0.48 0.23 0.42 0.3 0.46 -0.52 0.84 0.55 0.5 52.5 1.61 2.2 0.64 3.37 0.78 2.08 0.63 
Taiwan 0.19 0.4 0.18 0.38 0.05 0.22 0.1 0.3 -0.59 0.61 0.49 0.5 43.9 1.6 2.16 0.78 2.83 0.91 1.48 0.57 
Thailand 0.37 0.48 0.19 0.39 0.2 0.4 0.23 0.42 0.36 0.41 0.51 0.5 45.4 1.57 1.51 0.71 2.85 0.77 1.78 0.5 
Trin & Tob 0.75 0.43 0.25 0.43 0.17 0.38 0.31 0.46 0.51 0.47 0.55 0.5 42.6 1.73 1.65 0.65 2.74 1.05 1.72 0.57 
Turkey 0.03 0.16 0.02 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.03 0.17 0.31 0.57 0.5 0.5 36.5 1.39 1.62 0.69 2.97 0.92 1.81 0.65 
Ukraine 0.17 0.37 0.05 0.23 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.28 -0.35 0.72 0.66 0.47 42.4 1.68 2.27 0.63 2.66 0.91 1.55 0.56 
Uruguay 0.27 0.45 0.07 0.26 0.06 0.24 0.13 0.34 -0.44 0.88 0.56 0.5 46.5 1.87 1.44 0.74 2.39 0.9 2.08 0.65 
USA 0.66 0.47 0.3 0.46 0.17 0.37 0.27 0.44 0.04 0.83 0.5 0.5 48 1.7 1.95 0.5 2.87 0.92 1.98 0.63 
Vietnam 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36 0.11 0.31 0.09 0.29 -0.82 0.65 0.49 0.5 40.8 1.58 1.51 0.63 2.16 0.57 1.8 0.54 
Zambia 0.96 0.2 0.27 0.44 0.22 0.41 0.41 0.49 0.58 0.46 0.49 0.5 29.8 1.19 1.7 0.69 2.5 1.27 1.82 0.6 
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Table 11: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 5: Country characteristics 
Country   Proportion of...      HDI RAS POL_IV 
  NONE CATH PROT ORTH MUS JEW HIND BUD OTH    
Argentina 0.17 0.74 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.02 0.75 47.6 8 
Australia 0.4 0.23 0.31 0.02 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.93 75.1 10 
Brazil 0.13 0.6 0.23 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.68 75.3 8 
Bulgaria 0.16 0 0 0.74 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.73 40.8 9 
Burkina Faso 0.02 0.31 0.08 0 0.53 0 0 0 0.05 0.3 75.7 0 
Canada 0.29 0.4 0.16 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.12 0.88 74 10 
Chile 0.23 0.6 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.76 57.2 10 
China 0.89 0 0.04 0 0.02 0 0 0.03 0.01 0.64 29.4 -7 
Cyprus 0.05 0 0 0.49 0.45 0 0 0 0 0.8 61 10 
Egypt 0 0 0.06 0 0.94 0 0 0 0 0.61 14.6 -3 
Ethiopia 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.65 0.11 0 0 0 0.02 0.31 56.5 1 
Finland 0.14 0 0.83 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.86 44.7 10 
Georgia 0.02 0 0 0.94 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.7 44.7 6 
Germany 0.43 0.21 0.33 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.88 57.7 10 
Ghana 0.03 0.21 0.55 0.04 0.15 0 0 0 0.03 0.46 73.2 8 
India 0.06 0 0.03 0 0.08 0.01 0.76 0.02 0.05 0.49 54.7 9 
Indonesia 0.01 0 0.07 0 0.92 0 0 0 0 0.57 32.3 8 
Iran 0.01 0 0 0 0.98 0 0 0 0.01 0.67 11 -6 
Italy 0.12 0.87 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.84 64.6 10 
Japan 0.64 0.01 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.31 0.03 0.87 69.1 10 
Jordan 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.98 0 0 0 0 0.71 17.1 -3 
Malaysia 0.02 0.07 0.05 0 0.57 0 0.08 0.2 0.01 0.73 20 3 
Mali 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0.93 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.35 60.1 7 
Moldova 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.92 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.61 45.2 8 
Morocco 0 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0.6 25.7 -6 
Norway 0.32 0.01 0.63 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.02 0.93 52.3 10 
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Country   Proportion of...      HDI RAS POL_IV 
  NONE CATH PROT ORTH MUS JEW HIND BUD OTH    
New Zealand 0.34 0.14 0.48 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.02 0.89 67.1 10 
Peru 0.12 0.71 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.7 55.6 9 
Poland 0.02 0.94 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.76 55.4 10 
Romania 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.86 0 0 0 0 0 0.77 53.1 9 
Rwanda 0.02 0.52 0.3 0 0.15 0 0 0 0 0.43 67.8 -3 
S. Africa 0.17 0.12 0.59 0 0.02 0 0.02 0 0.07 0.59 75.1 9 
S. Korea 0.29 0.21 0.23 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.02 0.85 75.7 8 
Slovenia 0.29 0.65 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.81 65.6 10 
Spain 0.2 0.8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.89 55.1 10 
Sweden 0.26 0.02 0.71 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.89 65.4 10 
Switzerland 0.2 0.41 0.33 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.04 0.9 57.1 10 
Taiwan 0.31 0.01 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.19 0.45 0.94 75.9 10 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0.97 0 0.64 56.1 -1 
Trin & Tob 0.07 0.2 0.44 0 0.05 0 0.23 0 0 0.72 72.8 10 
Turkey 0.01 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0.65 30.4 7 
Ukraine 0.31 0.07 0 0.6 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.7 57.6 7 
Uruguay 0.55 0.34 0.07 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.74 69 10 
USA 0.3 0.2 0.32 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.15 0.9 77.6 10 
Vietnam 0.21 0.06 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.15 0.56 0.55 24.1 -7 
Zambia 0.05 0.34 0.46 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.12 0.36 47.6 5 
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5.3 Empirical analysis of civil society participation 
Before we commence with the discussion of the results of our statistical 
modelling, the reader’s attention is drawn to Figure 5. In this graph, we see 
data taken from Wave 2 of the European Values Survey (1990-3). 
Respondents were asked to rate how important varying reasons were for 
motivating their volunteering in civil society, on a scale of 1 to 5 with higher 
numbers representing greater importance. As we can see in Figure 5, many 
different possible reasons were given for volunteering, that relate to either 
some sort of identification with those in need, or a sense of civic duty, or 
some sort of selfish interest. Additionally, religious belief is given as a 
possible motivation. In general, most of the possible reasons are fairly evenly 
distributed. However, what is most striking is the number of people who are 
prepared to say that religious belief is of no importance in motivating their 
voluntary behaviour. This is consistent with the secularisation literature 
which tends to identify (but not solely) Europe as increasingly irreligious to 
the point where religion is socially irrelevant. What is most striking is that 
the closest comparator is the reason “I did not want to but could not refuse” 
which must be regarded as the most pathetic reason offered. Fortunately, 
most people have a bit more spine and tend to volunteer for better reasons. 
However, the fact that religious belief can be compared to this ‘non-reason’ 
and not to the more altruistic or idealistic possible reasons, speaks volumes 
as to the social relevance of religion in contemporary European society.  
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Figure 5: Reasons for volunteering - results from the European Values Survey 
 
The fact that religiosity does not motivate voluntary behaviour for so many, 
reflects the fact that Western societies have seen declines in both religious 
belief and participation in religious services. For those who remain in 
possession of religiosity (both in terms of belief and/or attendance) does it 
still motivate voluntary behaviour?  To this question we now turn, along 
with the contextual hypotheses that form the basis of this thesis. 
5.3.1 Religious organisation membership 
In Table 12 are presented the results of multilevel logistic regressions of the 
dependent variable RELORG. There are 59,152 observations at level-1 and 
46 at level-2. Model 1c is the empty model from which the VPC can be 
estimated. Indeed, some 44% of the variance is found at the country-level.  
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Table 12: Multilevel logistic regression of religious organisation membership 
(RELORG) 
 Model 1c Model 2c Model 3c Model 4c Model 5c Model 6c Model 7c 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -0.39** -0.32** -1.25*** -1.36*** -1.48*** -1.50*** -1.52*** 
 (0.17) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) 
RELIGIOSITY  0.92*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.84*** 
  (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CATHOLIC   1.12*** 1.12*** 1.11*** 1.15*** 1.15*** 
   (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) 
PROTESTANT   1.55*** 1.56*** 1.68*** 1.71*** 1.71*** 
   (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.14) 
ORTHODOX   0.86*** 0.86*** 0.84*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 
   (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
MUSLIM   0.72*** 0.74*** 0.67*** 0.71*** 0.70*** 
   (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
JEW   1.27*** 1.26*** 1.27*** 1.31*** 1.30*** 
   (0.18) (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
HINDU   0.76*** 0.77*** 0.71*** 0.74*** 0.73*** 
   (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
BUDDHIST   1.04*** 1.05*** 1.03*** 1.07*** 1.07*** 
   (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
OTHER   0.94*** 0.94*** 0.94*** 0.97*** 0.96*** 
   (0.23) (0.22) (0.24) (0.24) (0.23) 
FEMALE    -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
AGE    0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
    (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
AGE2    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EDUC MID    0.05* 0.06* 0.06* 0.06* 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
EDUC HIGH    0.17*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
CLASS 2    -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
CLASS 3    0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
    (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
CLASS 4    0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 
    (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
CLASS 5    0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 
    (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
POSTMAT    0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
    (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
HDI     -1.23 -1.66* -1.32 
     (0.95) (0.97) (0.94) 
RAS     3.60*** 3.66*** 3.05*** 
     (1.14) (1.13) (1.10) 
POL_IV     0.00 -0.00 0.00 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
HDI*REL      0.93**  
      (0.38)  
RAS*REL       1.01** 
       (0.45) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Model 2c adds RELIGIOSITY along with a random-slopes component. 
Unsurprisingly, its effect is both positive and highly significant although not 
uniform across all countries, as the variance component for RELIGIOSITY is 
statistically significant (0.47, p=0.00) (n.b. when RELIGIOSITY is held at its 
mean). Model 3c subsequently builds on its predecessor by introducing 
controls for denominational identification. This has the effect of reducing the 
effect of RELIGIOSITY somewhat although it retains its statistical 
significance at the 1% level. As for the effects of denominational 
identification themselves, unsurprisingly, all denominations are significantly 
more likely to participate in religious organisations than the unaffiliated. 
Next, Model 4c further extends the number of controls at the individual-
level. Their effect does nothing too much to radically alter the effects from as 
they were in Model 3c. In themselves, nothing much by way of significant 
effects is found. It is only EDUC that matters, with the more educated being 
significantly distinct from those with low education. Otherwise, all other 
controls are unrelated – FEMALE, AGE, CLASS, and POSTMAT are all 
statistically insignificant. Model 5c introduces HDI, RAS, and POL_IV. Doing 
so slightly increases the effect of religiosity and shakes up the coefficients 
for denominational identification somewhat, but not so much that they are 
too different from the last model. The only other notable difference is that 
having a middle level of education is now mildly significant at the 10% level. 
The effect of HDI is also insignificant whilst the effect of RAS is positive and 
highly significant. Now we turn to the investigation of the interaction effects 
that serve as the tests for the main hypotheses that are the subject of this 
chapter, as they relate to religious organisations. Model 6c introduces the 
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interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and HDI. Its effect is significant and 
positive. Thus, we can confirm Hypothesis 2 that religiosity increases its 
effect on civil society participation as born out in religious organisations, 
under conditions of greater modernity. However, as we shall see later on, we 
will have to alter our theoretical explanations in order to reconcile this 
finding with those of the previous chapter.  
When the regression is re-estimated multiple times, each time removing one 
country at a time, the interaction effect remains positive and significant, 
despite some minor fluctuations in its magnitude. Thus, we can be confident 
that the model as it pertains to this data, is robust vis-à-vis influential level-
2 cases. 
Table 13 presents the conditional regression coefficients for the interaction 
effect of Model 6c. From this table, we see that the effect of RELIGIOSTIY at 
the minimum of HDI in the dataset, is positive but as HDI increases, that 
effect is getting stronger and stronger. Note also, that the effect of religiosity 
is highly significant across the range of HDI in our data.  
Table 13: Effect of religiosity on religious organisation membership by country 
modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6c) 
 Minimum HDI Mean HDI Maximum HDI 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -0.84** -1.50*** -1.91*** 
 (0.40) (0.27) (0.41) 
RELIGIOSITY 0.48*** 0.85*** 1.08*** 
 (0.17) (0.07) (0.11) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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The interaction between RELIGIOSITY and HDI is presented as a conditional 
effects plot in Figure 6. From this, we can see that the effects of 
RELIGIOSITY are unsurprisingly substantial on participation in religious 
type organisations, but that modernisation does increase that effect 
somewhat. It is also clear that religious organisations are more likely to 
occur in underdeveloped countries than elsewhere. 
Figure 6: The effect of religiosity on participation in religious organisations as 
moderated by country-level modernisation - conditional effects plot for Model 6c 
 
Another way of looking at this interaction is presented in Figure 7. Logistic 
regressions were run within each of the countries in the sample, with 
RELORG regressed on RELIGIOSITY plus all other individual level controls. 
In Figure 7, the β-coefficients for religiosity for each country are graphed 
against HDI. From this graph we can see an upward trend of modernisation 
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on the effect of religiosity on participation in religious organisations despite 
the apparent ‘noise’ of the data.  
Figure 7: The effect of modernisation on the effect of religiosity on participation in 
religious organisations (results of country-specific logistic regressions with controls) 
 
Model 7c introduces the interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and RAS. 
Its effect is also significant and positive. Thus, we can confirm Hypothesis 5, 
that religiosity increases its effect on civil society participation as born out in 
religious organisations, under conditions of greater separation of religion 
and state.  
Model 7c was also re-estimated 46 times, each time with one country after 
another being removed, in order to test the robustness of the model with 
regard to influential cases at the macro-level. Regarding the interaction 
term, in no incidence did it reverse its polarity nor lose significance, despite 
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some minor fluctuations in magnitude of the regression coefficient and p-
value. 
In Table 14, the conditional regression coefficients for the interaction of 
Model 7c are presented. We see that the effect of religiosity is increasing as 
RAS increases. Across the range of RAS in our sample, the conditional 
regression coefficients are increasingly positive and significant. 
Table 14: Effect of religiosity on religious organisation membership by separation of 
religion and state (conditional regression coefficients Model 7c) 
 Minimum RAS Mean RAS Maximum RAS 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -2.77*** -1.52*** -0.74* 
 (0.45) (0.26) (0.43) 
RELIGIOSITY 0.43** 0.84*** 1.10*** 
 (0.22) (0.07) (0.12) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
This interaction is presented as a conditional effects plot in Figure 8. There 
we can see that the difference in the effect of religiosity on participation is 
much more pronounced at the maximum level of separation of religion and 
state than at the point where it is minimal. Generally speaking, religious 
organisations are more prevalent in countries with greater separation of 
religion and state than elsewhere.  
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Figure 8: The effect of religiosity on religious organisation participation as moderated 
by separation of religion and state - conditional effects plot for Model 7c 
 
This interaction can also be viewed in an alternative manner. In Figure 9, we 
have presented the β-coefficients from country-specific logistic regressions of 
RELORG on RELIGIOSITY with controls, graphed across the range of RAS in 
our sample. Again, a positive upward trend is evidenced lending confidence 
to our multilevel modelling. 
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Figure 9: The effect of separation of religion and state on the effect of religiosity on 
participation in religious organisations (results of country-specific logistic regressions 
with controls) 
 
5.3.2 Charitable/humanitarian organisation membership 
Now we turn our attention to participation in charitable or humanitarian 
organisations as another manifestation of civil society. In Table 15 are 
presented the results of multilevel modelling of the dependent variable 
CHARORG. There are 58,666 cases at level-1 and 46 at level-2. From Model 
1d we calculate the VPC – it is estimated that 28% of the variance in the 
dependent variable lies at the macro-level. Model 2d introduces 
RELIGIOSITY along with a random slopes component. 
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Table 15: Multilevel logistic regression of charitable/humanitarian organisation 
membership (CHARORG) 
 Model 1d Model 2d Model 3d Model 4d Model 5d Model 6d Model 7d 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -1.48*** -1.41*** -1.37*** -2.09*** -2.24*** -2.24*** -2.24*** 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.16) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
RELIGIOSITY  0.21*** 0.21*** 0.19*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
CATHOLIC   -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) 
PROTESTANT   0.11* 0.13** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 
   (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
ORTHODOX   -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.26*** -0.25*** 
   (0.09) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
MUSLIM   -0.24** -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 -0.15 
   (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
JEW   0.24 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.13 
   (0.20) (0.19) (0.18) (0.19) (0.18) 
HINDU   -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
   (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
BUDDHIST   0.05 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
OTHER   -0.11 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
   (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
FEMALE    0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
AGE    0.99*** 1.01*** 1.02*** 1.01*** 
    (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
AGE2    -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
EDUC MID    0.31*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
EDUC HIGH    0.67*** 0.68*** 0.69*** 0.68*** 
    (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLASS 2    0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 0.12** 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLASS 3    0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 0.21*** 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 4    0.36*** 0.36*** 0.37*** 0.36*** 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 5    0.56*** 0.56*** 0.57*** 0.56*** 
    (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
POSTMAT    0.11*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI     -0.88 -1.55* -0.90 
     (0.84) (0.86) (0.84) 
RAS     1.41* 1.42* 1.35* 
     (0.78) (0.78) (0.76) 
POL_IV     0.01 0.01 0.01 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI*REL      0.89***  
      (0.20)  
RAS*REL       0.07 
       (0.29) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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RELIGIOSITY is positively linked to participation in 
charitable/humanitarian organisations, although the effect does vary to 
some extent across countries, as evidenced by the significant variance 
component (0.10, p=0.00) (n.b. when RELIGIOSITY is held at its mean). 
Model 3d introduces controls for denominational identification. Their 
introduction does nothing to alter the effect of RELIGIOSITY from the last 
model. Denominational identification alters the likelihood of participation in 
some instances, in others not, as compared to those without identification. 
Protestants are more likely to participate than the non-affiliated whilst 
Orthodox Christians and Muslims are less likely. For all other confessions, 
there are no statistically significant differences. Next, Model 4d introduces 
further controls at the individual level. Their doing so makes only one 
difference – Muslims are no longer significantly less likely to participate than 
those who do not identify with any denomination. RELIGIOSITY remains 
positive and significant. Women are significantly more likely to participate. 
AGE follows a significant inverted U-shaped trend. EDUC is associated with 
greater likelihood of participation as are CLASS and POSTMAT. Model 5d 
introduces HDI, RAS, and POL_IV at the macro-level. Their introduction 
does not change the substantive message from that of Model 4d. HDI has no 
statistical significance, whilst RAS is positive and significant if only at the 
10% level. POLITY_IV is positive in effect but insignificant. Model 6d 
introduces the interaction term for RELIGIOSITY and HDI. It is positive and 
significant – thus we can confirm Hypothesis 2 that modernisation increases 
the effect of religiosity on participation in civil society as manifested in 
participation in charitable and humanitarian based organisations.  
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Model 6d was re-estimated 46 times, with each time one country after 
another being dropped from the dataset. No influential cases at the country 
level were identified that did anything to alter the significance and polarity of 
the interaction effect.  
Table 16 presents the conditional regression coefficients that stem from the 
interaction in Model 6d. We can see that at the minimal level of HDI, the 
effect of religiosity on participation in charitable/humanitarian 
organisations is negative but insignificant. By the mean level, it has 
switched its polarity and become significant. Once HDI has reached its 
maximum, the effect of RELIGIOSITY has become even more pronounced. 
Table 16: Effect of religiosity on charitable/humanitarian organisation membership 
by country modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6d) 
 Minimum HDI Mean HDI Maximum HDI 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -1.62*** -2.24*** -2.63*** 
 (0.34) (0.21) (0.35) 
RELIGIOSITY -0.15 0.20*** 0.42*** 
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.04) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
This interaction is presented graphically as a conditional effects plot in 
Figure 10. When HDI is minimal, participation in charitable/humanitarian 
organisations is greater. However, religiosity has something of an equalising 
effect making participation by the highly religious in countries at the 
different ends of the range of modernisation, much more comparable than 
that of those totally without faith. 
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Figure 10: The effect of religiosity on participation in charitable and humanitarian 
organisations as moderated by country-level modernisation - conditional effects plot 
for Model 6d 
 
Model 7d introduces an interaction term for RELIGIOSITY and RAS in order 
to test Hypothesis 5. Its effect is positive but insignificant – thus we fail to 
confirm Hypothesis 5, as it pertains to charitable and humanitarian 
organisations, that the effect of greater separation of religion and state 
increases the effect of religiosity on participation in civil society.  
When we remove one country, re-estimate the model, then remove the next 
country and re-estimate the model 46 times, in no incidence does the 
message change, despite minor fluctuations in the β-coefficients and p-
values. Thus, we can safely assume there are no country-level cases with an 
overbearing influence on our modelling. 
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5.3.3 Environmental organisation membership 
Next the analysis shifts its attention to the dependent variable ENVORG, 
which measures participation in environmental type organisations. The 
results are presented in Table 17. There are 58,686 cases at level-1 and 46 
cases at level-2. Model 1e is again the empty model; from this some 31% of 
the variance in the dependent variable is estimated to be at the country-
level, as measured by the VPC. Model 2e introduces RELIGIOSITY along 
with a random slopes component. Religiosity is negative in effect but 
statistically insignificant. Also, the variance component for RELIGIOSITY is 
significant, meaning there are unmeasured effects of religiosity that are 
country specific (0.08, p=0.00) (n.b. when RELIGIOSITY is held at its mean). 
Model 3e introduces controls for denominational identification. Their 
introduction makes the effect of religiosity less negative but it is still 
insignificant. Also, only Orthodox people are significantly distinct from those 
with no denominational identification. Model 4e builds on its predecessor by 
introducing further controls at the individual level. The effect of 
RELIGIOSITY becomes positive but remains insignificant. No changes of 
note are registered in the effects of religious denomination. Women are 
significantly less likely to participate whilst AGE follows a familiar 
curvilinear trend. EDUC and CLASS both follow a pattern that is more or 
less linear, positive, and statistically significant. POSTMAT is also 
significantly and positively tied to participation in organisations concerned 
with the environment. Model 5e now introduces controls at the macro-level, 
namely HDI, RAS, and POL_IV.  
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Table 17: Multilevel logistic regression of environmental organisation membership 
(ENVORG) 
 Model 1e Model 2e Model 3e Model 4e Model 5e Model 6e Model 7e 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -1.91*** -1.85*** -1.78*** -2.34*** -2.79*** -2.79*** -2.80*** 
 (0.16) (0.12) (0.13) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
RELIGIOSITY  -0.01 -0.00 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.05 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
CATHOLIC   -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
   (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
PROTESTANT   0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ORTHODOX   -0.36*** -0.34*** -0.39*** -0.40*** -0.39*** 
   (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
MUSLIM   -0.18 -0.12 -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
   (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
JEW   0.22 0.18 0.19 0.18 0.19 
   (0.28) (0.28) (0.29) (0.29) (0.29) 
HINDU   -0.14 -0.13 -0.17 -0.17 -0.17 
   (0.30) (0.30) (0.24) (0.25) (0.25) 
BUDDHIST   0.03 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.09 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
OTHER   0.03 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 
   (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
FEMALE    -0.09*** -0.09** -0.09** -0.09** 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
AGE    0.24* 0.26* 0.26* 0.26* 
    (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
AGE2    -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** -0.02*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EDUC MID    0.18*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
EDUC HIGH    0.37*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 0.42*** 
    (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLASS 2    0.16*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.15*** 
    (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
CLASS 3    0.23*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.23*** 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 4    0.36*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
    (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 5    0.43** 0.46** 0.46** 0.46** 
    (0.19) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
POSTMAT    0.14*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 0.16*** 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
HDI     -3.84*** -3.82*** -3.84*** 
     (0.90) (0.89) (0.89) 
RAS     1.17 1.18 1.16 
     (0.78) (0.78) (0.78) 
POL_IV     0.05 0.05 0.05 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
HDI*REL      0.23  
      (0.17)  
RAS*REL       -0.20 
       (0.23) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Their introduction does nothing to alter the effects from as they were in the 
last model. HDI is negatively and significantly linked to participation whilst 
RAS is positively tied but insignificant. POLITY_IV is insignificant. Model 6e 
introduces the interaction effect for RELIGIOSITY and HDI in order to test 
Hypothesis 2 as it pertains to participation in environmental type 
organisations – that modernisation increases the effect of religiosity on civil 
society participation. As we can see from Table 17, the interaction term is 
insignificant and thus we cannot confirm this hypothesis. Model 6e is re-
estimated 46 times, with each time one country after another being taken 
out of the dataset, in order to test for influential country-level cases. When 
Switzerland is dropped from the data, the interaction coefficient is now 0.29 
with a standard error of 0.17 and a p-value of 0.0915. Accordingly, we can 
now tentatively confirm Hypothesis 2. Table 18 presents the conditional 
regression coefficients that stem from this revealed interaction in Model 6b.  
Table 18: Effect of religiosity on environmental organisation membership by country 
modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6f/restricted sample) 
 Minimum HDI Mean HDI Maximum HDI 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -1.20*** -2.80*** -3.80*** 
 (0.31) (0.19) (0.36) 
RELIGIOSITY -0.06 0.05 0.13*** 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.04) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
We see as the minimum level of HDI within our newly restricted sample, that 
the effect of religiosity is negative, but insignificant. At the mean level, it is 
                                       
15 In all incidences where overbearingly-influential cases are found at level-2, the relevant 
parameters are reported in text. For full details of all re-estimated models using subsets of 
the data, see Appendix C. 
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now positive but still insignificant. It is only towards the maximum level that 
this effect attains significance, with its magnitude growing as HDI increases. 
This interaction is presented graphically in the form of a conditional effects 
plot, in Figure 11. As we can see there is a disparity between the least 
developed and most developed societies, in line with previous findings. Yet, 
the interaction is too weak to be having any equalising effect as we 
witnessed earlier. Indeed, the effects of religiosity are paltry across the 
spectrum of HDI. 
Figure 11: The effect of religiosity on participation in environmental organisations as 
moderated by country-level modernisation - conditional effects plot for Model 6 
(restricted sample) 
 
Model 7e subsequently introduces an interaction term for RELIGIOSITY and 
RAS. This is to test Hypothesis 2 is it pertains to environmental 
organisations – that conditions of greater religious freedom and deregulation 
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will increase the effect of religiosity on civil society participation. Again, this 
hypothesis cannot be confirmed as the interaction term is statistically 
insignificant.  
Model 7e was re-estimated 46 times, removing one country at a time, from 
each model. In this incidence, the absence of not one country was sufficient 
to alter either the polarity or significance of the interaction coefficient. Thus, 
we consider this finding robust with respect to possible influential cases at 
the macro level. 
5.3.4 Cultural/educational organisation membership 
Now we turn our attention to the analysis of the dependent variable 
CULTORG, which measures participation in civil society organisations 
concerned with culture or education. The results of multilevel logistic 
regressions are presented in Table 19. At level-1, there are 58,798 cases and 
46 at level-2. Model 1f is the empty model and from this, it is estimated that 
some 27% of the variance in the dependent variable can be found at the 
country-level. Model 2f subsequently introduces RELIGIOSITY along with a 
random slopes component. The effect of RELIGIOSITY is found to be 
positively related to participation and significant if only at the 5% level. Also, 
there is significant variance in this effect across countries, as measured by 
the variance components (0.07, p=0.00) (n.b. when RELIGIOSITY is held at 
its mean). Model 3f introduces controls for denominational identification. 
Their addition reduces ever so slightly the effect of RELIGIOSITY on 
participation.  
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Table 19: Multilevel logistic regression of cultural/education organisation 
membership (CULTORG) 
 Model 1f Model 2f Model 3f Model 4f Model 5f Model 6f Model 7f 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -1.37*** -1.31*** -1.27*** -2.21*** -2.45*** -2.46*** -2.47*** 
 (0.13) (0.11) (0.12) (0.17) (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) 
RELIGIOSITY  0.09** 0.08** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.13*** 0.13*** 
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
CATHOLIC   0.03 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
   (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
PROTESTANT   0.09* 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12*** 0.12** 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
ORTHODOX   -0.08 -0.08 -0.10 -0.10 -0.10 
   (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) 
MUSLIM   -0.31*** -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** -0.22** 
   (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
JEW   0.30 0.28 0.29 0.29 0.29 
   (0.24) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) 
HINDU   -0.17 -0.13 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 
   (0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.14) (0.14) 
BUDDHIST   -0.01 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 
   (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) 
OTHER   -0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 
   (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
FEMALE    0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
AGE    -1.12*** -1.16*** -1.17*** -1.17*** 
    (0.17) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18) 
AGE2    0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.03*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EDUC MID    0.35*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
EDUC HIGH    0.83*** 0.88*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 
    (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
CLASS 2    0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 0.11** 
    (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
CLASS 3    0.24*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLASS 4    0.43*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.45*** 
    (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLASS 5    0.38** 0.40** 0.40** 0.40** 
    (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17) 
POSTMAT    0.13*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 0.14*** 
    (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI     -1.82** -2.14** -2.10** 
     (0.84) (0.84) (0.84) 
RAS     1.65** 1.64** 1.42* 
     (0.75) (0.74) (0.73) 
POL_IV     0.02 0.02 0.02 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
HDI*REL      0.57***  
      (0.17)  
RAS*REL       0.42** 
       (0.17) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Protestants participate more than the non-affiliated whilst Muslims do so 
less. Otherwise, denominational affiliation of any sort does nothing to 
distinguish individuals. Model 3f introduces further individual-level 
controls. Their effect is to increase the effect of RELIGIOSITY on 
participation and this is now significant at the 1% level. Muslims still are 
less likely to participate than the non-affiliated but the effect has attenuated 
somewhat, whilst Protestants are somewhat more likely than they had been 
in the preceding model. No significant differences were found between men 
and women, whilst the effect of AGE follows an inverted U-shaped trend. 
EDUC and CLASS are both positively linked to participation. With EDUC, 
the effect is more or less linear, whilst for CLASS, the effect increases before 
levelling off at the highest level. Finally, POSTMAT is positively linked to 
participation. Model 5f introduces HDI, RAS, and POL_IV at the country-
level. Their introduction does nothing to change the message of the model 
from as it was in Model 4f. HDI is negatively linked to participation whilst 
RAS is positively linked to participation. POLITY_IV is insignificantly related. 
Model 6f introduces an interaction term between RELIGIOSITY and HDI. 
This is to test Hypothesis 2 – that modernisation increases the effect of 
religiosity on civil society participation – in this case in cultural/educational 
organisations. The interaction term is positive and significant at the 1% level 
and thus we can confirm Hypothesis 2 in this instance.  
Again, the by now familiar procedure was carried out for checking for 
influential cases at the country-level – it was found that in no incidence did 
the interaction effect switch its polarity nor lose its significance. There are 
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influential cases in the model, and in some cases, the interaction effect can 
be said to be even higher than we have estimated it at in Model 6f as fitted 
to the complete dataset. However, these differences are not so great so as to 
alter the substantive message of the model, and thus we persist with the one 
estimated on the full dataset. 
Table 20 presents the conditional regression coefficients for the interaction 
between RELIGIOSITY and HDI in Model 6f. On this basis, we can say that 
where HDI is minimal, the effect of religiosity on participation is negative but 
insignificant, but as HDI increases to its mean level within the dataset, the 
polarity is reversed and this newly positive effect is also significant at the 1% 
level. By the maximal level of HDI within the dataset, the effect is greater 
still and also highly significant.  
Table 20: Effect of religiosity on cultural/educational organisation membership by 
modernisation (conditional regression coefficients Model 6f) 
 Minimum HDI Mean HDI Maximum HDI 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -1.60*** -2.46*** -2.99*** 
 (0.33) (0.21) (0.34) 
RELIGIOSITY -0.09 0.13*** 0.27*** 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.04) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The interaction between RELIGIOSITY and HDI is presented graphically in 
Figure 12. We can see that overall, participation in cultural or educational 
organisations is greater in less developed countries, but that the effect of 
religiosity is an equalising one – religious individuals are more comparable 
across the spectrum of modernisation than those without religion (n.b. the 
slope for the minimum level of HDI is insignificant). 
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Figure 12: The effect of religiosity on participation in cultural and educational 
organisations as moderated by country-level modernisation - conditional effects plot 
for Model 6f 
 
Next, in Model 7f, an interaction term is introduced between RELIGIOSITY 
and RAS, so that we can test Hypothesis 5 – concerning the prediction that 
religiosity will increase its effect on civil society participation under 
conditions of greater separation of religion and state. The effect of this 
interaction is positive and significant at the 5% level. We confirm Hypothesis 
5 on this basis. Once again, the same procedure was undertaken for testing 
for influential cases at the country level; only in the case of Iran did the 
interaction effect lose significance. When Iran is omitted from the dataset, 
the interaction coefficient has a value of 0.30 with a p-value of 0.108. It fails 
to be significant at the 10% level but only just. Given that its insignificance 
is so slight and given that there is probably some inflation of the standard 
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errors brought about by close correlations between for instance CLASS and 
EDUC, and HDI and POLITY_IV, we can afford to sweep this result under 
the rug and persist with Model 7f as it is applied to the complete dataset. 
Indeed, when POLITY_IV is removed from the model and Iran is omitted from 
the sample, the interaction becomes significant (p=0.069).  
Table 21 presents the conditional regression coefficients that stem from the 
interaction in Model 7f. Here we see that the effect of religiosity is negative 
and insignificant at the minimum level of religion and state, positive at the 
mean and significant, and more positive yet at the maximum and also highly 
significant. 
Table 21: Effect of religiosity on cultural/educational organisation membership by 
separation of religion and state (conditional regression coefficients Model 7f) 
 Minimum RAS Mean RAS Maximum RAS 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -3.05*** -2.47*** -2.11*** 
 (0.31) (0.19) (0.30) 
RELIGIOSITY -0.04 0.13*** 0.24*** 
 (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
This interaction is presented graphically in Figure 13. We see that countries 
with the highest level of separation of religion and state have more 
participation in cultural/educational organisations, and that religiosity 
makes individuals less comparable across the spectrum of separation of 
religion and state. Indeed, at the lowest level of RELIGIOSITY, individuals at 
the lowest level of separation of religion and state are broadly comparable 
with individuals of the same level of RELIGIOSITY at the highest level of 
separation of religion and state. Increasing RELIGIOSITY drastically alters 
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things, making individuals very different in terms of the likelihood of 
participating in this sphere of civil society. 
Figure 13: The effect of religiosity on participation in cultural and educational 
organisations as moderated by separation of religion and state - conditional effects 
plot for Model 7f 
 
5.4 Summary. 
This chapter has been concerned with the role of the individual’s religiosity 
in civil society as it is moderated by the hosting country’s levels of 
modernisation and religious freedom. We have been chiefly concerned with 
the testing of Hypotheses 2 and 5. The former expected that as 
modernisation increases, so religiosity would increase its effect on civil 
society participation. The latter hypothesis expected that as the religious 
market became more deregulated, freer, and without state establishment of 
religion, the effect of religiosity would become greater too. Indeed these 
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hypotheses have found some support but what is apparent is that what can 
matter when answering these research questions is the particular sphere of 
civil society in question.  
This chapter examined civil society as it manifests itself in four distinct 
spheres that are distinguished by the purpose they have. The four types of 
organisation were: (1) religious organisations, (2) charitable/humanitarian 
organisations, (3) environmental organisations, and (4) cultural/educational 
organisations. Hypothesis 2 was confirmed with regard to religious 
organisations, charitable/humanitarian organisations, and 
cultural/educational organisations. It was only confirmed with regard to 
environmental organisations once one overly-influential case had been 
identified and removed from the dataset. Hypothesis 5 was confirmed only 
with regard to religious organisations, and cultural or educational 
organisations. It went unconfirmed with respect to charitable or 
humanitarian organisations, and environmental organisations. The possible 
reasons for these conflicting results will be discussed in Chapter 7. Now we 
move on to our exploration of unconventional political participation and how 
religiosity is conditioned in its effects by the country-context in which the 
individual lives.  
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Chapter 6 – The effect of country context on the relationship 
between religiosity and unconventional political 
participation 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter deals with the exploration of religiosity and unconventional 
political participation. In our theoretical chapter, it was outlined that 
religiosity would tend to lead individuals away from unconventional political 
participation. This was because religiosity is often seen within the literature 
as conservative and authoritarian whilst unconventional political 
participation is seen as radical and authority challenging, and thus the two 
are simply incompatible, like water and oil, from a theoretical standpoint. 
This individual-level theory was then contextualised and two key hypotheses 
were proposed and it is their testing that is the key concern of this chapter. 
With Hypothesis 3, it is expected that religiosity will increase its effect, that 
is to say make the effect of religiosity less negative, on unconventional 
political participation, as modernisation increases. Hypothesis 6 expects 
that the effect of religiosity will become more negative as the level of 
separation of religion and state increases. These hypotheses are investigated 
using multilevel analysis.  
The results show that modernisation does make the effect of religiosity less 
negative but only in 2 out of 3 indicators analysed here – signing petitions 
and taking part in boycotts, but not attending protests. Thus, Hypothesis 3 
receives only partial confirmation. Level of separation of religion and state in 
no incidence makes more negative the effect of religiosity on unconventional 
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political participation and thus Hypothesis 6 is rejected. In one case, that of 
boycotting, a positive interaction is found but otherwise the observed effect 
is null. 
6.2 Modelling unconventional political participation 
In Chapter 3, indicators of unconventional political participation were 
identified. They were PETITION, BOYCOTT, and PROTEST. As these 
variables are binary in nature, they are modelled using logistic regression-
based techniques. As the data is nested, again with individuals deemed 
nested within countries, multilevel techniques are applied. The modelling 
process is by now familiar to us and needs no further repetition, other than 
to say that Hypothesis 3 is tested by an interaction effect between our 
measure of modernisation, namely the HDI index, and RELIGIOSITY (Model 
6), whilst Hypothesis 6 is tested by an interaction between separation of 
religion and state, as measured by the RAS index, and RELIGIOSITY (Model 
7). Descriptive statistics for the variables used in this chapter are presented 
in Tables 22 and 23.  
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Table 22: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 6: Individual level variables 
 PETITION BOYCOTT PROTEST RELIGIOSITY AGE FEMALE EDUC CLASS POSTMAT 
Country mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Argentina 0.3 0.46 0.03 0.18 0.2 0.4 -0.13 0.76 42.55 17.59 0.53 0.5 1.65 0.74 2.46 0.82 1.87 0.65 
Australia 0.73 0.45 0.12 0.32 0.15 0.36 -0.66 0.91 50.45 16.86 0.55 0.5 2.4 0.74 2.9 0.88 2.09 0.61 
Brazil 0.75 0.44 0.65 0.48 0.62 0.49 0.42 0.5 39.96 15.68 0.58 0.49 1.57 0.75 2.16 0.86 1.79 0.62 
Bulgaria 0.09 0.29 0.02 0.13 0.09 0.29 -0.53 0.67 47.36 16.51 0.54 0.5 1.98 0.68 2.31 0.83 1.46 0.54 
Burkina Faso 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.35 0.25 0.43 0.64 0.47 34.31 13.92 0.49 0.5 1.25 0.54 1.97 1.01 1.62 0.58 
Canada 0.67 0.47 0.19 0.39 0.2 0.4 -0.21 0.86 48.21 17.8 0.58 0.49 2.04 0.73 2.92 0.91 2.18 0.59 
Chile 0.19 0.39 0.03 0.18 0.2 0.4 -0.02 0.69 42.93 16.98 0.55 0.5 1.78 0.73 2.64 0.92 1.84 0.63 
China 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.18   -1.29 0.83 44.76 13.32 0.54 0.5 1.54 0.61 2.34 0.89 1.56 0.58 
Cyprus 0.24 0.43 0.12 0.33 0.3 0.46 0.05 0.64 41.63 15.98 0.51 0.5 2.07 0.76 3.17 0.88 1.79 0.65 
Ethiopia 0.37 0.48 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.64 0.47 29.93 10.21 0.49 0.5 1.6 0.69 2.38 1.08 1.89 0.64 
Finland 0.4 0.49 0.14 0.35 0.06 0.24 -0.56 0.76 47.52 17.49 0.52 0.5 1.93 0.75 2.84 0.85 1.86 0.6 
Georgia 0.05 0.23 0.03 0.17 0.15 0.36 0.37 0.41 45.41 17.19 0.53 0.5 2.29 0.54 2.64 0.93 1.65 0.58 
Germany 0.36 0.48 0.05 0.22 0.15 0.36 -0.9 0.85 50.44 17.49 0.56 0.5 1.74 0.71 2.8 0.85 1.94 0.63 
Ghana 0.05 0.21 0.02 0.15 0.09 0.29 0.78 0.33 33.86 14.07 0.49 0.5 1.38 0.59 2 1.04 1.73 0.56 
India 0.27 0.45 0.15 0.36 0.19 0.39 0.16 0.64 41.37 14.71 0.43 0.5 1.72 0.8 2.52 1.17 1.68 0.56 
Indonesia 0.07 0.26 0.04 0.2 0.17 0.38 0.69 0.37 36.1 13.94 0.48 0.5 2.14 0.72 2.97 0.87 1.6 0.58 
Japan 0.49 0.5 0.05 0.22 0.03 0.17 -0.8 0.6 48.15 15.74 0.56 0.5 2.17 0.58 2.69 0.86 1.84 0.56 
Jordan 0.04 0.2 0.03 0.17 0.05 0.22 0.91 0.28 37.59 14.4 0.51 0.5 1.88 0.81 3.02 0.85 1.56 0.56 
Malaysia 0.09 0.29 0.03 0.18 0.05 0.22 0.38 0.48 31.84 11.93 0.5 0.5 1.94 0.58 2.79 1.04 1.74 0.58 
Mali 0.22 0.41 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.46 0.68 0.4 37.25 14.85 0.5 0.5 1.3 0.6 2.88 1.1 1.64 0.59 
Moldova 0.1 0.3 0.04 0.2 0.16 0.36 -0.05 0.62 42.78 16.85 0.53 0.5 2.06 0.53 2.8 1.03 1.67 0.61 
Morocco 0.08 0.28 0.07 0.26 0.18 0.38 0.69 0.32 37.17 13.38 0.51 0.5 1.29 0.54 2.38 0.78 1.55 0.61 
Norway 0.49 0.5 0.16 0.37 0.14 0.34 -0.93 0.76 45.78 16.06 0.5 0.5 2.29 0.76 3 0.88 2.12 0.49 
Peru 0.23 0.42 0.04 0.2 0.24 0.43 0.27 0.58 37.62 14.9 0.51 0.5 1.86 0.74 2.42 0.88 1.95 0.64 
Poland 0.17 0.37 0.02 0.15 0.05 0.22 0.35 0.58 45.96 17.82 0.49 0.5 1.62 0.71 2.44 0.92 1.76 0.58 
Romania 0.06 0.23 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.24 0.32 0.49 48.68 17.38 0.54 0.5 1.83 0.73 2.4 1.03 1.57 0.59 
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 PETITION BOYCOTT PROTEST RELIGIOSITY AGE FEMALE EDUC CLASS POSTMAT 
Country mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Rwanda 0.08 0.28 0.04 0.19 0.16 0.37 0.68 0.3 34.65 14.15 0.51 0.5 1.21 0.47 1.7 0.98 1.87 0.68 
Slovenia 0.26 0.44 0.05 0.21 0.09 0.28 -0.61 0.84 46.19 17.84 0.54 0.5 2 0.7 2.8 0.88 1.95 0.59 
S. Africa 0.13 0.33 0.1 0.31 0.15 0.35 0.44 0.55 38.82 16.58 0.5 0.5 1.84 0.53 2.38 1.23 1.7 0.61 
S. Korea 0.39 0.49 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.32 -0.43 0.84 41.38 14.01 0.5 0.5 2.44 0.66 2.98 0.81 1.48 0.55 
Sweden 0.71 0.46 0.18 0.38 0.15 0.36 -1.04 0.73 47.73 16.99 0.5 0.5 2.34 0.73 3.16 0.9 2.2 0.51 
Switzerland 0.7 0.46 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 -0.52 0.84 52.45 16.14 0.55 0.5 2.2 0.64 3.37 0.78 2.08 0.63 
Taiwan 0.11 0.32 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.27 -0.59 0.61 43.88 16.05 0.49 0.5 2.16 0.78 2.83 0.91 1.48 0.57 
Thailand 0.08 0.28 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.21 0.36 0.41 45.35 15.73 0.51 0.5 1.51 0.71 2.85 0.77 1.78 0.5 
Trin & Tob 0.75 0.44 0.69 0.46 0.65 0.48 0.51 0.47 42.61 17.33 0.55 0.5 1.65 0.65 2.74 1.05 1.72 0.57 
Turkey 0.56 0.5 0.27 0.44 0.27 0.45 0.31 0.57 36.48 13.86 0.5 0.5 1.62 0.69 2.97 0.92 1.81 0.65 
Ukraine 0.08 0.27 0.03 0.17 0.17 0.38 -0.35 0.72 42.38 16.77 0.66 0.47 2.27 0.63 2.66 0.91 1.55 0.56 
USA 0.67 0.47 0.2 0.4 0.11 0.31 0.04 0.83 47.96 17.03 0.5 0.5 1.95 0.5 2.87 0.92 1.98 0.63 
Uruguay 0.8 0.4 0.29 0.46 0.71 0.45 -0.44 0.88 46.53 18.65 0.56 0.5 1.44 0.74 2.39 0.9 2.08 0.65 
Vietnam 0.06 0.23 0 0.05 0 0.06 -0.82 0.65 40.75 15.85 0.49 0.5 1.51 0.63 2.16 0.57 1.8 0.54 
Zambia 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.33 0.26 0.44 0.58 0.46 29.79 11.88 0.49 0.5 1.7 0.69 2.5 1.27 1.82 0.6 
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Table 23: Descriptive statistics of all countries analysed in Chapter 6: Individual characteristics 
  Proportion of...    HDI RAS POL_IV 
Country NONE CATH PROT ORTH MUS JEW HIND BUD OTH    
Argentina 0.17 0.74 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.02 0.75 47.56 8 
Australia 0.4 0.23 0.31 0.02 0 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.93 75.06 10 
Brazil 0.13 0.6 0.23 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.68 75.27 8 
Bulgaria 0.16 0 0 0.74 0.1 0 0 0 0 0.73 40.84 9 
Burkina Faso 0.02 0.31 0.08 0 0.53 0 0 0 0.05 0.3 75.68 0 
Canada 0.29 0.4 0.16 0.01 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.12 0.88 74.03 10 
Chile 0.23 0.6 0.17 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.76 57.22 10 
China 0.89 0 0.04 0 0.02 0 0 0.03 0.01 0.64 29.41 -7 
Cyprus 0.05 0 0 0.49 0.45 0 0 0 0 0.8 61.02 10 
Ethiopia 0.02 0.02 0.19 0.65 0.11 0 0 0 0.02 0.31 56.51 1 
Finland 0.14 0 0.83 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.86 44.68 10 
Georgia 0.02 0 0 0.94 0.03 0 0 0 0 0.7 44.72 6 
Germany 0.43 0.21 0.33 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.88 57.68 10 
Ghana 0.03 0.21 0.55 0.04 0.15 0 0 0 0.03 0.46 73.24 8 
India 0.06 0 0.03 0 0.08 0.01 0.76 0.02 0.05 0.49 54.69 9 
Indonesia 0.01 0 0.07 0 0.92 0 0 0 0 0.57 32.34 8 
Japan 0.64 0.01 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.31 0.03 0.87 69.05 10 
Jordan 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.98 0 0 0 0 0.71 17.05 -3 
Malaysia 0.02 0.07 0.05 0 0.57 0 0.08 0.2 0.01 0.73 20.04 3 
Mali 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0.93 0.01 0.01 0 0.01 0.35 60.13 7 
Moldova 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.92 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.61 45.22 8 
Morocco 0 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0.6 25.7 -6 
Norway 0.32 0.01 0.63 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.02 0.93 52.29 10 
Peru 0.12 0.71 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.7 55.56 9 
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  Proportion of...    HDI RAS POL_IV 
Country NONE CATH PROT ORTH MUS JEW HIND BUD OTH    
Poland 0.02 0.94 0.01 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.01 0.76 55.35 10 
Romania 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.86 0 0 0 0 0 0.77 53.06 9 
Rwanda 0.02 0.52 0.3 0 0.15 0 0 0 0 0.43 67.78 -3 
Slovenia 0.29 0.65 0.02 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.81 65.6 10 
S. Africa 0.17 0.12 0.59 0 0.02 0 0.02 0 0.07 0.59 75.06 9 
S. Korea 0.29 0.21 0.23 0 0 0 0 0.25 0.02 0.85 75.68 8 
Sweden 0.26 0.02 0.71 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.89 65.39 10 
Switzerland 0.2 0.41 0.33 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.04 0.9 57.06 10 
Taiwan 0.31 0.01 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.19 0.45 0.94 75.89 10 
Thailand 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0.97 0 0.64 56.05 -1 
Trin & Tob 0.07 0.2 0.44 0 0.05 0 0.23 0 0 0.72 72.77 10 
Turkey 0.01 0 0 0 0.99 0 0 0 0 0.65 30.35 7 
Ukraine 0.31 0.07 0 0.6 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.7 57.57 7 
USA 0.3 0.2 0.32 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.15 0.9 77.56 10 
Uruguay 0.55 0.34 0.07 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 0.74 69.02 10 
Vietnam 0.21 0.06 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.15 0.56 0.55 24.05 -7 
Zambia 0.05 0.34 0.46 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.12 0.36 47.61 5 
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Model 6 can be stated algebraically as16:  
log (
𝜋𝑖𝑗
1 − 𝜋𝑖𝑗
) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1. 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2. 𝐶𝐴𝑇𝐻𝑂𝐿𝐼𝐶𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3. 𝑃𝑅𝑂𝑇𝐸𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑁𝑇𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽4. 𝑂𝑅𝑇𝐻𝑂𝐷𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽5. 𝑀𝑈𝑆𝐿𝐼𝑀𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽6. 𝐽𝐸𝑊𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7. 𝐻𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽8. 𝐵𝑈𝐷𝐷𝐻𝐼𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽9. 𝑂𝑇𝐻𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽10. 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽11. 𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽12. 𝐴𝐺𝐸
2
𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽13. 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶_𝑀𝐼𝐷 𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽14. 𝐸𝐷𝑈𝐶_𝐻𝐼𝐺𝐻𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽15. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆2𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽16. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆3𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽17. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆4𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽18. 𝐶𝐿𝐴𝑆𝑆5𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽19. 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑀𝐴𝑇𝑖𝑗
+ 𝛽20. 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑗 + 𝛽23. 𝑅𝐴𝑆𝑗 + 𝛽24. 𝑃𝑂𝐿_𝐼𝑉𝑗 + 𝛽25. 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗. 𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑗 + 𝑢0𝑗
+ 𝑢1𝑗 . 𝑅𝐸𝐿𝐼𝐺𝐼𝑂𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑗 +∈𝑖𝑗 
π is the probability of unconventional participation (as measured by the 
indicator in question), 𝑖 is the 𝑖th individual and 𝑗 is the 𝑗th country. Simply 
switching HDI with RAS in the interaction term will give us Model 7. Again, 
robust standard errors are estimated in order to make allowances for 
heteroskedasticity in the models. Population averaged models are reported. 
RELIGIOSITY, HDI, RAS, and AGE have all been grand mean centred so that 
any possible effects of multicollinearity are handled. Again, RAS and AGE 
have been divided by 100, so that results can be presented as rounded up to 
2 decimal places. 
6.3 Empirical analysis of unconventional political participation 
6.3.1 Signing petitions 
The analysis begins with the dependent variable PETITION. Results of the 
multilevel modelling are presented in Table 24. There are 46,184 cases at 
                                       
16 With the exception of when the dependent variable is PROTEST; since the effect of AGE is 
not found to follow a quadratic trend, it is modelled in a linear fashion. 
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level-1 and 41 at level-2. From Model 1g, it is estimated that around 35% of 
the variance in the dependent variable is to be found at the country-level. In 
Model 2g, RELIGIOSITY is introduced alongside a random slopes 
component. This forms the base for all subsequent models. The effect of 
RELIGIOSITY is negative and highly significant in line with our broader 
theoretical reasoning, although it varies across countries (0.06, p=0.00) (n.b. 
when RELIGIOSITY is held at its mean). Model 3g adds controls for 
individual denominational identification. The effect of their introduction on 
the effect of RELIGIOSITY is negligible – it remains negative and significant 
at the 1% level. Muslims and Hindus sign petitions significantly less than 
those with no denominational identification, whilst Jews sign more often. 
These are the only denominational effects observed. Model 4g adds further 
controls at the individual-level. This causes a substantial reduction in the 
strength of the effect of RELIGIOSITY from as it was in the preceding model. 
Also, the regression coefficient is now significant only at the 10% level. This 
suggests that a substantial part of the effect of RELIGIOSITY observed in 
previous models, but by no means all, is actually down to correlations 
between RELIGIOSITY and other individual-level factors. Elsewhere in Model 
4g, Muslims still are less likely to sign a petition than the non-affiliated, but 
the effect is somewhat lessened and the coefficient is now only significant at 
the 10% level. Jews still sign petitions more than the non-affiliated but 
again, the regression coefficient is not as strong as it had been. Hindus 
remain distinctly unlikely to sign petitions – which can perhaps be put down 
to low levels of literacy within the Indian subcontinent.  
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Table 24: Multilevel logistic regression of having signed petitions (PETITION) 
 Model 1g Model 2g Model 3g Model 4g Model 5g Model 6g Model 7g 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -0.84*** -0.81*** -0.76*** -1.54*** -1.97*** -1.97*** -1.95*** 
 (0.19) (0.17) (0.17) (0.19) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
RELIGIOSITY  -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.06* -0.08** -0.09*** -0.10*** 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
CATHOLIC   0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.03 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
PROTESTANT   0.01 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 
   (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ORTHODOX   -0.06 -0.05 -0.05 -0.06 -0.05 
   (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
MUSLIM   -0.21** -0.13* -0.13 -0.13 -0.13 
   (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
JEW   0.35* 0.30* 0.37* 0.35* 0.37* 
   (0.19) (0.18) (0.20) (0.19) (0.20) 
HINDU   -0.41*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.42*** 
   (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) 
BUDDHIST   -0.03 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 
   (0.11) (0.11) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) 
OTHER   -0.07 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
FEMALE    -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
AGE    0.51*** 0.58*** 0.57*** 0.57*** 
    (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
AGE2    -0.05*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EDUC MID    0.36*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 0.40*** 
    (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
EDUC HIGH    0.68*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.75*** 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLASS 2    0.13* 0.13* 0.13* 0.14* 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 3    0.24*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
CLASS 4    0.40*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 0.44*** 
    (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) 
CLASS 5    0.32** 0.34** 0.33** 0.34** 
    (0.14) (0.16) (0.15) (0.16) 
POSTMAT    0.20*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 0.22*** 
    (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI     2.06** 0.88 2.04** 
     (0.83) (0.88) (0.83) 
RAS     3.21*** 3.20*** 2.49** 
     (1.01) (1.01) (1.10) 
POL_IV     0.03 0.03 0.03 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI*REL      0.72***  
      (0.14)  
RAS*REL       0.48** 
       (0.21) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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No significant differences can be found between the sexes when it comes to 
signing a petition, whilst the effect of AGE follows a familiar upturned U-
shape trend. The likelihood of signing a petition increases more or less 
linearly with educational attainment whilst the effect of social class is that 
the likelihood of signing a petition rises concomitantly before levelling off 
somewhat at the upper echelons of the social structure. Finally, post-
material values are associated with greater likelihood of petition signing. 
Model 5g introduces controls at the macro-level. The effect of religiosity now 
becomes more negative and is now significant at the 5% level. Muslims are 
no longer distinct from the non-affiliated, although Jews and Hindus remain 
so. The effects of AGE, CLASS, EDUC, and POSTMAT are not substantively 
different from as they were in Model 4g. HDI and RAS both have a positive 
and highly significant effect on petition signing. The effect of POL_IV is 
insignificant. Model 6g introduces an interaction term between RELIGIOSITY 
and HDI, in order to test Hypothesis 3 – that the effect of religiosity on 
unconventional political participation increases (becomes less negative) with 
the level of the hosting country’s modernisation. As the interaction 
coefficient is both positive and highly significant, we can confirm this 
hypothesis in this instance.  
Model 6g was re-estimated 41 times, each time with one country after the 
other being removed from the dataset, in order to test for any overly-
influential cases at the country-level. In no incidence did the interaction 
coefficient either lose its significance or reverse its polarity, despite some 
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fluctuations in its magnitude. Thus, we can consider this finding to some 
degree robust in this respect.  
In Table 25, the conditional regression coefficients for this interaction can be 
found. At the minimum level of HDI, the effect of religiosity is negative and 
highly significant. At the mean, the effect is less negative than before but 
still highly significant. Once HDI has reached its maximum, the effect is now 
positive and significant at the 1% level. 
Table 25: Effect of religiosity on signing petitions by country modernisation 
(conditional regression coefficients Model 6g) 
 Minimum HDI Mean HDI Maximum HDI 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -2.32*** -1.97*** -1.75*** 
 (0.37) (0.17) (0.30) 
RELIGIOSITY -0.38*** -0.09*** 0.09*** 
 (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Figure 14 presents the interaction between RELIGIOSITY and HDI in the 
form of a conditional effects plot. We can see things are very much 
dependent on your level of religiosity and the level of development of the 
country in which you live. When HDI is minimal, someone with minimal 
RELIGIOSITY is far more likely to sign a petition than someone with 
maximal RELIGIOSITY. When HDI reaches its observed mean in the dataset, 
the effect has lessened, whilst when it is at its maximum, the relationship 
has become positive. Regarding levels of petition signing across countries as 
measured by the level of HDI, this is best summed up visually as it is hard 
to account for in written word.    
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Figure 14: The effect of religiosity on signing petitions as conditioned by the country 
level of modernisation - conditional effects plot for Model 6g 
 
PETITION was regressed (logit) on RELIGIOSITY plus controls at the 
individual level in each country and the β-coefficients are graphed against 
HDI, as presented in Figure 15. We can see an upward trend with the effect 
of RELIGIOSTY rising, in line with our multilevel modelling. 
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Figure 15: The effect of modernisation on the effect of religiosity on signing petitions 
(results of country-specific logistic regressions with controls) 
 
Model 7g introduces an interaction between RELIGIOSITY and RAS, so that 
we can test Hypothesis 6 – that the effect of religiosity on unconventional 
political participation decreases (becomes more negative) with the level of 
separation of religion and state. The interaction coefficient is both positive 
and significant at the 5% level and thus we cannot confirm Hypothesis 6.  
Model 7g was also re-estimated 41 times, with each time one country after 
another been removed from the dataset, in order to test for any influential 
cases at the country-level. In all but one incidence, removal of a country did 
not change the significance and polarity of the interaction coefficient, give or 
take some fluctuations in its strength. The exception was when Turkey was 
removed from the dataset – the interaction coefficient had a value of 0.34 
with a standard error of 0.21, and a p-value of 0.102. Removal of POL_IV in 
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order to counter any potential enlargement of standard errors due to strong 
inter-correlations between macro-level variables reduces the p-value to 0.10 
whilst further removing HDI actually serves to increase it. Thus, we cannot 
actually find a way to lower the p-value below the 10% threshold. It is 
concluded that the positive and significant result found in Model 7g when 
applied to the full dataset, is due to the overbearing influence of Turkey and 
that in actuality the relationship is in effect null. 
6.3.2 Boycotting 
Now we turn our attention to the analysis of the dependent variable 
BOYCOTT. The results of the multilevel analysis are displayed in Table 26. 
There are 44,681 cases at level-1 and 41 at level-2. Model 1h is again the 
empty model from which it is estimated that some 31% of the variance in 
the dependent variable is to be found at the country-level. Model 2h 
introduces RELIGIOSITY into the model along with an accompanying 
random slope. Again, the effect of religiosity is negative and highly 
significant. Additionally, there is significant variation in the effect of 
religiosity across countries (0.14, p=0.00) (n.b. when RELIGIOSITY is at its 
mean). Model 2h introduces controls for denominational affiliation. The 
effect of their introduction is to attenuate the effect of RELIGIOSITY 
somewhat, although it remains negative and highly significant. Protestants, 
Orthodox, Hindus, and ‘Other’ are all less likely to boycott than those with 
no denominational identification. All other religious groups are not 
significantly different from the reference category.  
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Table 26: Multilevel logistic regression of having participated in a boycott (BOYCOTT) 
 Model 1h Model 2h Model 3h Model 4h Model 5h Model 6h Model 7h 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -2.03*** -1.95*** -1.80*** -2.73*** -3.09*** -3.09*** -3.08*** 
 (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) 
RELIGIOSITY  -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.14*** -0.15*** -0.14*** -0.16*** 
  (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
CATHOLIC   -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) 
PROTESTANT   -0.22*** -0.18*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
ORTHODOX   -0.42*** -0.43*** -0.45*** -0.46*** -0.45*** 
   (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
MUSLIM   -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
   (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) 
JEW   0.40 0.36 0.35 0.35 0.35 
   (0.27) (0.25) (0.24) (0.25) (0.24) 
HINDU   -0.58*** -0.55*** -0.56*** -0.56*** -0.56*** 
   (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
BUDDHIST   0.03 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 
   (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) 
OTHER   -0.21*** -0.16*** -0.17*** -0.18*** -0.18*** 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
FEMALE    -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.24*** -0.24*** 
    (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
AGE    0.36** 0.37** 0.37** 0.37** 
    (0.15) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
AGE2    -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** -0.05*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EDUC MID    0.47*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.50*** 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
EDUC HIGH    0.84*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 0.89*** 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLASS 2    0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLASS 3    0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
CLASS 4    0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 0.19** 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 5    0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 
    (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) 
POSTMAT    0.32*** 0.33*** 0.34*** 0.33*** 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI     -1.64*** -1.86*** -1.65*** 
     (0.55) (0.60) (0.55) 
RAS     2.56** 2.55** 2.24** 
     (1.03) (1.03) (1.11) 
POL_IV     0.02 0.02 0.02 
     (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI*REL      0.21  
      (0.21)  
RAS*REL       0.35 
       (0.25) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Model 4h introduces further controls at the individual-level. Their 
introduction further attenuates the effect of religiosity – it becomes less 
negative - although it is still significant at the 1% level. Denominational 
effects do not differ too much from the last model. Women are significantly 
less likely than men to engage in boycotts. AGE follows an inverted U-
shaped trend. EDUC is near-linearly related to boycotting. Only those from 
CLASS 4 are significantly distinct from the reference category (CLASS 1). 
POSTMAT is significantly and positively linked to the likelihood of 
boycotting. Model 5h introduces controls at the country-level. The impact of 
their introduction is to sharpen the effect of RELIGIOSITY somewhat, by 
making it more negative, although there is no change in its significance. 
Denominational effects along with the other individual level controls do not 
alter. HDI is negatively and significantly linked to boycotting whilst RAS is 
positively and significantly linked. POL_IV bears no significant relationship 
to boycotting. Model 6h introduces an interaction term between 
RELIGIOSITY and HDI in order to test Hypothesis 3 – that modernisation 
increases (makes less negative) the effect of religiosity on unconventional 
political participation, in this case boycotting. The interaction term is 
positive in line with our theory, but statistically insignificant. Thus, we 
cannot confirm Hypothesis 3 in this instance.  
When we apply the same process of checking for influential cases that was 
used earlier, we find one country whose removal, causes the interaction 
effect to be both positive and significant, if only at the 10% level. This 
country is Rwanda, and when it is removed from the dataset, the interaction 
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regression coefficient is 0.31 with a standard error of 0.19 with a p-value of 
0.09. Thus, we can now confirm Hypothesis 3 given the principle that it is 
unwise to let one case define the rule for all cases. Conditional regression 
coefficients, derived from Model 7h - as estimated using a dataset missing 
the Rwandan case - for the effect of RELIGIOSITY as conditional on the level 
of HDI, are presented in Table 27. We can see clearly that the effect of 
RELIGIOSITY is negative and significant at the minimum level of HDI but 
this effect is becoming less negative as HDI increases and by its highest 
level, the effect is still negative but statistically insignificant.  
Table 27: Effect of religiosity on boycotting by country modernisation (conditional 
regression coefficients Model 6h/restricted sample) 
 Minimum HDI Mean HDI Maximum HDI 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -2.24*** -3.03*** -3.53*** 
 (0.28) (0.23) (0.29) 
RELIGIOSITY -0.27*** -0.15*** -0.07 
 (0.10) (0.04) (0.05) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
The interaction between RELIGIOSITY and HDI found using the restricted 
dataset is presented as a conditional effects plot in Figure 16. There we can 
see that boycotting is more prevalent in societies with minimal 
modernisation. We can also see how religiosity is attenuating in its effect as 
modernisation, as measured by HDI, increases. By the time HDI has 
reached its maximum level in our dataset, the effect is negligible. The other 
thing to note from this graph is that the effect of religiosity is to make 
individuals from the extremes of development, much more comparable than 
two individuals from the same location who are totally irreligious. 
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Figure 16: The effect of religiosity on boycotting as conditioned by the country level 
of modernisation - conditional effects plot for Model 6h (restricted sample) 
 
Model 7h introduces an interaction effect between RELIGIOSITY and RAS in 
order to test Hypothesis 6 – that the effect of religiosity decreases (becomes 
more negative) under conditions of greater separation of religion and state. 
Again, the interaction term is positive but statistically insignificant. Thus, 
we cannot confirm Hypothesis 6. However, when the process of removing 
one country at a time and re-estimating the model is applied in order to test 
for overly-influential cases at the country-level, three cases emerge in which 
their exclusion produces interaction effects that are both positive and 
significant. These countries are China, Burkina Faso, and Uruguay. When 
all three are excluded simultaneously, then the regression coefficient for the 
interaction between RELIGIOSITY and RAS is 0.55 with a standard error of 
0.23 and is significant at the 5% level. In Table 28, conditional regression 
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coefficients are presented, showing how the effect of RELIGIOSITY changes 
with rising levels of RAS. They are calculated based on the use of a 
restricted dataset that excludes China, Burkina Faso, and Uruguay. We see 
that the effect of RELIGIOSITY is negative and significant at the minimum 
level of RAS, less negative at the mean but still significant, and less negative 
still and insignificant at the maximum. 
Table 28: Effect of religiosity on boycotting by separation of religion and state 
(conditional regression coefficients Model 7h/restricted sample) 
 Minimum RAS Mean RAS Maximum RAS 
 b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -3.96*** -3.07*** -2.53*** 
 (0.43) (0.24) (0.44) 
RELIGIOSITY -0.40*** -0.18*** -0.04 
 (0.11) (0.04) (0.06) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Once more, we can graph this interaction using a conditional effects plot 
(Figure 17). There we can see that countries with the highest level of RAS 
have more prevalent incidences of boycotting but that the effect of 
RELIGIOSITY is negligible. In countries with average and minimal 
separation of religion and state, the effect of RELIGIOSITY is negative, so 
much so that two religious individuals taken from the extremes of RAS are 
less comparable than two individuals from the same circumstances who are 
not religious.  
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Figure 17: The effect of religiosity on boycotting as conditioned by separation of 
religion and state - conditional effects plot for Model 7h (restricted sample) 
 
6.3.3 Attending a protest 
The final dependent variable analysed in this chapter is PROTEST, which 
captures involvement in legally sanctioned demonstrations. The results of 
our multilevel modelling are presented in 29. At level-1 there are 43,867 
cases and at level-2, 40. From Model 1i, the VPC is estimated, with roughly 
27% of the variance in the dependent variable being attributed to the 
country-level. Model 2i introduces RELIGIOSITY with a random slopes 
component. In line with our theoretical reasoning, the effect is negative and 
highly significant, with variation across countries (variance 0.17, p=0.00) 
(n.b. when RELIGIOSITY is at its mean). Next, in Model 3i, controls are 
introduced for denominational identification.  
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Table 29: Multilevel logistic regression of having attended a protest (PROTEST) 
 Model 1i Model 2i Model 3i Model 4i Model 5i Model 6i Model 7i 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -1.42*** -1.37*** -1.22*** -2.13*** -2.67*** -2.67*** -2.67*** 
 (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.21) (0.34) (0.34) (0.33) 
RELIGIOSITY  -0.17*** -0.13** -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.07 
  (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
CATHOLIC   -0.09* -0.06 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
PROTESTANT   -0.25*** -0.21*** -0.23*** -0.23*** -0.23*** 
   (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
ORTHODOX   -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
   (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
MUSLIM   -0.27*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.19*** 
   (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
JEW   0.43** 0.43** 0.45** 0.45** 0.45** 
   (0.19) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21) 
HINDU   -0.41*** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.42*** -0.41*** 
   (0.11) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
BUDDHIST   -0.09* -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
   (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
OTHER   -0.17** -0.12* -0.15* -0.15* -0.15* 
   (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
FEMALE    -0.27*** -0.29*** -0.29*** -0.29*** 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
AGE    -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 -0.09 
    (0.18) (0.19) (0.19) (0.19) 
AGE2    -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
EDUC MID    0.36*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 
    (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
EDUC HIGH    0.72*** 0.77*** 0.78*** 0.77*** 
    (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 2    0.17** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 
    (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 3    0.21*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.20*** 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 4    0.19** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 
    (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
CLASS 5    0.16 0.14 0.14 0.14 
    (0.17) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
POSTMAT    0.32*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 
    (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI     -3.10*** -3.32*** -3.10*** 
     (0.62) (0.73) (0.62) 
RAS     1.77** 1.77** 1.74** 
     (0.69) (0.69) (0.72) 
POL_IV     0.05 0.05 0.05 
     (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
HDI*REL      0.30  
      (0.29)  
RAS*REL       0.04 
       (0.46) 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Their introduction makes the effect of RELIGIOSITY somewhat less negative. 
Catholics, Protestants, Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists, and ‘Other’ are all 
significantly less likely to protest than the reference category, namely those 
with no such denominational identification. Jews are significantly more 
likely to protest than the same reference category. Model 4i increases the 
number of controls at the individual level. Their introduction causes 
RELIGIOSITY to become less negative and to no longer be statistically 
significant. Denominational effects are also somewhat attenuated by their 
introduction. However, the only real substantive difference is that, Catholics 
and Buddhists are now no longer significantly distinct from those with no 
denominational identification. Females are significantly less likely to protest 
than males. AGE does not follow a curvilinear trend. The likelihood of 
protesting increases significantly in a near linear fashion with increasing 
levels of educational attainment. By contrast, the effect of class 
identification is curvilinear with those identifying with CLASS 3 most likely 
to protest whilst CLASS 5 and CLASS 1 are indistinct. Model 5i introduces 
country-level controls. No substantive differences are registered. 
RELIGIOSITY remains negatively and insignificantly tied to the likelihood of 
protesting. HDI is negatively and significantly linked to the likelihood of 
protesting whilst RAS is positively and significantly linked. The effect of 
POL_IV is positive but insignificant. Model 6i introduces an interaction 
between RELIGIOSITY and HDI to test Hypothesis 3 – that the effect of 
religiosity on the likelihood of protesting increases (becomes less negative) as 
levels of modernisation rise. The interaction term is positive but statistically 
insignificant and therefore we cannot confirm Hypothesis 3.  
 
 
~ 235 ~ 
 
Model 6i was re-estimated 40 times, with each time one country after 
another being removed from the dataset, in order to assess whether or not 
there were countries that were exerting an overbearing influence on the 
results. No cases were identified, in which the omission of one country could 
produce a significant effect. Thus, we still cannot confirm Hypothesis 3.  
Model 7i shifts our attention to the testing of Hypothesis 6 – that the effect 
of religiosity decreases (becomes more negative) as the level of separation of 
religion and state increases – by introducing an interaction between 
RELIGIOSITY and RAS. Again, the effect was positive but insignificant.  
The same procedure for checking for overly influential cases was undertaken 
and again, no incidences were found whereby the removal of one country 
produced a significant effect. Thus, we cannot confirm Hypothesis 6 either.  
Thus, we have to look to Model 5i and accept that the effect of religiosity on 
protesting does not vary systematically across countries, at least as far as 
modernisation and separation of religion and state are concerned. However, 
Model 5i shows an insignificant and negative effect of RELIGIOSITY, but this 
is not really coherent with either our theorising or prior results which have 
tended to show negative effects of religiosity in all but the most advanced 
societies. Thus, the suspicion arises that there might be one or more 
country-cases that are exerting an overbearing influence on the regression 
results. Indeed, when Morocco is removed from the dataset and Model 5i is 
re-estimated, the regression coefficient for RELIGIOSITY is -0.10 with a 
standard error of 0.06 and a p-value of 0.07. The effect is now significant if 
only at the 10% level, but we can at least confirm a negative effect of 
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religiosity on protesting, in line with our more-general theoretical outlook, 
even though our hypotheses remain unsupported vis-à-vis protesting. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has been concerned with unconventional political participation 
and particularly the testing of Hypotheses 3 and 6. These have been 
evaluated through the analysis of three measures of unconventional political 
participation, namely the signing of petitions, participation in boycotts, and 
engaging in protests. Concerning Hypothesis 3, support has been found 
pertaining to petitions and boycotting. The analysis of protesting did not 
produce any supporting evidence. Regarding Hypothesis 6, no support was 
found regarding boycotting, petition signing and protesting. An interaction 
in the opposite direction from the theoretical prediction was found 
pertaining to boycotting but otherwise the effect was null. This chapter 
concludes our empirical exploration of the effects of religiosity on various 
forms of participation. Now we move on to try and synthesise the findings of 
the last three chapters into something coherent, from which we can posit 
revisions to the theory of the sociology of religion. 
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Chapter 7 – Conclusions, revisions of theories, and the future 
of religious research 
7.1 Introduction 
We have come to the end of our exploration of religiosity, country-context, 
and forms of public participation. In this chapter, the hypotheses and 
empirical evidence are summarised. Additionally, an attempt is made to 
provide a theoretically coherent summary of what we have uncovered 
through our empirical explorations of the World Values Survey data. 
Revisions for the theories of secularisation and religious economies are put 
forward. Finally, the limitations of this study are assessed and directions for 
future research are tentatively opened up for discussion. 
7.2 Review of hypotheses and empirical findings 
We begin this recap of our theory and summary of our results with a 
discussion of those derived from secularisation theory. A summary of these 
is presented in Table 30. 
Regarding conventional political participation, it was hypothesised that 
country-level modernisation would decrease the effect of religiosity at the 
individual level (Hypothesis 1). This was justified, using secularisation 
theory on the grounds that religion would become weakened in form and 
frozen out of the political mainstream due to effects of secularisation 
brought about by modernisation. However, it could not be confirmed 
empirically. 
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Table 30: Summary of hypotheses derived from secularisation theory and empirical 
findings 
Hypothesis Expectation Indicator Empirical Finding 
1. Modernisation decreases effect of 
religiosity on conventional political 
participation. 
- 
 
VOTE 
PARTY 
 
0 
+ 
 
2. Modernisation increases effect of 
religiosity on civil society participation. 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
RELORG 
CHARORG 
ENVORG 
CULTORG 
 
+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
3. Modernisation increases (makes less 
negative) the effect of religiosity on 
unconventional political participation. 
+ 
 
 
PETITION 
BOYCOTT 
PROTEST 
+ 
+ 
0 
 
No interaction was found between religiosity and modernisation with regard 
to voting. A positive interaction was found regarding membership of political 
parties. In both analyses of voting and party membership, religiosity was 
found to be for the most part positively linked to conventional political 
participation, in line with our more general theoretical positioning (with the 
exception of countries with a minimal level of modernisation when it comes 
to party participation). 
In light of secularisation theory and its re-imagining by Casanova, civil 
society could be seen as a replacement for conventional politics in the eyes 
of organised religion. Religion was viewed under modern conditions as 
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having given up its claims to supremacy over the state and as having the 
possibility of reinvention, in its so-called “de-privatisation”, as a social and 
moral guardian within civil society. Thus, it was hypothesised that under 
conditions of greater modernisation, religiosity would be more pronounced 
in its effect on civil society participation than elsewhere (Hypothesis 2). 
Indeed, our empirical analysis tended to favour Hypothesis 2. Positive 
interactions were found when each of the four of the indicators of civil 
society utilised in this study were analysed. Since religiosity is not becoming 
less linked to conventional politics, we cannot accept a Casanovian 
framework as this implies a transfer from this field into that of civil society – 
one is at the expense of the other. Thus, the expectation of Hypothesis 2 is 
met although the theoretical underpinning requires some refining. 
Unconventional political participation was seen as requiring a different 
theoretical framework since it is authority challenging in a way conventional 
politics is not. It was expected that religiosity should usher people away 
from such a mode of participation since religiosity is often empirically 
supportive of authority and conforming to it. This expectation of a negative 
link between religiosity and unconventional political participation was 
contextualised using secularisation theory. It was expected that under 
conditions of greater modernisation, religiosity would not discourage 
individuals from participating as much as it did elsewhere due to 
secularisation having depleted its authoritarian drive (Hypothesis 3). Results 
tended to favour Hypothesis 3 – 2 out of the 3 indicators analysed provided 
supportive evidence whilst the third provided a positive albeit insignificant 
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effect. Thus, the weight of the evidence confirms Hypothesis 3 but the lack 
of complete support requires explanation still. 
Our alternative theorising stemmed from religious economies theory. 
Hypotheses derived from this school of theory, alongside the results of our 
empirical analyses, are presented in Table 31. Regarding conventional 
political participation, it was hypothesised that conditions of a religious free-
market as brought about by separation of religion and state and the 
religious freedom that flows from it, would enliven and embolden religion so 
that religious people would feel more confident in themselves and their faith 
and participate more (Hypothesis 4). In both voting and political party 
participation however, no supportive evidence was found. In both cases, the 
interaction effects were insignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 4 goes unconfirmed. 
With civil society, something similar was expected – greater levels of 
separation of religion and state along with greater religious freedom were 
supposed to enliven religion so that religious people would feel more 
confident in their religion and thus participate more in order to impress 
religion’s influence on civil society (Hypothesis 5). Some evidence was found 
to support this hypothesis, but equally, some evidence did not. In two out of 
four indicators – religious organisations and organisations associated with 
culture and education - this was found to be the case.  
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Table 31: Summary of hypotheses derived from religious economies theory and 
empirical findings 
Hypothesis Expectation Indicator Empirical Finding 
4. Religious free-market conditions increase 
effect of religiosity on conventional political 
participation. 
+ 
 
VOTE 
PARTY 
 
0 
0 
 
5. Religious free-market conditions increase 
effect of religiosity on civil society 
participation. 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
RELORG 
CHARORG 
ENVORG 
CULTORG 
 
+ 
0 
0 
+ 
6. Religious free-market conditions decrease 
(makes more negative) the effect of religiosity 
on unconventional political participation. 
- 
 
 
PETITION 
BOYCOTT 
PROTEST 
0 
+ 
0 
 
However, regarding charitable or humanitarian organisations and 
environmental organisations, no positive and significant interactions were 
found.  
The relationship between religiosity and unconventional political 
participation was also expected to be affected by the level of separation of 
religion and state. It was argued that with greater separation, religiosity 
would become more confident in itself and that proponents would be more 
enthusiastic about their religion and this would transfer into a greater 
familiarity with religious teachings so that the natural suspicion of religion 
of authority-challenging behaviour would be enhanced. It was predicted that 
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the effect of religiosity would become even more negative with greater levels 
of separation of religion and state (Hypothesis 6). Across three separate 
measures of unconventional political participation, no evidence was found to 
support this line of theoretical reasoning. In two cases – namely signing 
petitions and protesting – null effects were found. It was only participation 
in boycotts whereby a significant effect was found and it was positive. Thus, 
we can reject Hypothesis 6 with the unexpected results found empirically 
requiring some discussion. 
7.3 Integrative conclusions and discussion regarding secularisation 
theory 
So, what are we to make of all this? Firstly, regarding secularisation theory, 
it is evident that while advanced modernised societies are witnessing a 
decline in the social relevance of religion, manifested most strikingly in 
declining levels of belief and attendance, this does not mean we are seeing 
an accompanying privatisation of religiosity, in terms of the influence of 
religiosity on the behaviour of religious individuals. In the most modernised 
societies, religiosity is a strong predictor of both voting and participation in 
political parties. It also strongly influences participation in civil society 
organisations. Whilst modernisation does not quite overcome religion’s 
innate suspicion of unconventional political participation, it is the case that 
these forms are not quite as alien to religion as they are in less modernised 
societies. Indeed, it was found that with regard to petition signing, religiosity 
had a positive effect in the most modernised societies. Religiosity under 
modernity has not however got over its aversion to more confrontational 
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forms such as boycotting and protesting enough to embrace them. Perhaps, 
with time, we shall expect religiosity to lose its aversion to these but that is 
a question for the future. What matters now, is that we see in the most 
modernised societies, where the effects of secularisation are expected to be 
the most pronounced and indeed are with regard to falling levels of belief 
and attendance, a greater ease amongst religious people in participating in 
forms of organisational behaviour than elsewhere. This defies our theoretical 
expectation – one that is reasonably derived from secularisation theory - and 
calls for some revisions to be made. 
It is illuminating to first of all consider the difference between the types of 
dependent variables analysed in Chapters 4 and 5. Firstly, why is it that we 
have positive interactions between religiosity and modernisation when 
political parties and civil society organisations are analysed but not with 
regard to voting? Types of political participation have been classified 
according to the level of initiative that they require (Verba et al., 1978). If 
this is so, then we can also infer from this that forms of all types of 
participation are also more or less costly to the individual, both in financial 
and non-financial terms.  
Voting is for the most part low-cost in that it requires little by way of money 
and is not (relatively) time consuming. Admittedly, there are some instances 
where voting can cost you your life, but such examples are the exception 
rather than the rule. Generally, to vote, all it requires is no less than a 
couple of hours maximum plus the means of transport to get there – the 
pencil is usually supplied. Importantly, it is also a solitary activity that 
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requires none of the types of attitude that make associational life possible, 
namely willingness to compromise, open-mindedness etc. Membership in 
political parties and civil society organisations by contrast are far more 
resource-demanding. The minimum required of membership in most 
organisations regardless of their type, is money – membership fees must be 
paid either monthly or yearly. Already, the member has sacrificed far more 
than the voter has of his resources. Further involvement in organisations 
will eat into the individual’s time budget – organisations will have meetings 
and campaigns that will require the more-active member to sacrifice their 
free-time. For the most involved, such organisations will have executive 
positions to fill – chairpersons, treasurers, educators etc. – such that it is 
clear that being a member has potentially far greater costs to the individual 
than voting.  
It is argued that this qualitative difference between voting and 
organisational membership is a possible source of explanation for the 
disparities in findings from our multilevel modelling. The most modernised 
societies are suffering from a decline in organisational membership – think 
back to the conditional effects plots in Chapters 4, 5, and 6. There we saw 
that the probability of participating in organisations of all types, tended to 
be much lower when modernisation was at its highest than when it was at 
its lowest. This finding is in line with Putnam’s work on declining 
associational life in the United States (Putnam, 2000).  
What is put forward here is that modernisation leads to a decline in 
associational life for two reasons. Firstly, there is a crisis of ideology in the 
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most advanced societies whereby the old political allegiances have been 
undermined by a combination of a shifting class structure (Gray & Caul, 
2000; Evans & Tilley, 2011) and the political manoeuvrings of the political 
parties in a mad dash towards the centre, known as ‘triangulation’. The old 
ideologies of left and right have to some degree been replaced in the 
mainstream of political discourse by a (neoliberal) pragmatism and 
‘managerialism’ and as such do not quite have the same power to galvanise 
individuals into action as for instance nationalism and socialism once did. 
The second possible reason is that modern life itself makes organisational 
life difficult. Here we can directly resort to Putnam (2000) who argued that 
social capital in the form of organisational life was collapsing in the United 
States as a result of generational changes, greater involvement of women in 
the labour force, increasing television consumption, and urbanisation. 
Putnam can be challenged on his thesis (e.g. Andersen et al., 2006), 
however, its use is it allows us to theorise that modernisation makes 
organisational life difficult. 
With these two arguments in mind, we can then posit the explanation for 
why religious people participate more than non-religious people in the most 
modernised societies, as religiosity offers an ideological resource that 
enables participation which provides them with the ideology needed to 
sustain involvement and which is also strong enough to make the costs of 
participation in organisations brought about by modern life seem, in short, 
less costly. Religiosity is thus an ideological advantage that enables 
organisational participation for the religious. As the non-religious are 
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without it, they are less likely to have reason to participate and to not have 
the kind of ideological resources that make the increasing costs of 
organisational involvement that are brought about by advanced 
modernisation, seem less costly.  
To summarise the argument, modernisation makes participation in 
organisations more costly and there is also an ideological crises in the most 
modernised societies. Thus, religious people in the most modernised 
societies have a relative advantage over the non-religious that makes 
organisational life easier and so they are more likely to join organisations 
and to sustain membership. Remember, because voting is relatively cost-
free, no interactions are found in our analyses – the effect of religiosity is 
positive and uniform across the spectrum of modernisation as 
modernisation does nothing to make voting more costly (n.b. the absence of 
a main effect of HDI on VOTE). 
So, far we have an explanation of one side of the interaction between 
modernisation and religiosity in its effect on organisational membership. 
Now we can turn our attention to ask why the effect might be negative or 
null in societies with the lowest levels of modernisation. Remember in the 
empirical chapters of this thesis, it was found that in the least modernised 
societies, the effect of religiosity was negative with regard to political party 
participation and null regarding all types of civil society organisations 
(excepting religious organisations). The explanation for these findings is 
simple. These societies have not undergone too much modernisation and 
thus the ideological deficit is not so great as to disadvantage the non-
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religious whilst the costs of organisational life are not so great either, as 
such that religiosity can serve to make them seem less.  
Regarding political parties, the negative effect observed under conditions of 
minimal modernisation may well be explained by levels of political 
corruption. It has been argued that corruption decreases with the level of 
modernisation (Treisman, 2000). It could be that where modernisation has 
been low, political parties are more corrupt and thus the strong moral codes 
of religion (remember religiosity is more stringent under such 
circumstances) serve as a disadvantage for the religious in terms of the 
ability to participate. We know that religious people tend to be more moral 
(Bloodgood et al., 2007; Stack & Kposowa, 2006; Conroy & Emerson, 2004) 
when it comes to things like corruption and honesty. Thus, when they are 
presented with it in political parties on a day to day basis, they would be 
more likely to abstain.  
This line of argument is lent weight by the theoretical ideas of Norris (2002). 
She argues that in the older democracies, political parties have switched 
from being “mass branch parties” to “catch-all parties”. The former, first 
conceptualised by Duverger, are characterised by a core of committed party 
activists at the heart of a bloc of loyal voters. The latter type, conceptualised 
by Kircheimer, sees the political party as de-coupled from its traditional 
base of support and as having abandoned its ideological fundamentals in 
order to attract as many people as possible – the catch-all party tries to 
please everyone (Norris, 2002). Such parties rely on mass-media in order to 
get their message across and to mobilise turnout. They have become 
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professionalised, are often state subsidised, and are media savvy. The 
implication is they no longer require grassroots canvassers and local 
networks. By contrast Norris argues, in under-developed societies where 
media penetration and levels of literacy are low, the political party still has a 
vital role to play in political communication. Elections are characterised by 
more traditional means such as rallies and voting drives that stress verbal 
communication. According to Norris, a result of this ‘personal touch’ is that 
political ‘clientalism’ is much more common with promises made to local 
communities and vested interests in return for electoral support. 
Norris’ theories are relevant and supportive of the theoretical interpretations 
of the findings of this thesis. Using these ideas, we can link the shift to 
catch-all parties to the ideological benefits of religiosity. Catch-all parties, 
predominantly found in post-industrial societies try to appeal to everyone 
and end up appealing to no-one, since they have no strong message capable 
of galvanising a particular community. The religious individual will be at a 
relative advantage since they have an ideology stressing public commitment 
in a weakly ideological environment. Non-religious individuals will tend to 
find themselves ideologically lost at sea, and will tend not to get involved or 
sustain commitment. At the same time, given the ‘clientalism’, or put more 
simply, the corruption that goes with the face-to-face approach of political 
campaigns in undeveloped societies, religious individuals will be more likely 
to find this disdainful and abstain from party involvement in line with the 
findings of this thesis. 
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Does this theory hold up in the case of religious organisations? It might be 
argued that it is unreasonable to expect a relative advantage in favour of 
religious people in more modernised countries simply because non-religious 
people will not participate in religious organisations. Indeed, from Figure 6, 
we can see that when religiosity is minimal in countries with maximal 
modernisation, the probability of membership of a religious organisation is 
null. However, one can argue that the advantage in fact is not between the 
religious and the non-religious but the devoutly religious and the less 
devout, of whom the latter will be much more secularised in their ideological 
outlook and thus would have more difficulty sustaining organisational 
memberships. 
Another possible source of explanation comes from the literature on 
fundamentalism (Bruce, 2008; Marty & Appleby, 1994) which sees its 
subject matter as a backlash against modernisation. Whilst it is 
inappropriate to classify our religious organisational participants in more 
modernised societies as fundamentalists, it could be that these religious 
people are reacting against modernisation as well, but in a more moderate 
and restrained fashion. Perhaps greater organisational behaviour by the 
religious is more likely in modernised societies because somehow they are 
offended by modernisation that offers no place for religion as a source of 
public legitimation and morals and this offence is enough to galvanise them 
into action? Perhaps such an offence is compounded by declining religious 
numbers and the public deriding of religion by trendy commentators and 
attention-seeking comedians?  Such an explanation may be appealing, but 
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the fact that no variation in the effect of religiosity on voting across the 
spectrum of modernisation has been found speaks against this. The 
explanation has to be specifically to do with the nature of organisational 
behaviour as opposed to that of the act of voting. 
One could further speculate that the effect of secularisation on religiosity 
makes it less distinct and thus less of an obstacle to participation within 
more modernised countries when it comes to face-to-face activity as the 
religious and the non-religious are more capable of working together and 
have less to disagree upon. 
Now all there remains to be done is to integrate the findings concerning 
unconventional political participation into the discussion as so far we have 
only discussed conventional and civil society participation.  
With increasing levels of modernisation, it was found that unconventional 
political participation became less negative in effect regarding two measures 
– namely signing of petitions and boycotting. Regarding protesting, no such 
interaction was found. Thus, with some unconventional methods, religiosity 
overcomes its innate hostility to authority challenging behaviour so that by 
the time modernisation reaches its maximum level within the data, the effect 
on petition signing is positive whilst it is null for boycotting. These findings 
can be explained by looking at the level of challenge and threat to authority 
inherent in each mode of unconventional political participation. 
Petitions are impersonal – the individual never confronts those to whom the 
petition is addressed. All that is presented to the authority figure being 
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petitioned is a name on a piece of paper alongside other names on a piece of 
paper. Thus, the challenge is low. Boycotting is slightly greater in its affront 
to authority as it threatens to take away from the powerful that which 
sustains them, namely money. Protesting is by far the most challenging to 
authority as more often than not it involves some encounter with the police 
who are dressed ‘appropriately’ for the occasion.  
In general, it seems that modernisation lessens the effect of religiosity on the 
less challenging modes of unconventional political participation. 
Modernisation, associated with secularisation, is depleting religion such that 
it is no longer quite so suspicious of those modes of unconventional political 
participation that are the least offensive to authority – in a sense religion 
mellows and even comes to embrace the most benign methods of this form 
of authority-challenging behaviour. It is becoming less-distinct. However, 
the challenge to authority inherent in protesting is still too much for 
modernised religion and thus we cannot see any effect of modernisation in 
our empirical analyses. This interpretation is lent weight by the fact that 
religious groups along with some notable youth organisations, are 
increasingly using petitions to garner support for the issues they are 
concerned with, such that we can say petitions have become part and parcel 
of religious civil society17. 
To summarise our argument, modernisation makes organisational 
behaviour more difficult so that religiosity becomes advantageous. When 
modernisation is minimal, religiosity steers people away from the political 
                                       
17 With thanks to Pascal Siegers for drawing this to my attention in a personal 
communication. 
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parties as they cannot provide a culture that is acceptable to religion’s 
greater demands on individuals’ morality. Since the costs of voting are 
minimal and thus constant across the spectrum of modernisation, religiosity 
has nothing to help overcome, hence no variation in its effect. Finally, 
modernisation depletes religion in its pro-authoritarianism and this 
manifests itself in a lessened negative effect of religiosity on modes of 
unconventional political behaviour when modernisation is highest, although 
the most challenging modes remain unpalatable. 
How might this relate to the paper of Ruiter & De Graaf (2006)? Recall that 
they found the effect of religiosity on volunteering within civil society 
organisations was decreasing as national devoutness increased. The 
explanation put forward was that where national devoutness is low, religious 
people have to work harder to sustain volunteering but where the social 
context is more religious, they do not have to work quite so hard since the 
social milieu founded on religious values of altruism is more encouraging of 
volunteering net of individual religiosity. Thus, the religious can afford to 
relax a little bit more, safe in the knowledge that the religious social context 
will sustain volunteering. Essentially, it could be argued that the 
relationships uncovered in this thesis directly map onto that found by Ruiter 
& De Graaf albeit with a different explanatory mechanism put forward, since 
there is a country-level correlation between modernisation/development and 
national devoutness to which causal effect is attributed – countries with a 
higher HDI have a lower level of national devoutness. However, this 
dissertation has not found consistent effects across all indicators and this 
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calls into question the explanatory theory put forward by Ruiter & De Graaf 
– why is it the case that voting behaviour for instance is not subject to the 
same effects as organisational behaviour when we have theoretical and 
empirical reasons to believe religion would encourage it as a form of civic 
duty with a contextual effect equally plausible? This finding and the 
explanation put forward in this thesis, that modernisation leads to a secular 
ideological deficit that makes religiosity more compatible with organisational 
behaviour (as it has a relative advantage) which at the same time is 
becoming more and more difficult to sustain due to the pressures of modern 
life, trumps the explanatory framework of Ruiter & De Graaf as it can deal 
with the voting anomaly.  
Similarly, Stavrova et al. (in press) have, using a social norms framework, 
argued that the effect of religiosity on individual subjective well-being 
increases as the level of national devoutness increases. Again, if we take 
modernisation/development as a proxy for the social norm to be religious 
(national devoutness) then these scholars should be aware that their 
explanation might not be functioning in every case of every outcome. 
Accordingly and as a friendly challenge, these scholars might want to find 
an outcome that is influenced by religiosity but whereby the relationship is 
not varying across the spectrum of the social norm to be religious and put 
forward an explanation compatible with their own theory that can account 
for such a deviant case, in a similar manner to how I dealt with conflicting 
results pertaining to voting and protesting.  
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7.4 Integrative conclusions and discussion regarding religious 
economies theory 
Essentially, the argument was that religion would become more assertive 
and more confident in itself and this would manifest in a greater demand 
placed on conventional politics and civil society in order to shape society in 
line with religious teachings, under conditions of greater religious freedom 
and separation of religion and state. Additionally, it was argued that 
religious precepts would become better understood so that that the 
authoritarian drive inherent within religion would become stronger and 
religious individuals would adjust themselves in line with this. This, it was 
expected, would then spill over into a greater aversion to the unconventional 
modes of political participation, again under conditions of greater religious 
freedom and separation of religion and state. This theorising, derived from 
the religious economies school, has for the most part not found empirical 
support. No evidence was uncovered to show variation in the effect of 
religiosity on conventional political participation across the spectrum of 
separation of religion and state. Furthermore, some evidence was found for 
greater separation of religion and state positively influencing the effect of 
religiosity on civil society participation, but equally there was evidence for it 
not doing so. With regard to unconventional political participation, mixed 
findings were also found but the fact that no increasingly-negative effect was 
found in any of the indicators casts doubt on the likelihood of a religious-
economies style mechanism of the type theorised here. Instead, we have to 
consider the specific nature of each indicator and how it relates on a 
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theoretical level to the concepts identified by our theory – namely the 
separation of religion and state and religiosity. 
Why might there be no variation in conventional political participation 
across the spectrum of separation of religion and state? Let us imagine two 
pure forms of the state that represent the polar opposites of the concept of 
separation of religion and state. First, let us consider at one end the 
theocracy, where religion and state are one (e.g. Iran). There, religion is 
accepted in all parts of government, such that there is strong 
encouragement for religious people to participate. Political parties will make 
strong appeals to religion in order to project legitimacy as this is granted to 
them by religious authorities. Religious people will be more likely to 
participate in political parties because such religiously-endorsed parties 
have the most influence, the most legitimacy, and most importantly every 
chance of being successful. Religious people are more likely to be rewarded 
in their participation and sustain involvement. Similarly, in the theocracy, a 
religious person will be more likely to vote since the candidates on offer will 
be approved by religious authorities and thus very appealing to the religious 
voter. Thus, in the theocracy, there is an upward pressure on the effect of 
religiosity on conventional political participation.  
Now we turn our attention to its polar opposite, the secular state, where 
religion and state are constitutionally separated (e.g. the USA). In the 
secular state, political parties will be more likely to appeal to non-religious 
people or at least suppress their religiosity to broaden their appeal to a 
secular audience. Additionally, political parties will have scant chance of 
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enacting religious laws so that religious party participants are not rewarded 
so much for their participation. However, the fact of laicism would offer 
plenty to antagonise religious people and spur them into action as when a 
state secularises it becomes open to others whose very existence is offensive 
to most religious tastes – homosexuals for instance. Also, the secular state 
makes laws that are equally unpalatable to the religious – such as the 
legalisation of abortion. Thus, while the state might not necessarily be open 
to the religious, an upward pressure on the effect of religiosity on 
conventional political participation is also felt as the very secularism of the 
state that excludes the religious also serves to antagonise them into action. 
To complete the argument, we now need to combine these two strands of 
reasoning. At one end of the spectrum of separation of religion and state, we 
have the theocracy where there is an upward pressure on encouraging 
religious people to participate, whilst at the other, in the secular state, there 
is also an upward pressure. If we put these together and then imagine the 
regression line for the effect of separation of religion and state on the effect 
of religiosity on conventional political participation, we can see why a slope 
of zero is plausible as the upward pressure from the theocracy is cancelled 
out by the equally upward pressure of the secular state. In the theocracy, 
religious people participate because they have everything to be for; in the 
secular state, religious people participate because they have everything to be 
against. 
A consideration of the nature of separation of religion and state can also 
illuminate our findings concerning its effect on the behaviour of religious 
 
 
~ 257 ~ 
 
individuals in civil society. Recall that it was only with regard to religious 
organisations, and cultural/education organisations that we found 
significant effects. No effects were found for charitable/humanitarian 
organisations or environmental ones. Religion has always been interested in 
culture, viewing it as a way through which it can pass on religious ideas 
concerning the way things are and the way things ought to be – religious 
culture is thus instructive and normative. Similarly, religion has always 
been interested in having a role in education as it is where the mind is most 
impressionable. Again, imagine the pure forms of the theocracy and the 
secular state. In the theocracy, cultural and educational instruction along 
religious lines will be provided by the state so that that there is no need for 
religious people to provide these in civil society. In the secular state 
however, religion will be frozen out of the classroom so that there is an 
impetus for religious people to take to civil society in an attempt to exert the 
right influence on culture and education. One could make a similar 
argument for religious organisations – in the theocracy when separation of 
religion and state is minimal the content normally expressed in religious 
organisations is expressed in the state so religious people have less incentive 
to participate, whereas in the secular state, when separation of religion and 
state is optimal and religion is frozen out of the state, there is a great 
incentive to take part. Recall from Figure 8 just how unlikely religious 
organisations were when separation of religion and state was minimal.  
The lack of significant effects of separation of religion and state on 
environmental organisations can be explained if we argue that religion has 
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no environmental interest that could be expressed in the state – there is no 
divinely prescribed response to global warming! With regard to 
charitable/humanitarian organisations, the null-effect can be explained in a 
similar manner so that organisations do not offer anything specifically 
religious that the state could take up, whilst humanitarian organisations 
themselves are usually concerning themselves in affairs outside of the state 
in which they are hosted.  
With unconventional political participation, results were mixed. It was only 
with regard to boycotting that a significant result was found, and it was not 
in the direction of our theoretical expectation. Thus, we can conclude that 
the religious economies-derived explanation put forward was not happening. 
The issue of boycotting is perplexing. Possibly it is the case that religious 
people boycott more when separation of religion and state is maximal 
because they are so affronted by the secular society which they find 
themselves in.  There is simply an abundance of things to boycott from a 
religious point of view, which would not be present in a more restrictive 
theocracy. Thus, the idea of boycotting something does not seem so 
unacceptable to religious people after all. The fact that no significant results 
for interactions between separation of religion and state and religiosity 
pertaining to petition signing and protesting is consistent with this as in a 
secular society, there is no sense in petitioning government or 
demonstrating to have something changed as the constitution will not allow 
it – their cries fall on deaf ears – and so there is no upward pressure in the 
secular state. Instead, religious people take the only action they can which 
 
 
~ 259 ~ 
 
is to protest through their consumption (boycotting), this being something 
they do have control over. They can have influence and be rewarded through 
its withdrawal, so much so that in the most secular states, there is no 
longer a negative discrepancy in favour of the religious in the likelihood of 
boycotting and they boycott in equal measure with the non-religious. In a 
theocracy with a high degree of state establishment of religion, petitions and 
protests would be more likely since the right sets of ears can be found, but 
there is less need for unconventional political participation since the 
theocratic state does less to antagonise the religious and so no upward 
pressure. Thus, you get slopes with a coefficient of zero as the effects of 
separation of religion and state on the effects of religiosity on protesting and 
petition signing. 
Whatever the reasons for the results found with regard to those hypotheses 
derived from religious economies theory, what is most striking is that they 
are far too inconsistent to be compatible with the reasoning that was put 
forward in Chapter 2, and thus it seems the case that this was unhelpful in 
trying to make sense of the data.  
7.5 Revising the theories of the sociology of religion and directions for 
future research 
Both theories from the sociology of religion require some substantive 
revisions now that our empirical analyses have been completed and 
explanations put forward. 
Secularisation theory is all too often focused on measuring decline in belief 
or attendance in whichever country the researcher in question has in mind. 
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However, the definition of secularisation is the declining social relevance of 
religion and thus studies need to focus not just on counting bums on pews, 
for instance, but also to look at the effect religiosity has on the wider social 
order as modernisation advances. This is what this study has done in 
looking at the effect of religiosity on public participation. With this change of 
direction in mind, we can revise the expectations of classical secularisation 
theory which tended to posit a privatisation of religion accompanying 
modernisation and decline in belief and religious attendance. Instead, we 
have argued that religiosity does not become privatised in the sense that it 
guides individuals away from participating in the theatres of public life. 
Religiosity somewhat paradoxically becomes an advantage that enables 
participation in organisational life even when in terms of numbers it is in 
decline. This is the irony of modernity – religiosity has the potential to be the 
most influential precisely when it is in shortest supply. Secularisation 
theory needs to understand that secularisation is to be understood as both 
decline in religious numbers and relatively greater religious action and thus 
we can speak of a paradox of the simultaneous lessening and increasing 
social relevance of religion in the modernised world. Additionally, theorists 
need to look at the advantages of religiosity in the context of the 
disadvantages of non-religiosity. It needs to be explored what it is about the 
negative pole of religiosity that makes organisational participation unlikely 
in order to illuminate the qualities of religiosity that truly matter. Thus, 
researchers need to move away from religiosity and start to identify secular 
alternatives that suppress participation in organisations, be it values of 
consumerism or egoism or what have you. 
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Casanova provided a fascinating counter-point to secularisation with his 
thesis on the deprivatisation of religion in the modern world. This thesis 
shows that privatisation does not occur with secularisation, at least in the 
terms it is conceived of herein. However, the idea that religion retreats from 
the conventional political sphere if only to re-manifest itself in civil society 
was not supported. The so-called deprivatisation of religion should instead 
be thought of as applying equally to organisational life across both the 
conventional mode of politics that contests the composition of the state, and 
civil society that acts independently as its regulator. It is not the quality of 
religion that is changing with regard to non-authority challenging modes of 
behaviour. In a sense, what is apparently an increasing public nature of 
religiosity is illusionary – it is my contention that it is the effects of 
modernisation that deplete secular alternatives to religion so that religion 
itself becomes advantageous without undergoing too much transformation. 
Transformations of religion are only felt in the unconventional mode. 
Religious economies theory has a troubled empirical history. To date, its 
concern has been mostly to do with explaining bums on pews and like 
secularisation theory its proponents need to look at the knock-on effects 
that are implicit within the theory. This thesis makes a contribution to this 
but the results were not encouraging for this as a worthwhile line of inquiry. 
Given that consistent effects were not found and given Borgonovi’s (2008) 
most recent findings, plus the unrealistic nature of those studies linking 
greater separation of religion and state to greater religious vitality, the 
recommendation is that this line of theory gradually be phased out. 
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Certainly, some further studies ought to focus on further testing the theory 
that greater competition leads to greater religious vitality as research into 
this matter was effectively reset to zero by Voas et al. (2002) so that we can 
say the jury is still out on this one. Future studies of this theory should take 
into account Voas et al.’s recommendations for dealing with the index of 
pluralism when applied in regression models, but most importantly should 
find ways of assessing whether or not the religious market is truly 
competitive, since pluralism is only a necessary but not sufficient – and thus 
a proxy – indicator. 
Explorations of the effect of separation of religion and state on the behaviour 
of religious people is a promising line of inquiry opened up by this thesis. 
Indeed, some interesting main-effects of this variable were found in its 
empirical analyses that require further empirical validation. Most 
promisingly is the line of theorising – that religious people orientate 
themselves in terms of their public participation depending on whether or 
not the state is open or closed to them by law. This would require that 
separation of religion and state as a concept be divested of the theoretical 
baggage it has acquired from religious economies theory. Furthermore, we 
need to better explore the possibility of religious people compensating for 
their exclusion from the state through manifestations within organisations 
in civil society. 
7.6 Limitations of this study 
Of course, every study has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. The 
strengths are the novelty of theoretical design along with measurement 
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items and data that have a degree of validity whilst utilising a large number 
of macro-units so that the ranges of the key macro-level variables are large 
enough for us to draw inferences. This allows the development of novel and 
stimulating theoretical insights. That said, the validity of the index of 
religiosity was not meeting the stricter tests imposed by the confirmatory 
factor analysis framework. Indeed all indicators have some level of 
measurement error arising from problems with application across different 
contexts and in-house effects. This would be true of any cross-comparative 
research, however. What matters is that the measurement items used in this 
thesis have some basis for comparison and that was established in Chapter 
3. It is important that we stuck with a most-different systems research 
design in order to keep the range of modernisation and separation of religion 
and state sufficiently large enough so that they have enough variance so 
that the effects specified in our theoretical section might be seen empirically. 
Had we opted for a most-similar design, this would not have been possible 
as such macro-level variables would not have had enough variance. 
Conversely, such a design would mean items at the individual level would be 
more comparable since cultural differences would be less pronounced. In 
mitigation, it needs to be stressed that a balance needs to be struck, when 
assessing cross-level interaction models, between a research design that 
allows a wide range at level-2 in the independent variables, and level-1 
variables with a degree of comparative validity. The data selected and the 
labours undertaken in Chapter 3 are sufficient to confirm this. 
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This study has focused on differences between countries. It has been 
concerned with variations in effects of religiosity on different outcomes of 
behaviour, as conditioned by country-level variables identified by theory. 
Accordingly, cross-sectional data was used. This is troublesome as from 
such data correlations can be found, but ‘causality’ cannot be ascertained. 
The way to do this would be through panel datasets and the appropriate 
statistical models. However, there are not enough of these surveys in 
number to state with confidence, if the kinds of interactions put forward in 
this thesis are happening. Longitudinal causal models need to be used in 
conjunction with comparative work using cross-sectional data sources such 
as the WVS. Additionally, so called pseudo-panel designs may be fruitful, 
since the WVS and other similar country-comparative surveys multiple 
waves over time. 
7.7 Final words 
We have reached the end of our exploration of the effects of religiosity on 
forms of public behaviour as they vary across countries. This thesis provides 
an interesting way of looking at the dominant and competing theories of the 
sociology of religion. It has made a novel interpretation and application of 
these theories and fills a gap in the literature through its use of cross-level 
theorising that stresses variation across countries that reconcile macro and 
micro levels. Such approaches are few in number. If there is one over-
arching ‘moral’ that encapsulates my contribution to the discipline that I 
would want other researchers to take over, it is that what is apparently self-
evident in theory is not always matched by empirical evidence. It is up to us 
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to reconcile them so that theory leads to evidence which leads back into 
better theory and so on, in a dialectic of ever-increasing refinement and 
improvement.  
For every ending is but a new beginning. The findings of this thesis are not 
intended to be taken as the final word on the research questions raised. 
They are intended to be open questions in themselves that serve to open up 
new debates in the sociologies of both religion and politics. They also raise 
the possibilities of new questions and theories which can advance academia 
by making further scholarship possible. I look forward to seeing where this 
takes us and what others may make of it as the discipline evolves. We, as 
social scientists cannot however afford to dwell on our theories and rest on 
what laurels we might have, but instead need to find ways to further refine 
them so that they never fall into the trap of being dead dogmas. It is hoped 
that this thesis does this by presenting something that invigorates the 
sociology of religion in a manner that is intellectually stimulating and 
rewarding to the reader.  
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Appendix A – Newspeak: List of all variables used and their 
signifiers 
AGE – Age of respondent 
AGE2 – AGE squared 
BOYCOTT – Participated in a boycott in the last 5 years 
BUDDHIST – Buddhist 
CATHOLIC – Catholic  
CHARORG - Membership of a charitable or humanitarian organisation 
CLASS – Subjective social class 
CONFCHAR – Confidence in charitable and humanitarian organisations 
CONFENV – Confidence in the environmental movement 
CONFPARTY – Confidence in the political parties 
CULTORG – Membership of a cultural or educational organisation 
EDUC – Educational attainment 
ENVORG – Membership of an environmental organisation 
FEMALE – Gender  
HDI – Human development index (level of country modernisation) 
HINDU - Hindu 
IMPGOD – Subjective importance of GOD 
IMPREL – Subjective importance of religion 
JEW – Jewish 
MUSLIM – Muslim 
NONE – No denominational affiliation 
ORTHODOX – Orthodox 
OTHER – Other denominational affiliation 
PARTY – Membership of a political party 
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PETITION – Signed a petition in the last 5 years 
POL_IV – Polity IV measure of country democracy/autocracy 
POSTMAT – Post-material values 
PROTESTANT – Protestant 
PROTEST – Attended a lawful demonstration in the last 5 years 
RAS – Religion and state project (separation of country religion and state) 
RELATT – Individual’s frequency of religious attendance 
RELIGIOSITY – Religiosity of the individual 
RELORG – Membership of a religious organisation 
VOTE – Voted in the last general/presidential election 
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Appendix B – Validity testing of dependent variables 
Table 32: Logistic regressions of PARTY on CONFPARTY 
  
N 
 
 
β-CONFPARTY 
 
s.e. 
 
p-value 
 
pseudo R2 
 
Overall 
 
69873 
 
0.50*** 
 
0.11 
 
0.00 
 
0.03 
 
Sample specific 
     
Andorra 992 0.81*** 0.16 0.00 0.04 
Argentina 979 0.39** 0.15 0.01 0.01 
Australia 1301 0.29* 0.15 0.06 0.00 
Brazil 1469 0.50*** 0.10 0.00 0.03 
Bulgaria 965 0.87*** 0.17 0.00 0.06 
Burkina Faso 1270 0.25*** 0.07 0.00 0.01 
Canada 2041 0.43*** 0.09 0.00 0.01 
Chile 976 0.31** 0.11 0.01 0.01 
China 1703 0.41*** 0.11 0.00 0.01 
Colombia 2978 -0.01 0.09 0.89 0.00 
Cyprus 1039 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.00 
Ethiopia 1335 0.71*** 0.08 0.00 0.06 
Finland 992 1.03*** 0.14 0.00 0.07 
France 989 0.97*** 0.18 0.00 0.07 
Georgia 1325 1.44*** 0.35 0.00 0.11 
Germany 1982 0.76*** 0.14 0.00 0.03 
Ghana 1493 0.42*** 0.06 0.00 0.03 
Great Britain 961 0.48*** 0.14 0.00 0.02 
India 1596 0.32*** 0.06 0.00 0.02 
Indonesia 1869 0.22** 0.08 0.01 0.00 
Iran 2488 0.18* 0.09 0.05 0.00 
Italy 975 0.82*** 0.15 0.00 0.04 
Japan 960 0.81*** 0.18 0.00 0.04 
Jordan 929 0.33 0.35 0.35 0.01 
Malaysia 1199 0.28*** 0.09 0.00 0.01 
Mali 1195 0.51*** 0.06 0.00 0.05 
Mexico 1512 0.57*** 0.08 0.00 0.04 
Moldova 1028 0.61*** 0.13 0.00 0.04 
Morocco 1063 0.97*** 0.20 0.00 0.09 
Netherlands 980 1.04*** 0.19 0.00 0.06 
New Zealand 758 0.80*** 0.17 0.00 0.03 
Norway 1015 0.55*** 0.15 0.00 0.01 
Peru 1465 0.83*** 0.14 0.00 0.04 
Poland 921 0.24 0.19 0.21 0.00 
Romania 1684 0.53*** 0.16 0.00 0.02 
Russian Fed 1882 0.07 0.13 0.60 0.00 
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N 
 
 
β-CONFPARTY 
 
s.e. 
 
p-value 
 
pseudo R2 
Rwanda 1171 0.39*** 0.07 0.00 0.02 
Serbia 1166 1.06*** 0.13 0.00 0.08 
Slovenia 971 0.78*** 0.20 0.00 0.03 
South Africa 2908 0.41*** 0.04 0.00 0.02 
South Korea 1193 0.04 0.15 0.82 0.00 
Spain 1163 0.05 0.19 0.78 0.00 
Sweden 978 0.65*** 0.17 0.00 0.02 
Switzerland 1178 0.70*** 0.13 0.00 0.03 
Taiwan 1216 0.72*** 0.15 0.00 0.03 
Thailand 1509 0.74*** 0.10 0.00 0.04 
Trinidad & Tob 975 0.24** 0.12 0.04 0.00 
Turkey 1292 0.18 0.14 0.19 0.00 
Ukraine 864 0.63*** 0.16 0.00 0.03 
United States 1201 0.20** 0.10 0.04 0.00 
Uruguay 980 0.63*** 0.14 0.00 0.04 
Viet Nam 1409 0.22*** 0.12 0.08 0.00 
Zambia 1390 0.45*** 0.06 0.00 0.03 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
 
 
~ 293 ~ 
 
Table 33: Logistic regressions of RELORG on CONFREL 
  
N 
 
 
β-CONFREL 
 
s.e. 
 
pseudo R2 
 
Overall 
 
71510 
 
0.59*** 
 
0.01 
 
0.05 
 
Country Specific 
    
Andorra 1000 1.09*** 0.10 0.12 
Argentina 986 0.49*** 0.07 0.04 
Australia 1338 1.47*** 0.09 0.18 
Brazil 1492 0.62*** 0.07 0.05 
Bulgaria 955 1.01*** 0.22 0.08 
Burkina Faso 1449 0.41*** 0.06 0.02 
Canada 2092 0.75*** 0.06 0.07 
Chile 992 0.44*** 0.07 0.03 
China 1176 1.42*** 0.12 0.20 
Colombia 3013 0.42*** 0.04 0.02 
Cyprus 1032 0.81*** 0.11 0.08 
Ethiopia 1449 0.81*** 0.07 0.10 
Finland 999 1.14*** 0.11 0.11 
France 969 1.04*** 0.13 0.12 
Georgia 1379 0.54** 0.20 0.01 
Germany 1939 1.38*** 0.07 0.20 
Ghana 1530 0.84*** 0.11 0.06 
Great Britain 945 0.90*** 0.09 0.10 
India 1784 0.12* 0.06 0.00 
Indonesia 1954 0.18** 0.08 0.00 
Iran 2637 0.61*** 0.05 0.04 
Italy 990 0.88*** 0.11 0.07 
Japan 1001 2.77*** 0.23 0.38 
Jordan 1172 0.37 0.33 0.00 
Malaysia 1200 -0.03 0.09 0.00 
Mali 1391 0.49*** 0.09 0.02 
Mexico 1529 0.58*** 0.06 0.05 
Moldova 1038 0.76*** 0.09 0.07 
Morocco 1158 0.85*** 0.31 0.02 
Netherlands 916 1.54*** 0.11 0.25 
New Zealand 799 1.51*** 0.12 0.20 
Norway 1016 0.61*** 0.08 0.04 
Peru 1481 -0.10* 0.05 0.00 
Poland 988 0.44*** 0.09 0.02 
Romania 1764 0.81*** 0.15 0.03 
Russian Fed 1817 0.63 0.09 0.04 
Rwanda 1490 -0.12 0.10 0.00 
Serbia 1150 1.44*** 0.12 0.17 
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N 
 
 
β-CONFREL 
 
s.e. 
 
pseudo R2 
Slovenia 1011 0.89*** 0.09 0.10 
South Africa 2959 1.05*** 0.06 0.13 
South Korea 1191 1.06*** 0.08 0.14 
Spain 1182 1.02*** 0.09 0.13 
Sweden 978 0.74*** 0.09 0.06 
Switzerland 1209 0.88*** 0.08 0.09 
Taiwan 1221 1.09*** 0.11 0.10 
Thailand 1517 0.47*** 0.07 0.02 
Trinidad & Tob 992 0.39*** 0.08 0.02 
Turkey 1320 0.25 0.20 0.01 
Ukraine 883 1.20*** 0.14 0.11 
United States 1210 1.29*** 0.09 0.18 
Uruguay 992 1.02*** 0.08 0.17 
Viet Nam 1372 0.92*** 0.10 0.09 
Zambia 1463 1.24*** 0.17 0.12 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
  
 
 
~ 295 ~ 
 
Table 34: Logistic regressions of CHARORG on CONFCHAR 
  
N 
 
 
β-CONFCHAR 
 
 
s.e. 
 
pseudo R2 
 
Overall 
 
69695 
 
0.30*** 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
Country Specific 
    
Andorra 997 0.53*** 0.12 0.02 
Argentina 933 0.23* 0.12 0.00 
Australia 1322 0.49*** 0.09 0.02 
Brazil 1454 0.19** 0.08 0.00 
Bulgaria 863 0.12 0.27 0.00 
Burkina Faso 1186 -0.44*** 0.12 0.02 
Canada 2028 0.27*** 0.07 0.01 
Chile 955 0.41*** 0.09 0.02 
China 1278 0.28** 0.12 0.01 
Colombia 2922 0.36*** 0.08 0.01 
Cyprus 1028 0.33*** 0.11 0.01 
Egypt 2972 0.13 0.16 0.00 
Ethiopia 1398 0.96*** 0.08 0.10 
Finland 1000 0.45*** 0.11 0.02 
France 993 0.29*** 0.10 0.01 
Georgia 1180 0.49 0.58 0.01 
Germany 1894 0.64*** 0.11 0.03 
Ghana 1384 0.31*** 0.08 0.01 
Great Britain 963 0.50*** 0.10 0.02 
India 1085 0.07 0.06 0.00 
Indonesia 1815 0.58*** 0.07 0.03 
Iran 2587 0.34*** 0.06 0.01 
Italy 974 0.61*** 0.12 0.03 
Japan 837 0.88*** 0.23 0.04 
Jordan 1014 0.03 0.19 0.00 
Malaysia 1198 0.64*** 0.12 0.03 
Mali 1109 0.42*** 0.07 0.02 
Mexico 1504 0.24*** 0.07 0.01 
Moldova 1024 0.87*** 0.15 0.07 
Morocco 1015 0.26 0.16 0.01 
Netherlands 971 0.63*** 0.11 0.03 
Norway 1015 0.28** 0.10 0.01 
Peru 1419 0.21** 0.09 0.01 
Poland 889 0.11 0.14 0.00 
Romania 1395 0.46* 0.27 0.01 
Russian Fed 1706 0.14 0.12 0.00 
Rwanda 1368 0.20*** 0.07 0.01 
Serbia 1121 0.28 0.18 0.01 
Slovenia 996 0.58*** 0.11 0.03 
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N 
 
 
β-CONFCHAR 
 
 
s.e. 
 
pseudo R2 
South Africa 2723 0.03 0.05 0.00 
South Korea 1194 -0.02 0.14 0.00 
Spain 1140 0.80*** 0.15 0.04 
Sweden 985 0.59*** 0.10 0.03 
Switzerland 1205 0.48*** 0.09 0.02 
Taiwan 1212 0.54*** 0.11 0.02 
Thailand 1513 0.54*** 0.09 0.02 
Trinidad & Tob 968 -0.03 0.09 0.00 
Turkey 1280 0.24 0.21 0.00 
Ukraine 775 0.48** 0.19 0.02 
United States 1181 0.69*** 0.10 0.04 
Uruguay 966 0.44** 0.16 0.02 
viet nam 1425 0.44*** 0.12 0.01 
Zambia 1336 0.14** 0.06 0.00 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 35: Logistic regressions of ENVORG on CONFENV 
  
N 
 
 
β-CONFENV 
 
s.e. 
 
pseudo R2 
 
Overall 
 
69733 
 
0.38*** 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
Country specific 
    
Andorra 992 0.45*** 0.14 0.01 
Argentina 883 -0.05 0.13 0.00 
Australia 1294 0.51*** 0.12 0.02 
Brazil 1452 0.26** 0.13 0.01 
Bulgaria 792 0.11 0.35 0.00 
Burkina Faso 1197 -0.04 0.11 0.00 
Canada 2037 0.22*** 0.09 0.00 
Chile 953 -0.01 0.11 0.00 
China 1348 0.17 0.11 0.00 
Colombia 2797 0.55*** 0.10 0.03 
Cyprus 1031 0.28* 0.14 0.01 
Egypt 2753 0.25 0.21 0.00 
Ethiopia 1363 1.07*** 0.08 0.13 
Finland 989 0.98*** 0.17 0.06 
France 984 0.35** 0.13 0.01 
Georgia 1169 -0.65 0.60 0.02 
Germany 1923 1.00*** 0.16 0.06 
Ghana 1408 0.52*** 0.07 0.03 
Great Britain 956 0.37*** 0.12 0.01 
India 1262 0.31*** 0.06 0.02 
Indonesia 1793 0.32*** 0.07 0.01 
Iran 2554 0.19** 0.08 0.00 
Italy 953 0.47** 0.18 0.01 
Japan 922 0.08 0.22 0.00 
Jordan 989 0.60 0.58 0.02 
Malaysia 1198 0.20 0.14 0.00 
Mali 1155 0.47*** 0.07 0.03 
Mexico 1509 0.13 0.09 0.00 
Moldova 1009 0.26* 0.15 0.01 
Morocco 936 0.33 0.24 0.01 
Netherlands 975 0.84*** 0.14 0.05 
New Zealand 696 0.45*** 0.14 0.02 
Norway 1014 0.55** 0.21 0.01 
Peru 1394 0.06 0.11 0.00 
Poland 870 -0.06 0.18 0.00 
Romania 1354 0.51 0.40 0.01 
Russian Fed 1749 -0.09 0.14 0.00 
Rwanda 1300 0.52*** 0.09 0.03 
Serbia 1080 0.55** 0.24 0.02 
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N 
 
 
β-CONFENV 
 
s.e. 
 
pseudo R2 
Slovenia 963 0.32* 0.17 0.01 
South Africa 2662 0.05 0.06 0.00 
South Korea 1195 -0.02 0.15 0.00 
Spain 1133 0.56*** 0.19 0.02 
Sweden 985 1.04*** 0.19 0.05 
Switzerland 1199 0.64*** 0.11 0.03 
Taiwan 1212 0.59*** 0.19 0.02 
Thailand 1509 0.33*** 0.09 0.01 
Trinidad & Tob 942 0.03 0.10 0.00 
Turkey 1238 0.45 0.29 0.01 
Ukraine 847 0.36 0.22 0.01 
United States 1203 0.89*** 0.12 0.05 
Uruguay 971 0.44** 0.17 0.02 
Viet Nam 1401 0.45*** 0.14 0.01 
Zambia 1240 0.33*** 0.07 0.02 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix C – Re-estimated models on restricted samples 
Table 36: Re-estimated multilevel logistic regressions using restricted samples 
 ENVORG 6e 
(-Switzerland) 
PETITION 7g 
(-Turkey) 
BOYCOTT 6h 
(-Rwanda) 
BOYCOTT 7h 
(China, B.Faso, 
Uruguay) 
PROTEST 5i 
(-Morocco) 
 b/se b/se b/se b/se b/se 
CONSTANT -2.80*** -1.99*** -3.03*** -3.07*** -3.29*** 
 (0.19) (0.19) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) 
RELIGIOSITY 0.05 -0.08** -0.15*** -0.18*** -0.10* 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
CATHOLIC -0.04 0.03 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) 
PROTESTANT 0.07 0.05 -0.20*** -0.19*** -0.23*** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
ORTHODOX -0.40*** -0.05 -0.45*** -0.46*** -0.07 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.16) (0.16) (0.07) 
MUSLIM -0.13 -0.14 0.02 -0.04 -0.19*** 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.14) (0.13) (0.07) 
JEW 0.11 0.37* 0.36 0.37 0.46** 
 (0.29) (0.20) (0.25) (0.24) (0.21) 
HINDU -0.17 -0.42*** -0.56*** -0.57*** -0.42*** 
 (0.25) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) 
BUDDHIST 0.09 0.03 0.10 0.09 -0.01 
 (0.08) (0.13) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
OTHER 0.06 -0.01 -0.18*** -0.18*** -0.15* 
 (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.09) 
FEMALE -0.10*** -0.04 -0.24*** -0.23*** -0.28*** 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) 
AGE 0.27* 0.59*** 0.41** 0.39** -0.35** 
 (0.16) (0.20) (0.16) (0.16) (0.16) 
AGE2 -0.02*** -0.06*** -0.06*** -0.06***  
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)  
EDUC MID 0.20*** 0.40*** 0.49*** 0.48*** 0.35*** 
 (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) 
EDUC HIGH 0.41*** 0.75*** 0.89*** 0.86*** 0.75*** 
 (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) 
CLASS 2 0.16*** 0.13* 0.02 0.02 0.17** 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) 
CLASS 3 0.24*** 0.26*** 0.09 0.10 0.19*** 
 (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
CLASS 4 0.38*** 0.45*** 0.18** 0.18** 0.18** 
 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) 
CLASS 5 0.46** 0.35** 0.06 0.09 0.13 
 (0.19) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) 
POSTMAT 0.15*** 0.23*** 0.35*** 0.34*** 0.34*** 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI -4.01*** 1.91** -1.98*** -1.69*** -3.82*** 
 (0.89) (0.85) (0.58) (0.59) (0.60) 
RAS 1.26 3.60*** 2.80** 2.15* 1.96*** 
 (0.79) (0.78) (1.14) (1.13) (0.65) 
POL_IV 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.12*** 
 (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
HDI*REL 0.29*  0.31*   
 (0.17)  (0.19)   
RAS*REL  0.34  0.55**  
  (0.21)  (0.23)  
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Appendix D – Random effects from Chapters 4, 5 & 6 
Table 37: Multilevel logistic regression of VOTE: Random effects 
 Model  
1a 
Model  
2a 
Model  
3a 
Model  
4a 
Model  
5a 
Model  
6a 
Model  
7a 
N1 49402 49402 49402 49402 49402 49402 49402 
N2 39 39 39 39 39 39 39 
Constant 0.67*** 0.80*** 0.81*** 0.79*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 0.71*** 
Religiosity  0.13*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
Covariance  -0.13 -0.14 -0.08 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
VPC 0.17 0.20 0.20 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 38: Multilevel logistic regression of PARTY: Random effects 
 Model 
1b 
Model 
2b 
Model 
3b 
Model 
4b 
Model 
5b 
Model 
6b 
Model 
7b 
N1 58683 58683 58683 58683 58683 58683 58683 
N2 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
Constant 1.20*** 1.24*** 1.30*** 1.42*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 0.84*** 
Religiosity  0.11*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05*** 0.07*** 
Covariance  -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
VPC 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.30 0.20 0.20 0.20 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 39: Multilevel logistic regression of RELORG: Random effects 
 Model 
1c 
Model 
2c 
Model 
3c 
Model 
4c 
Model 
5c 
Model 
6c 
Model 
7c 
N1 59152 59152 59152 59152 59152 59152 59152 
N2 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
CONSTANT 2.57*** 2.85*** 2.48*** 2.48*** 1.73*** 1.72*** 1.67*** 
RELIGIOSITY  0.47*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.33*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 
Covariance  0.16 -0.04 -0.04 -0.17 -0.16 -0.12 
VPC 0.44 0.46 0.43 0.43 0.34 0.34 0.34 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 40: Multilevel logistic regression of CHARORG: Random effects 
 Model 
1d 
Model 
2d 
Model 
3d 
Model 
4d 
Model 
5d 
Model 
6d 
Model 
7d 
N1 58666 58666 58666 58666 58666 58666 58666 
N2 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
CONSTANT 1.25*** 1.38*** 1.21*** 1.25*** 1.03*** 1.01*** 1.03*** 
RELIGIOSITY  0.10*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.10*** 0.06*** 0.10*** 
Covariance  -0.04 -0.06 -0.11 -0.08 -0.05 -0.08 
VPC 0.28 0.30 0.27 0.28 0.24 0.24 0.24 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 41: Multilevel logistic regression of ENVORG: Random effects 
 Model 
1e 
Model 
2e 
Model 
3e 
Model 
4e 
Model 
5e 
Model 
6e 
Model 
7e 
N1 58686 58686 58686 58686 58686 58686 58686 
N2 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
CONSTANT 1.46*** 1.45*** 1.34*** 1.41*** 0.85*** 0.85*** 0.86*** 
RELIGIOSITY  0.08*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.07 0.07*** 
Covariance  -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.02 0.01 
VPC 0.31 0.31 0.29 0.30 0.21 0.21 0.21 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
 
Table 42: Multilevel logistic regression of CULTORG: Random effects 
 Model 
1f 
Model 
2f 
Model 
3f 
Model 
4f 
Model 
5f 
Model 
6f 
Model 
7f 
N1 58798 58798 58798 58798 58798 58798 58798 
N2 46 46 46 46 46 46 46 
CONSTANT 1.20*** 1.23*** 1.15*** 1.19*** 0.90*** 0.89*** 0.87*** 
RELIGIOSITY  0.07*** 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.05*** 
Covariance  0.04 0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 
VPC 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.21 0.21 0.21 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 43: Multilevel logistic regression of PETITION: Random effects 
 Model 
1g 
Model 
2g 
Model 
3g 
Model 
4g 
Model 
5g 
Model 
6g 
Model 
7g 
N1 46184 46184 46184 46184 46184 46184 46184 
N2 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
CONSTANT 1.78*** 1.67*** 1.61*** 1.56*** 1.15*** 1.11*** 1.14*** 
RELIGIOSITY  0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.03*** 0.05*** 
Covariance  -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12 -0.08 -0.11 
VPC 0.35 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.26 0.25 0.26 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 44: Multilevel logistic regression of BOYCOTT: Random effects 
 Model 
1h 
Model 
2h 
Model 
3h 
Model 
4h 
Model 
5h 
Model 
6h 
Model 
7h 
N1 44681 44681 44681 44681 44681 44681 44681 
N2 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 
CONSTANT 1.46*** 1.44*** 1.45*** 1.41*** 1.14*** 1.13*** 1.14*** 
RELIGIOSITY  0.14*** 0.14*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 0.10*** 
Covariance  -0.18 -0.17 -0.13 -0.12 -0.11 -0.12 
VPC 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30 0.26 0.26 0.26 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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Table 45: Multilevel logistic regression of PROTEST: Random effects 
 Model 
1i 
Model 
2i 
Model 
3i 
Model 
4i 
Model 
5i 
Model 
6i 
Model 
7i 
N1 43867 43867 43867 43867 43867 43867 43867 
N2 40 40 40 40 40 40 40 
CONSTANT 1.21*** 1.20*** 1.21*** 1.28*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 0.83*** 
RELIGIOSITY  0.17*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 0.15*** 
Covariance  -0.16 -0.16 -0.16 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 
VPC 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.20 0.20 0.20 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
 
Table 46: Re-estimated multilevel logistic regressions using restricted samples: 
Random effects 
 ENVORG  
6e 
PETITION 
7g 
BOYCOTT 
6h 
BOYCOTT 
7h 
PROTEST  
5i 
N1 57552 45952 43388 41860 42839 
N2 45 40 40 38 39 
CONSTANT 0.83*** 0.99*** 1.12*** 1.20*** 0.81*** 
RELIGIOSITY 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.15*** 
Covariance 0.03 -0.07 -0.09 -0.13 -0.16 
VPC 0.20 0.23 0.25 0.27 0.20 
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
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